Orthodox Christianity and Political Liberty:

The following is Gregg Frazer's response to Positive Liberty commenter Andy Craig's thoughts on the Babka/Frazer dialog. I add some brief comments below:

Mr. Craig:

I am sorry that you have rejected Christianity, and I would like to clear up a couple of things.

Biblical Christianity is authoritarian in the sense that God has established various authority structures and cares deeply whether His people respect what He’s established. It is not authoritarian in the sense that it requires an authoritarian political system. There is nothing about Christianity that would keep a believer from enjoying living in a “world of individual liberty.” Christians can flourish under freedom just as much as can non-Christians.

Also, let me respectfully suggest that you’re missing the point in I Samuel 8. The people did not “convince” God to do “something He didn’t want.” First, you’ll notice that verse 6 says it was displeasing in SAMUEL’S sight — not God’s. Second, God isn’t “convinced” to give them a king — He turns them over to their own foolishness to allow them to discover that they would be much better off if they did not reject God and the blessings He has in store for them. Third, in the rest of the chapter, God is warning them of the consequences of their wrong desires — which He knows because He is omniscient, etc.

If you’re concerned about liberty, you should be happy with this incident. God allows them to experience the disastrous results of their choice to reject Him.

I would be interested in other places in which you believe the Bible is contradictory — because I do not believe it is contradictory in any way.

I am also intrigued by your denial of the authoritativeness of the Bible. Do you know of any other authority which accurately predicted hundreds of events in great detail hundreds of years in advance? Also, I suspect you find science to be an impeccable authority — despite the scientific errors which are discovered nearly every day. Have you yet figured out what you should/should not eat in order to avoid cancer? I can’t keep up with the conflicting “facts.”

Finally, I agree with you that Christians frequently act inconsistently with the teachings of their faith — but I see that as a bad thing — tragic, really.

As a political libertarian (and a non-Christian) if I wanted to argue the case for political libertarianism to a biblical orthodox Christian I would not argue the Bible endorses or is the source of the concept of political liberty as found in the Declaration of Independence (it does/is not). Rather I would argue the Bible is compatible with the idea of political liberty. And it makes good sense for orthodox Christians to endorse the concept. If, in the grand scheme of things, it's most important for Christians to "save souls" by missionary or conversion efforts (as opposed to fighting a "culture war") then it makes sense that an evangelical Christian chiefly be concerned that he has his political/religious liberty to proselytize effectively and in fact save souls.

In a closed, controlled society where just about everyone believed in the same kind of orthodox theology, it makes sense, from an orthodox Christian perspective, to forbid heresy, if it were just a matter of setting mousetraps to keep the house free of mice, as it were. Samuel Rutherford, though he may have been mistaken about Romans 13 on strict biblical grounds, rejected religious liberty on grounds entirely compatible with the Bible:

“It was justice, not cruelty, yea mercy to the Church of God, to take away the life of Servetus, who used such spirituall and diabolick cruelty to many thousand soules, whom he did pervert, and by his Booke, does yet lead into perdition.”

– Samuel Rutherfurd, “A Free Disputation Against Pretended Liberty of Conscience.” (1649).

However, the experience of religious disagreements within Christendom made such a political-religious consensus nigh well impossible. In short, if you give the civil magistrate the power to forbid religious heresy or enforce orthodoxy, chances are, you'll end up on the receiving end as a "heretic." Not only do Roman Catholics and evangelical/reformed Protestants irreconcilably differ on religious truths, but within Protestantism, the sects differ in meaningful ways. Even among the "sola scriptura" orthodox Trinitarian understanding of Protestantism, sects differ in such serious ways that if we didn't recognize religious/political liberty, dominant sects would use the power of the state to persecute dissident sects. Indeed, the rationale that I have just laid out is the story of how religious/political liberty came to Christendom. It wasn't a matter of "finding" these concepts in the Bible or the longstanding traditional understanding thereof, but rather through experience of warring and blood shedding among sects that concepts of religious and political liberty emerged and gained hold in Western Society as a way to "keep the peace," as it were.

Frazer Replies to Babka on Romans 13 and Revolt:

The following is Gregg Frazer's latest response to Jim Babka's thoughts on Romans 13, Interposition and Revolt.

Mr. Babka:

The reason I talked about Romans 13 being read “poetically or allegorically” is because my position was identified in your post as “strict literalist.” So, since you identified it as such and obviously took issue with it, I assumed that you opposed a literally reading. My mistake, apparently.

To assuage your curiosity, I chose not to quote verses 3 & 4 because I did not consider them to be relevant to the immediate issue at hand — WHETHER we should be subject to government. Verses 3 & 4 are part of Paul’s argument as to WHY we should be subject, but they do not address WHETHER we should be subject — verses 1 & 2 answer that question clearly.

Since you are curious about my view of verses 3 & 4:
Verses 3 & 4 describe what governing authorities ARE — not what they SHOULD be. Paul says “rulers ARE not a cause of fear for good behavior” and government “IS a minister of God to you for good” and it “IS a minister of God, an avenger who brings wrath upon the one who practices evil.” He is not listing characteristics which must (in the eye of the individual beholder) be achieved in order to count something as a legitimate governing authority. He was already crystal clear in the first two verses that the fact of their existence proves that they are legitimate.

However, NO GOVERNMENT IS PERFECT — AND SOME ARE BETTER THAN OTHERS. So, while ALL governments restrain evil, all are run by fallen human beings and, therefore, ALL will also commit evil to some extent. [Just as Kobe Bryant and I could play one-on-one and both of us would be playing basketball, but one of us would be much better at it] To say (as do Rutherford and Mayhew and, apparently, you) that a government which does evil loses its legitimacy is to say that EVERY government is illegitimate, because they all commit evil at some level at some time. It is also to add something to the text (as I mentioned) which is not there. Paul never says ANYthing about ANY government being illegitimate in Romans 13, however. In the 1930s, the country with the lowest crime rate in the world was Hitler’s Germany. In the 1970s, the country with the world’s lowest crime rate was the Soviet Union. So, despite the evil being perpetrated by these governments, they were, nonetheless, restraining evil, as well.

Your position also begs the question of how much evil a government must do before it loses its legitimacy — what it the limit/boundary? Is it one really bad act or two pretty bad ones or three slightly bad ones or ….? How do you know the limit/boundary? From where do you get it? The Bible doesn’t give a limit because it doesn’t recognize such an idea.

Re: “even Calvin agreed that the ruler was forbidden from tyranny” — yes, but he said that it was up to GOD to punish the tyrant, not man! That’s an option that neither you nor Rutherford/Mayhew seem to recognize. Just because a ruler is a tyrant, it does not follow that we are authorized/allowed to remove him. The question is not whether a ruler will be judged for being a tyrant, the issue is WHO HAS THE AUTHORITY to judge him. Calvin and I say that God has not given that authority to man — He retains it for Himself.

Re: “ALL RULERS WERE PRIMARILY ACCOUNTABLE TO THE LAW — Lex Rex.” I’m glad you identified the source here — the source is Rutherford, not Paul (or God).

An actual plain reading demonstrates that the commands in these verses apply to “every person” — which is what it says! As for your question concerning magistrates, to them it would mean that if there was an authority above them (what you’d call the “higher magistrate”), then they must be subject to them. By definition, your “lower magistrates” have an authority over them — so there’s no “terrible” confusion — they are to be scared of that higher authority!

Re your concept of Interposition: you say that lower magistrates are not required to obey an “unlawful order from a higher magistrate” — but THERE’S NO SUCH THING, according to verses 1 & 2! You then say that the lower magistrate is more accountable to the law than he is the king — this is where you’re adding to Scripture what simply is not there. You’re citing Rutherford’s ideas here, not the Holy Spirit’s (through Paul). Where is the law even mentioned in Romans 13?

If you mean that lower magistrates are not required to obey an order which requires them to disobey God, then I wholeheartedly agree with you. And not only lower magistrates, but no Christian should obey an order which requires disobedience to God.

BUT such a command is not “unlawful” and it does not make the government or ruler issuing such an order illegitimate. Paul never even hints at such a notion. Why did Jesus affirm Pilate’s authority over Him in John 19:11? Why didn’t he say that, as a representative of an oppressive, militaristic, godless empire which had conquered Israel, Pilate had no legitimate authority over the common people — much less over the Son of God in human flesh?

The real problem, though, is in conflating disobedience and rebellion. In one paragraph, you’re talking about a basis for disobedience and in the next, you’re talking about rebellion. Do you not recognize a difference between them? I agree, as I said above, that Christians should not OBEY an order which commands disobedience to God (Acts 5:29), but that does not legitimize REBELLION — whether led by a lower magistrate or not.

Throughout Scripture, the same principle can be seen: we must obey the government unless/until it commands disobedience to God; then, we must disobey, but REMAIN IN SUBJECTION (that is, still recognize the government’s authority) — usually by taking the punishment. That’s why Shadrach & his pals went into the fiery furnace and Daniel went into the lion’s den and why Paul wrote Romans 13 from jail! There are, however, NO examples of rebellion approved by God in Scripture. I’m sorry you didn’t like my comments re the Exodus, but I thought it relevant because it WAS referenced by the Founders, unlike your Interposition theory.

The key flaw in the Interposition notion is, as I explained but you did not comment upon, that Calvin gave very specific historical examples of what he meant — lower magistrates who WITHIN THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT had the LEGAL AUTHORITY to “restrain the licentiousness of kings” and could do so “in accordance with their duty.” Calvin never says ANYTHING about rebellion or revolting on the part of the lower magistrates. He gave specific historical examples so that he would not be misunderstood on this point — but Interposition supporters ignore those examples and their implications and INSERT into Calvin’s discussion the idea of rebellion/revolution.

You ask “If a revolution is successful, and it results in a new government, wouldn’t that government also be established by God?” The answer, of course, is YES! It is irrelevant to the fundamental question, though — it has nothing to do with whether the revolution itself was right — unless you believe that the end justifies the means. Paul didn’t (Romans 3:8). So, if you’re asking me whether people living in the United States (like you and I) must be subject to the U.S. government, even though it came to be via revolution, the answer is: of course. Governments come into being through various means, but those means are irrelevant to the question of subjection. Paul was writing to Romans living under a ruler who likely poisoned his predecessor.

I wholeheartedly agree with you that what matters is what’s biblical — not what’s Calvinist. But when we discuss an idea which has no biblical basis, but supposedly originated with Calvin and is ascribed to him, we’re stuck talking about Calvin. The Bible doesn’t talk about “interposition” or “lower magistrates” or anyone’s right to rebel. I take up defense of Calvin because I believe he would not want to be identified with an idea he would find abhorrent.

I DID NOT DEFINE WHO IS OR IS NOT A CALVINIST or claim that people who call themselves Calvinists are not Calvinists! I denied that AN IDEA was Calvinist in the sense that Calvin taught it. He did not.

Apparently, you (like Mr. Van Dyke) have misunderstood my position regarding Protestant Christian influence in the Founding era. You seem to think that I reject any influence whatsoever by Christianity – which I do not do. I call your attention to the definition of my term, theistic rationalism: it was “a hybrid belief system mixing elements of natural religion, Christianity, and rationalism; with rationalism as the predominant element.” I further argue that adherents of theistic rationalism were raised in a nominally Christian environment, but were educated in Enlightenment thought – and that they believed that these three elements would generally complement one another. But when conflict between them could not be resolved or ignored, reason must play the decisive role. So, adherents were willing to define God in whatever way their reason indicated and to jettison Christian beliefs which did not conform to reason. But they retained those Christian beliefs which they considered reasonable. I argue as vehemently against the notion that they were rank secularists, atheist, or deists as I do against the notion that they were Christians. In fact, I developed my term specifically to separate what they believed from deism and secularism as much as from Christianity.

Re our 2006 dialogue, please report what I said accurately. I did NOT say that Locke was not influenced by Rutherford. I said that there is NO EVIDENCE that Locke was influenced by Rutherford — and I have yet to see any, supplied by you or anyone else.

King George referred to the Presbyterian Parson’s Rebellion because there were many Presbyterian parsons involved in drumming up support for it. The question is HOW were they drumming up support? I said that Mayhew and West and others replaced Romans 13 with their own ideas, but they did not make the Interposition argument. No one in the Founding era made the lower magistrate argument — they followed Mayhew’s justification which allowed for all to participate in rebellion, not just lower magistrates.

Again, I did NOT say that what the Founders DID cannot be compared favorably to the Interposition idea in practice. I said that they did not mention such an idea or make a case for the Revolution based upon it. [I repeat: if someone has knowledge of a citation of this notion in the Revolutionary literature, I would appreciate seeing it -- I am interested to see if anyone at the time saw things in those terms or if, as I suspect, supporters of the idea simply read it back into their thinking] I will say that what they did bears far greater resemblance to the sources they DID CITE, such as Locke, than one they did not cite: Interposition.

Yes, Mr. Babka, God clearly used the American Revolution to bring about the government of this area which was ordained in His plan. Why would you think I would be hesitant to affirm such a thing? God often uses sinful acts of men to accomplish His purpose. [Judas's betrayal, Pharaoh's hard heart, etc.]

The “Doctrine of Interposition” was NOT “discovered by John Calvin,” but rather discovered by “his successors” (if, by that, you mean those who claim to be Calvinists — and I don’t care what you want to call them). The American Revolution looks a lot like Interposition in action to those who want to see Interposition in action. To others — AND TO THE REVOLUTIONARIES THEMSELVES — it looks a lot like Lockean theory.

Since you’ve discussed what amuses you about one of my points, I’ll say what amuses me. You can, in one paragraph, say that “what matters here is not what is Calvinist or not; what matters is what is Biblical or not” and then conclude that what the Bible (Romans 13) clearly says is not true “so long as it’s based” on a doctrine “discovered by John Calvin.”

Your final remark about me ignoring evidence concerning whether Calvinists were true to Calvin on this question makes me really curious to see what I’ve missed. I trust that it will be some explication of the historical examples given by Calvin to make sure that he wasn’t misunderstood. But wait, I’ve already investigated those in depth, so that can’t be it — because it’s something I’ve “ignored.” I suspect it will be quotes from Calvin saying that rulers are not free to be tyrannical — but that can’t be, either, because I’ve read Calvin in that regard and in context. So, I know that he said tyrants will be punished — but that we have no authority to do it.

So, you’ve got my curiosity stirred, Mr. Babka.

Potential readers: I apologize for the length, but without it I couldn’t answer most of Mr. Babka’s arguments/points without being misunderstood. I suspect I’ll be misunderstood at points, anyway.

Babka Replies to Frazer on Romans 13 and Interposition

Jim Babka has replied to Gregg Frazer's criticisms of his remarks on Calvinism, Romans 13 and Interposition. You can read it at Positive Liberty here.

The More Things Change The More They Stay The Same, Part II:

I've blogged quite a bit how orthodox Trinitarian Christians (of the Protestant and Roman Catholic bent) tend to define Christianity as synonymous with orthodoxy. A lot has changed in America culturally and religiously since the Founding era. But this is not one of them. Here is the latest example from an article on WorldNetDaily entitled Focus on the Family website yanks Glenn Beck interview. From the article:

Focus on the Family, the evangelical organization founded by Dr. James Dobson, has removed from its website an interview with former CNN host Glenn Beck following complaints over the politically conservative TV personality's Mormon faith.

The original article about Beck's best-selling new book, "The Christmas Sweater," appeared on the ministry's CitizenLink website on Dec. 19, but three days later an article published on ChristianNewsWire criticized Focus for promoting a Mormon "as a Christian."

"While Glenn's social views are compatible with many Christian views, his beliefs in Mormonism are not," writes Steve McConkey of Underground Apologetics on ChristianNewsWire. "The CitizenLink story does not mention Beck's Mormon faith, however the story makes it look as if Beck is a Christian who believes in the essential doctrines of the faith."

FOF are using the test of orthodoxy to exclude Mormons from the concept of "Christianity."

Richard Price, who profoundly influenced the American Founding, and himself an Arian who believed Jesus a divine but created and subordinate being, discussed this dynamic during the Founding era. What follows is from his widely read address Observations on the Importance of the American Revolution, indeed an address that George Washington "read with much pleasure."

Price says a number of interesting things in the address. First, he identifies as a Christian and promotes Christianity:

When Christianity, that first and best of all the means of human improvement, was first preached it was charged with turning the world upside down.

But he also slams the Trinity and its inclusion as an essential doctrine which the clergy must read and to which the people must assent:

Perhaps nothing more shocking to reason and humanity ever made a part of a religious system than the damning clauses in the Athanasian creed and yet the obligation of the clergy to declare assent to this creed, and to read it as a part of the public devotion, remains.

Then in the context of arguing religious liberty and equality for all (not just "Christians"), Price asserts:

Montesquieu probably was not a Christian. Newton and Locke were not Trinitarians and therefore not Christians according to the commonly received ideas of Christianity. Would the United States, for this reason, deny such men, were they living, all places of trust and power among them?

Understanding this dynamic -- that Americans were divided over how properly to understand "Christianity" -- is essential for understanding the political theological problem of the American Founding. The Founders solved it by taking Trinitarian Christianity out of politics and replacing it with "religion" in general, or some more generic kind of "Christianity" that would include basically anything that terms itself "Christianity," without having to meet any kind of theological test. Hence are the Mormons Christian? Yes. Why? Because they call themselves Christian. That's what "Americanism" as the Founding Fathers delivered it to us is all about. That the Mormons didn't exist during the Founding is irrelevant to my point. Substitute for "Mormons" Arians, Socinians, theological Universalists, and the logic stands.

New York Times on America's Religious Moderation:

Their article is entitled "Heaven for the Godless?" Here is a taste:

In June, the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life published a controversial survey in which 70 percent of Americans said that they believed religions other than theirs could lead to eternal life.

This threw evangelicals into a tizzy. After all, the Bible makes it clear that heaven is a velvet-roped V.I.P. area reserved for Christians. Jesus said so: “I am the way, the truth and the life: no man cometh unto the Father, but by me.” But the survey suggested that Americans just weren’t buying that.

The evangelicals complained that people must not have understood the question. The respondents couldn’t actually believe what they were saying, could they?

So in August, Pew asked the question again. (They released the results last week.) Sixty-five percent of respondents said — again — that other religions could lead to eternal life. But this time, to clear up any confusion, Pew asked them to specify which religions. The respondents essentially said all of them.

And they didn’t stop there. Nearly half also thought that atheists could go to heaven — dragged there kicking and screaming, no doubt — and most thought that people with no religious faith also could go.

What on earth does this mean?

This is America's Founders religious vision in action.

The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same:

I remember to have heard Dr. Priestley say, that if all England would candidly examine themselves, and confess, they would find that Unitarianism was really the religion of all;...

-- Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, August 22, 1813.

At American Creation we are glad to have on board the Rev. Gary Kowalski, minister to the First Unitarian Universalist Society of Burlington, Vermont and author of Revolutionary Spirits: The Enlightened Faith of America's Founding Fathers (BlueBridge 2008). In the comments to his first post he discusses Thomas Jefferson's prediction to Benjamin Waterhouse in 1822 "that there is not a young man now living in the United States who will not die an Unitarian." Rev. Kowalski notes Jefferson "was wrong, but what if he had been right?" Well, Jefferson was wrong in one respect: Not "everyone" is a Unitarian in America today or became one when he predicted they would. Also Jefferson might have meant officially "Unitarian" in Church membership (which ironically enough, Jefferson was not, even though he embraced the "unitarian" identity). Jefferson might have meant the Trinitarian Churches (like the Anglican/Episcopal one he was formally affiliated with) would officially adopt Unitarian doctrines, which they have not. The official Unitarian Churches never became dominant in America during the 19th Century and presently are fairly small.

However, in the sense that Jefferson speaks of Priestley asking Christian men to candidly examine what they really believe and discover it really is "unitarianism" after all, I think most self identified "Christians" of today might qualify as would perhaps a majority during the Founding era.

It's doubtful that a majority of the population during the American Founding were members of orthodox Trinitarian Churches, thought of themselves as "regenerate" or "born-again" and devoutly believed in orthodox Trinitarian doctrine. In "The Churching Of America, 1776-2005: Winners And Losers In Our Religious Economy," authors Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, carefully following census data, documented that only 17% of the American population belonged to a church and more folks were taverns on Saturday nights than in churches on Sunday mornings. This data have been disputed and lack of orthodox religiosity is not the only explanation for such low church membership. However the notion that the Christian America apologists spout that huge majorities were evangelical/born-again/orthodox Trinitarian Christians is wishful thinking with little support in the historical record.

The dominant creed of most of today's younger Americans was discussed in this article from the Christian Post by R. Albert Mohler, Jr. It dissected a survey of younger folks, and labeled their creed, "Moralistic Therapeutic Deism--the New American Religion." In reading the article, I noted nothing new about this creed, as it looked very similar to what America's Founders believed. Indeed, that this religion was termed a type of "Deism" -- a religion associated with the 18th Century -- contradicts its description as "new." And though the survey was of the young, I really didn't see it as differing too much from the nominal Christianity or deism of folks of all ages.

The article reports:

When Christian Smith and his fellow researchers with the National Study of Youth and Religion at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill took a close look at the religious beliefs held by American teenagers, they found that the faith held and described by most adolescents came down to something the researchers identified as "Moralistic Therapeutic Deism."

As described by Smith and his team, Moralistic Therapeutic Deism consists of beliefs like these: 1. "A god exists who created and ordered the world and watches over human life on earth." 2. "God wants people to be good, nice, and fair to each other, as taught in the Bible and by most world religions." 3. "The central goal of life is to be happy and to feel good about oneself." 4. "God does not need to be particularly involved in one's life except when God is needed to resolve a problem." 5. "Good people go to heaven when they die."

The more I think about it, the stronger I conclude that what's described above as "Moralistic Therapeutic Deism," the sub-silencio unitarianism that Jefferson/Priestley alluded to in the above quotation, is actually the dominant belief system of those (not just the "younger") who call themselves "Christians" both today and during the Founding era. Evangelicals especially should understand this as their own religion teaches true Christianity as a "narrow path"!

This struck me especially the other night when I was speaking to a family member by marriage, one whom I don't know too well, a smart, well educated businessman who does quite well for himself and his family and a lifelong member of the "Roman Catholic" club. We discussed my blogs, my interest in religion and our religious beliefs. He believed in God, the afterlife was open to the supernatural and called/thought of himself as a "Christian" and a "Roman Catholic." Yet, when I asked him specifically about the Trinity, eternal damnation, the infallibility of the Bible, and his Church's official teachings, he expressed skepticism, doubt, or disbelief. He seemed fairly socially libertarian on various lifestyle issues.

But the rub is that these people don't think of themselves as "deists," "unitarians," "theistic rationalists" or "heretics," certainly not "infidels!" They think of themselves as "Christians" in some sense. 80% of the American population today presently self define as Christians as did (one survey shows) 98% did during the Founding era.

It's true that Jefferson et al. had to keep their religion on the down low. Washington and Madison were so good at hiding their religious cards that they leave much room today for debating exactly what it was they believed.

I think the major difference between the Founding era and today was that the forces of "religious correctness" (the "orthodox") had a great deal more social and institutional power that forced heterodoxy on the down low. That they had the power to keep the masses in line and the heterodox elite on the down low doesn't necessarily mean they had a nation that was statically majority orthodox in its personal beliefs.

The elite philosophical class of the Founding era, (the "thinkers" like Jefferson, Adams, Paine, etc.) thought long and hard about these theological issues and rejected orthodoxy out of hand, sometimes bitterly so. The common man just didn't seem to care too much. That his minister preached orthodox doctrines in which he might not really believe (or fully understand) didn't much concern him. Author John Derbyshire once noted something along the lines of "the lazy Christian mind is reflexively 'deist.'" (See Michael and Jana Novak's "Washington's God," p. 160. The exact quote is theirs and paraphrases Derbyshire.)

Very few folks during the Founding era (at least openly) like Thomas Paine or Ethan Allen embraced a "non-Christian" form of Deism that rejected going to church, the Christian identity. These "non-Christian Deists" wanted nothing to do with the Christians' Jesus, Church or the Bible. Yet, many back then as today who were formally associated with a Christian Church and a Christian sect in an identificatory sense held to beliefs that the orthodox of today would term "Deism," "heresy," "infidelity" or something else (when trying to come up with the right labels the orthodox tend not to include "Christian" in the label. Hence Dr. Gregg Frazer's "theistic rationalism," or the term "Moralistic Therapeutic Deism" as discussed in the Christian Post). When asked to define the "Deism" that dominated the key Founders, Richard Brookhiser termed it something like "active-Christ form Deism," meaning these "Deists" 1) believed in an active Providence, and 2) at least somewhat regularly worshipped in Christian Churches.

Albert Mohler describes how to tell a "real Christian" from this "other" system:

They argue that this distortion of Christianity has taken root not only in the minds of individuals, but also "within the structures of at least some Christian organizations and institutions."

How can you tell? "The language, and therefore experience, of Trinity, holiness, sin, grace, justification, sanctification, church, . . . and heaven and hell appear, among most Christian teenagers in the United States at the very least, to be supplanted by the language of happiness, niceness, and an earned heavenly reward."

And indeed this exclusivist language of orthodoxy is conspicuously missing from the key Founding Fathers' God talk. They either, like Jefferson, J. Adams and Franklin explicitly rejected it, or like Washington, Madison, Wilson, G. Morris, and Hamilton totally ignored it but talked of God and sometimes "Christianity" along more generic lines. As Alexander Hamilton described his own version of this system (and keep in mind Hamilton wasn't even a member of a Church when he made this statement) in 1779 when describing what he looked for in a wife:

In politics I am indifferent what side she may be of. I think I have arguments that will easily convert her to mine. As to religion a moderate stock will satisfy me. She must believe in God and hate a saint.

But as to fortune, the larger stock of that the better. You know my temper and circumstances and will therefore pay special attention in the treaty. Though I run no risk of going to Purgatory for my avarice, yet as money is an essential ingredient to happiness in this world, as I have not much of my own, and as I am very little calculated to get more either by my address or industry, it must needs be that my wife, if I get one, bring at least a sufficiency to administer to her own extravagancies.

A religious "moderate" who believes in God but hates a saint. The language of "Trinity, holiness, sin, grace, justification, sanctification, church, . . . and heaven and hell" completely absent. I included some of his other thoughts from the letter for context. Hamilton was smart and realized he could convert his wife to his politics, but doesn't seem concerned with converting his wife from a generic "moderate" religion to "real Christianity." He seems more concerned that his wife have a fat pocketbook. He also mentioned something about "Purgatory." The theistic rationalists believed in a Protestant Purgatory where bad folks are temporarily punished, but eventually saved. The orthodox, with rare exception, believe in Hell period. The orthodox evangelicals who want to claim Hamilton as a "Christian" during this era certainly don't believe in "Purgatory."

All that said, the debate continues. Does this widely held, long believed in creed of those who profess to be "Christians" but rejects or ignores "experience, of Trinity, holiness, sin, grace, justification, sanctification, church, . . . and heaven and hell," qualify as "Christianity"? And if not, what then do we term it?

Frazer Responds to Van Dyke:

Gregg Frazer emails me this response to Tom Van Dyke's criticisms of his commentary:

Mr. Van Dyke: you continue to find my term idiosyncratic and unhelpful -- I suppose I shall have to try to muddle on without your approval.

Re the "religious-political landscape" issue: if you read my dissertation, you'd see evidence that it was also the political theology of the patriotic preachers and other educated elites -- not just the few key Founders.

It might also interest you to know that I did not conveniently select the eight key Founders -- they were selected by my dissertation committee chair because they were primarily responsible for the two founding documents.

Once again, speaking of begging the question, the Founders themselves never spoke of the "imago Dei" -- at least I point to what THEY claimed were their influences and sources.

Re your explanation of why they did not mention Christian sources: let me get this straight -- they did not know that they lived in an atmosphere influenced by Christian concepts, so they cannot be expected to include them in a list of multiple influences/sources?

How convenient for you that counter evidence cannot dent your view. What is the point of this entire discussion if, when faced with counter evidence, you simply reply with circular logic? We're spinning our wheels if you're going to resort to self-evident truths which cannot be dislodged by facts.

As a point of fact, Jefferson's original draft (which we have) DID include "their Creator" and "nature's God." What the Congress added was "supreme judge of the world" and "divine providence" -- both "God-words" as well, with no specific Christian or biblical content.

The fact that the Congress added non-Christian, non-biblical "God-words" to the Declaration actually supports my contention that theistic rationalism was the prevailing political theology -- and not Christianity. If they were trying to create a Christian nation, why didn't they insert Christian language/terms? Furthermore, if Jefferson and Franklin were such outliers where religion was concerned, why were they chosen to write the philosophical document? Would James Dobson and David Barton ask Barry Lynn or Madalyn Murray O'Hair to write such a document?

Again, I do not claim that the prevailing political theology undergirding the Founding was that of only a few key Founders!! On the contrary, I claim that that PREVAILING political theology can be SEEN in the writings of a few key Founders -- including the two founding documents. It would hardly be a "prevailing" political theology if it only existed in the minds of eight men.

I accept your apology, of course. I was not personally offended; I just wanted clarity.

Frazer Responds to "Our Founding Truth":

Dr. Frazer emailed me this response to "Our Founding Truth's" criticism of his remarks:

To "Our Founding Truth":

Once again, you're attacking claims that I did NOT make. I did not say that theistic rationalism was "formed" as the "religion" of the states or the nation. I said it was the political theology UNDERGIRDING the Founding. A political theology is like a philosophy -- it's not voted on or ratified, it is the collection of beliefs and ideas behind actions taken.

Christianity cannot be seen in many more key Founders. It can be seen in some Founders -- and I've never denied that, but not the key Founders and not in many. If you'd actually read my work, you'd see evidence that many of the patriotic preachers who supported the Revolution were theistic rationalists, too. If you knew the history of Yale University, for example, you'd know that it was started because of complaints that the preachers coming out of Harvard were not Christians. Yale followed Harvard’s bad production very soon after its founding.

I agree with you that there are not many definitions of Christianity, in reality. Only one definition is correct -- God's definition, as I said in my initial foray into this discussion. However, there are many definitions put forward -- which is what this blog was discussing when I reentered the discussion and what I meant by the comment you criticized.

Again, if you read my work, you'd see exactly the creeds and confessions to which I refer. They are:
Westminster Creed (Presbyterians & Congregationalists)
Augsburg Confession (Lutherans & some Reformed churches)
Philadelphia Confession (Baptists)
Apostle's Creed, Nicene Creed, Athanasius' Creed, & 39 Articles (Anglicans/Episcopalians)

These churches represented the vast majority of churches in 18th century America. They all agreed on ten fundamental doctrines. If someone did not adhere to those doctrines, he/she was not a Christian by their standards. The theistic rationalists only believed one of the ten core doctrines.

Let me add that Frazer notes the key Founders did NOT believe in the creeds of those churches even though many were formally affiliated with them. (For instance Jefferson, Madison, Washington, G. Morris, Franklin, Wilson and others with the Anglican/Episcopal Church against whose official doctrines they rebelled when they revolted against England. This is important: The Anglican Church it its official doctrines DEMANDED obedience to England. Revolting against England meant revolting against the official doctrines of their Church and casts into doubt that they believed in said Church's official teachings found in its oaths, creeds and confessions. In short, that Washington et al. were formally members of the Anglican Club is a weak place to rest their "orthodox Christianity.") There is smoking gun evidence that Jefferson, J. Adams, and Franklin disbelieved in orthodox Trinitarian doctrines and very good reason to believe Madison, Washington, G. Morris, Wilson and Hamilton (until near death) disbelieved in them as well. Though the evidence is, admittedly, less absolute than it is with Jefferson, J. Adams and Franklin.

Personally I regard J. Adams as central because he was so politically conservative and mainstream for the time, indeed likely to be thought of as a "Christian" and has said things that sound far far more "Christian" than Madison, Washington, and Hamilton (until the very end) ever did. Yet, when it came time to explicating exactly what it was he believed, he was virtually agreed with Jefferson and Franklin on the basics. In short, if Adams could be a "theistic rationalist"/"unitarian"/"Christian-Deist" what have you, then so too could have Washington, Madison, Wilson, G. Morris, and Hamilton (until the very end) AND many others.

Frazer, Babka & Romans 13:

Gregg Frazer has emailed me the following response to Jim Babka's remarks on Romans 13.

Let me begin with a clarification: I am not a “MacArthur disciple.” I am a disciple of Jesus Christ who is a congregant of MacArthur’s church. I disagree with MacArthur’s position on several significant issues. I agree with him concerning Romans 13 because I believe his position to be correct – not because it is his position.

My position regarding Romans 13 is described in the post as “strict literalist.” I am quite comfortable with the “literalist” label – I’m not sure what “strict” adds to it. I would submit that if you do not read a passage literally that clearly, in context, is meant to be read literally, then you’re not reading the passage. Romans 13:1-2 leaves no wiggle room for variant interpretation. It is very straightforward and universal in its language. THERE ARE PLENTY OF DIFFICULT, AMBIGUOUS PASSAGES of Scripture which admit varying interpretations, but ROMANS 13 IS NOT ONE OF THEM. There are passages meant to be read metaphorically or allegorically or mystically or as poetry, etc. – but Romans 13 is not one of them.

In the overall context, Paul spent 11 chapters establishing the Christian’s theological position – the meaning and substance of salvation. Then, in chapter 12, he began to address what that means on a daily, practical basis. He says that Christians must “be transformed by the renewing of [their] mind” – that they must think differently than non-Christians (Rom. 12:2). This begins five chapters explaining how Christians ought to live in light of their salvation – of which chapter 13 details the political implications. So, if Romans 13 doesn’t make intuitive sense to those whose minds have not been transformed and renewed, no one should be surprised. It also would not make much sense unless the reader understands God’s very strong commands concerning, and emphasis upon, authority of all kinds (in politics, in the church, in the workplace, in the home) throughout Scripture.

If one does not hold to the “strict literalist” interpretation of Romans 13, one is not interpreting Romans 13, but substituting one’s own version based on one’s own preferences. One is adding words to the text, bringing in outside material and arguments which are not present in the text.

“Let every person be in subjection to the governing authorities”: this is a universal, all-inclusive statement. Who is not included in “every person?” Where’s the wiggle room?

“For there is no authority except from God”: this is a universal, all-inclusive statement. To which authority does it not apply? Where is the wiggle room?

“and those which exist are established by God”: this is a universal, all-inclusive statement. The only authorities to which it does not apply are those which do not exist. Where is the wiggle room?

“Therefore, he who resists authority has opposed the ordinance of God”: how could it possibly be more clear? AND THIS WAS WRITTEN TO THOSE LIVING UNDER NERO!! If it does not apply to those living under a tyrant, then the entire passage is nonsensical and would have meant nothing to the people to whom it was written!

Those who (creatively) construct alternate “interpretations” of Romans 13 insert qualifiers where none exist and produce a different passage altogether. Theirs is not an interpretation, but a replacement. They should not refer to Romans 13 at all.

The church understood the implications and instruction of this passage for 15 centuries – and so did Luther and Calvin. It is ludicrous and even libelous to refer to any support for rebellion as “Calvinist.” Here’s what Calvin had to say about rebellion in Book IV of his Institutes, chapter 20 (paragraph numbers included):

23. "And make no mistake: it is impossible to resist the magistrate without also resisting God."

25. "But reflection on the Word of God will carry us beyond. For we are to be subject not only to the authority of those princes who do their duty towards us as they should, and uprightly, but to all of them, however they came by their office, even if the very last thing they do is to act like true princes."

"Those who govern for the public good are true examples and signs of his goodness; those who govern unjustly and intemperately have been raised up by him to punish the iniquity of the people. Both are equally furnished with that sacred majesty, with which he has endowed legitimate authority."

26. "... we must honor the worst tyrant in the office in which the Lord has seen fit to set him."

27. "If we keep firmly in mind that even the very worst kings are appointed by this same decree which establishes the authority of kings, then we will never permit ourselves the seditious idea that a king is to be treated according to his deserts, or that we need not obey a king who does not conduct himself towards us like a king."

29. "But if you go on to infer that only just governments are to be repaid by obedience, your reasoning is stupid."

31. "And even if the punishment of unbridled tyranny is the Lord=s vengeance, we are not to imagine that it is we ourselves who have been called upon to inflict it. All that has been assigned to us is to obey and suffer."

There have been those who called themselves Calvinists who devised support for rebellion – but it was not Calvin’s position at all. This is why the patriotic preachers argued in terms of “Mr. Locke’s doctrine” rather than Calvin’s.

As for the “interposition” argument, I presume that it refers to the so-called “lower magistrate loophole” – i.e. the idea that lower magistrates can lead the people in rebellion/revolution. Calvin said nothing of the kind, however. Calvin explained that if, within the system of government, there were “magistrates established to defend the people” and “to restrain the licentiousness of kings,” then they should act “in accordance with their duty” to restrain “the licentiousness and frenzy of kings.” So that he would not be misinterpreted, Calvin gave historical examples of officials who were part of their respective governmental systems (ephors in Sparta; tribunes in Rome; demarchs in Athens) and were expressly given the authority to restrain rulers within the system. He never used any form of the word “rebel” or “revolt” – their actions were legal and a recognized part of the system of government – akin to the power of Congress to impeach and remove the American president.

This interposition notion is a clever, but very recent, invention. To my knowledge, no one in the American Founding era mentioned such an idea or made a case for the American Revolution based upon it. [if anyone did, I’d be very interested in the info] Jonathan Mayhew and Samuel West created their own replacement for Romans 13, but they did not bother with the lower magistrate idea. They simply declared that the people themselves can rebel and that it is a good thing.

While many in the revolutionary period were fond of making comparisons between the American Revolution and the exodus of Israel, it is important to note that the Israelites did not rebel against Pharaoh and throw off his rule. Rather, they took no action (God brought the plagues) and then they simply obeyed Pharaoh’s command to leave Egypt (Exodus 12:31).

In the post, there was also a mention of concern for political liberty in the Bible. Since the passages generally used speak only of spiritual liberty (freedom from the bonds of sin), I would be curious to hear what the author of the post had in mind. One of the most prominent loyalist preachers, Jonathan Boucher, made the observation that there is not a single passage in the Bible in support of political liberty.

The Bible mentions some form of the words “rebel” or “revolt” more than 100 times – and all in the negative. In most cases, the condemnation could hardly be stronger (e.g. I Samuel 15:23).

Finally, to say that no governing authority may be resisted (rebelled against) is not to say that no governing authority may be disobeyed under one certain circumstance. Scripture is clear (Acts 4:19-20 & 5:29) that individual commands which require disobedience to God must be disobeyed – but we must still remain in subjection (that is, we still recognize the government’s authority), which usually means taking the punishment (as per the examples of Daniel, Shadrach, Meschach, and Abednego, and the apostles themselves). Resistance denies and strikes at the principle of authority; disobedience in pursuit of obedience to God is directed at a specific command/law and does not challenge the legitimacy of the authority behind it. The earthly authority’s command is “trumped” by a higher authority’s command – but the earthly authority does not forfeit its legitimacy. [just as a state law cannot violate a national law, but a state government does not lose its legitimacy and authority by passing such a law]

Gregg

Frazer's Most Recent Response:

Dr. Gregg Frazer has responded to the latest feedback to his thoughts generated in this comment section at American Creation. His response follows:

Mr. Van Dyke: I would ask you to at least be fair in your criticisms of my views and intellectually honest by criticizing arguments/claims that I actually make and not attributing claims to me that I do not make.

I do NOT claim "that the religious-political landscape of the Founding can be reduced to [the often private] thoughts of a half-dozen or so "key" Founders." I claim that the prevailing political theology undergirding the Founding was theistic rationalism and that it can be seen in the beliefs of a few key Founders and those of a large number of ministers in the churches of the period -- and in the Founding documents.

THERE IS MUCH MORE TO THE "RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL LANDSCAPE" THAN THAT -- WHICH I HAVE AFFIRMED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS -- INCLUDING THE POST TO WHICH YOU WERE RESPONDING. I recognize that there were a great number of religious sects in 18th century America, and representatives from many of them who played roles in the Founding.

If there is any "reductionism" going on here, it is ascribing the label of "Christian" too broadly.

Secondly, regarding your statement that "Dr. Frazer confesses he is appropriating the definition and understanding of 'Christian' to his own purposes as a self-proclaimed evangelical": I MADE NO SUCH CONFESSION! Quite the contrary, what I actually said (readers can go back and see) is that there are numerous definitions of the term "Christian" and that, for the purposes of understanding the period, I confined my work to the definition held by American Christians in the 18th century as put forward in their creeds and confessions. I noted that I have my own definition and that historians have several definitions and so on, but I did not use my own. I said that I agree with the 10 elements, but my own definition may include other elements as well -- as one could see in the definition I gave as my own. I hardly claimed to be "appropriating" the definition to my own purposes as an evangelical -- exactly the opposite!

You then made this accusation: "He casts everything outside it [definition of Christian] in his own idiosyncratic term of 'theistic rationalist,' which I regard as nonsense because of its limited scope." First, I explicitly do NOT cast "everything outside it" as theistic rationalism. I recognize deism, Judaism, atheism, Buddhism, Quakerism, and many other "isms" aside from the definition or my own "idiosyncratic" term. [it strikes me that most terms were considered idiosyncratic before being widely accepted] Second, if my term is so "limited" in scope, how could you make such a claim?

As to my term's "vagueness," I re-entered this discussion to try to clarify what "Christianity" is and how it should be dealt with by historians. "You guys" were in the midst of an ongoing argument over that term which has been raging for 2000 years. If my term is "vague," what do you say of the term "Christianity?" Of course, properly applied, it means something specific -- but so does my term. The fact that people can wrongly employ it or play games to try and manipulate it or willfully refuse to understand it doesn't change that fact.

Now, to the "smoking gun":

First, we're not talking here about the Declaration -- which is the only one of the two documents which mentions God -- Madison's commentary concerns the Constitution. Besides, the Declaration was never ratified, so there is no ratifier perspective.

Second, Madison's opinion is just that: Madison's opinion. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT, but it is not the sole authority or determinative -- it is an IMPORTANT contribution to the discussion, of course. If you consider Madison's opinion to be determinative and the end of discussion, then I would point out to you that Madison refused, when asked, to affirm Jasper Adams' contention that Christianity was the foundation of American civil, legal, and political institutions. So, apparently, the larger argument is over and we all at least agree that Christianity was not the basis (whether or not theistic rationalism is "nonsense").

Third, if one reads the context in which the Madison quote is found, one sees that his concern was for the primacy of the LANGUAGE of the Constitution. He was arguing for "THE SENSE IN WHICH the Constitution was accepted and ratified" and against reading it in light of "the changeable meaning of the words" -- against changes in "living languages" and against preferring the "modern sense" to the sense at the time of ratification. The language was not DETERMINED by the ratifiers.

Now, again, it is up to OFT to demonstrate that the "sense" of the words of the Constitution understood by the majority was somehow different than the sense understood by those who framed it. It seems highly unlikely that Madison would promote a sense different from his own – so he must have thought that the ratifiers shared his view.

The Madison quote has no relevance to the Declaration language debate, however. [And, if OFT says Jefferson's commentary on the Constitution is irrelevant, then Madison's commentary on the Declaration is similarly irrelevant.] Oh, wait, OFT decided at the end that Jefferson's commentary on the Constitution WAS relevant after all, because he thought he found a quote supporting his view.

I was shocked to find that OFT, who claims (if I remember correctly -- I apologize, if not) to be a Christian and concerned with what the Bible has to say, is a deconstructionist! He says that authorial intent "means nothing" -- is that how you approach Scripture? This is the root of the "living Constitution" nonsense and of the modern liberal assault on the Bible. The notion that what the author meant in what he wrote is irrelevant and that the author is "not responsible for the content" because we don't like what he intended is a view that I'm very surprised to see OFT ascribe to.

It also seems silly to me to suggest that the principles were "borrowed from Christian Church Fathers, and Christian Philosophers, mostly from the Protestant Reformation, taken from the Bible" when no one mentioned any of those sources at the Constitutional Convention or in the Federalist Papers. As for the Declaration, Jefferson told us the sources for its principles -- and he didn't mention any of these, either. He DID mention "Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, &c," but according to OFT, Jefferson didn't know what his sources were. Apparently, he was divinely inspired and it "came out of the Bible through the Reformers."

As per my argument on Jefferson's intention (which I maintain IS important), OFT sees Reformation principles, the secularist sees deist principles, the Jew sees Judaic principles, etc. Jefferson's intent has been realized beyond his wildest hopes.

OFT asks whether I think some notions are "of man." I did not say that they were -- I said that THEY (the Founders) identified philosophical and historical sources for them.

Restrictions on who could serve in government were STATE restrictions which applied only at the STATE level. Article VI of the Constitution expressly forbade religious tests for national office.

OFT says "the people pass laws." No, that would be a democracy. The U.S. is a republic in which the people's REPRESENTATIVES pass laws (and write public documents).

II Corinthians 3:3 has NOTHING to do with natural law. It simply says that the quality of the lives of the people to whom Paul ministered were his letter of commendation -- the affirmation of his ministry.

Romans 2:14-15 refers to God's moral law, not some "law of nature." I challenge OFT or Mr. Van Dyke to find "law of nature" or "Nature's God" in a concordance of the Bible -- you won't find either term because they're not biblical terms. The fact that Aquinas (with whom OFT probably has very little in common) or Calvin believed in a similar concept does not make it biblical or Christian.

Likewise, the fact that someone held a similar view centuries before does not make that view the source of a particular idea or principle. Plato and Confucius held some views similar to those of Jesus and the Apostle Paul -- does that make Plato and Confucius "sources" of Christianity? Of course not. One must show connection -- usually an affirmation from a writer that X or Y was a source. [As Jefferson did concerning the Declaration's principles, by the way -- he was under the apparently false impression that he knew from whence he got his ideas]

Gregg

Rowe: Let me add that Dr. Frazer above asserts that the Declaration was not ratified which is, in the context that he uses the term "ratified," correct. Unlike the US Constitution, the Declaration was NOT ratified by state ratifying conventions. The Continental Congress on 4 July, 1776 approved, that is voted in favor of the Declaration of Independence. And some sources (websites) use the specific term "ratified." But the DOI was NOT ratified in the same sense that the US Constitution was by state ratifying conventions.

The Declaration of Independence and Interposition:

My Positive Liberty co-blogger Jim Babka has encouraged me to explore further the Calvinist doctrine of "interposition" and the claim of right to revolt based on the Declaration of Independence. Here's how I understand the issue:

What the American Founders did DOESN’T at all fit with Calvin's understanding of Romans 13 or of interposition. However, there were some later Calvinists, Samuel Rutherford most notably, who enlarged Calvin's position on interposition as something close to but still not exactly what America's Founders later argued in principle and did in fact. Think of what Rutherford et al. argued in this sense as "living Calvinism." Systems of thought “live” and “evolve” much like the common law did. On my radio appearance with Jim and Herb Titus, Herb mentioned how Calvin/Calvinism, "planted a seed" that later bore its fruition in the American Revolution/Founding. I noted this could be true, but the idea of "planting a seed" was dangerous or contentious for those who want to argue their case from the right ("original intent"/"strict construction" or what have you).

Though I didn't have time to explain exactly what I meant in detail. I will here:

Sometimes ideas "grow" in ways that the Founders of such ideas would have neither expected nor supported. I noted, accurately, the Founding Fathers as "living Lockeans" in this sense. Jefferson's Virginia Statute on Religious Freedom and Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance were quintessentially Lockean documents. Yet, Locke was clear that neither Roman Catholics nor atheists "fit" into his vision of religious toleration. Jefferson and Madison on the other hand explicitly argued that religious rights belong to ALL. They were aware that they were extending Locke's ideas further than he personally planned. As Jefferson noted: "Where he [Locke] stopped short, we may go on."

So indeed the whole idea of "planting a seed" and seeing where ideas grow arguably could justify what some might term the "living Constitution" or at the very least results that contradict the Founders' intention of how the ideas were to be applied. Various scholars [many of whom quite conservative] blame the phenomenon of "the living Constitution" on the fact that America is broadly founded on ideals of liberty and equality and that America's founding courts inherited a judicial system where judges had long "made up the law" in their roles as common law deciders of cases and controversies.


Why Calvin would have been a Tory and Thought the American Revolution a Sin

What America's Founders did in declaring revolt was AGAINST what Calvin himself posited: Calvin's original Institutes Of The Christian Religion, Book Four, Chapter 20 can be found here. Calvin makes clear he thought that one must ALWAYS submit to government no matter who they are, or how tyrannical. There IS no right to revolt against tyranny. Dr. Gregg Frazer of The Masters College summed up his research on Calvin's original writings for the following article at WorldNetDaily. I am going to quote Frazer offering proof quotations that not only properly understand the context of Calvin's writings, but that cannot be "explained away" by "context" either:

Calvin said: "We are to be subject not only to the authority of those princes who do their duty towards us as they should, and uprightly, but to all of them, however they came by their office,even if the very last thing they do is act like [true] princes." And "we must honour [even] the worst tyrant in the office in which the Lord has seen fit to set him" and "if you go on to infer that only just governments are to be repaid by obedience, your reasoning is stupid." He warned, "Make no mistake: it is impossible to resist the magistrate without also resisting God." One more from Calvin: "And even if the punishment of unbridled tyranny is the Lord's vengeance [on tyrants], we are not to imagine that it is we ourselves who have been called upon to inflict it. All that has been assigned to us is to obey and suffer."...(Book IV, Chapter 20 of Calvin's "Institutes of the Christian Religion")

Frazer's Understanding of Calvin's Notion of Interposition

John Calvin does allow for a "lesser magistrate exception." Let's look at the original text (please forgive me if this translation of Calvin is slightly different than the one Frazer was citing; I don't know where to find that one online; ultimately I don't believe the translation affects the meaning):

For when popular magistrates have been appointed to curb the tyranny of kings, (as the Ephori, who were opposed to kings among the Spartans, or Tribunes of the people to consuls among the Romans, or Demarchs to the senate among the Athenians; and, perhaps, there is something similar to this in the power exercised in each kingdom by the three orders, when they hold their primary diets.) So far am I from forbidding these officially to check the undue license of kings, that if they connive at kings when they tyrannise and insult over the humbler of the people, I affirm that their dissimulation is not free from nefarious perfidy, because they fraudulently betray the liberty of the people, while knowing that, by the ordinance of God, they are its appointed guardians.

Frazer's comments from his PhD thesis:

So that he would not be misinterpreted, Calvin gave historical examples of officials who were part of their respective governmental systems and were expressly given authority to restrain rulers. He never uses any form of the word "rebel" or "revolt," however. Their actions were legal and a recognized part of the system of government -- akin to the power of the Congress to impeach and remove the American president. pp. 360-61.

In other words, the authority to resist the King MUST preexist in the governing positive law. Now, one could indeed make a case that what the American Founders DID was in accord with existing English positive law. And they acted as "intermediate magistrates." (It's a bit of a stretch, but one COULD, I think, make this case).

However, that's what they DID, not what they SAID. What they SAID is in the Declaration of Independence. Let's, again, look at the governing text:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, — That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

Now this has absolutely nothing to do with what John Calvin wrote in his Institutes of the Christian Religion regarding "interposition." Indeed, this is a clarion call for rebellion or revolt if governments don't meet certain "ends." This rhetoric cares nothing about the existing positive law or the status of the "resisters" as constitutional magistrates. If the existing positive law doesn't meet the natural ends of government, the theory goes, "the people" may "alter or to abolish it,..." In other words, they may revolt.

And when it came to discovering those "natural ends" of government, the Declaration does not turn to the Bible or John Calvin but "self evident" Truths discovered in "nature" or from "man's reason." Some have argued that "the laws of nature and nature's God" really refer to what's written in the Bible. But I don't see ANYWHERE in the Bible (other than that which might be derived from a sophistical reading of the good book) that clearly teaches:

that...men are...endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, — That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it,...

So when it came to "discovering" those "unalienable rights" in "nature" chiefly from "man's reason," the Founders turned to John Locke's doctrines as a proxy. And Locke never cited Calvin OR the subsequent Calvinists like Rutherford or interposition. And though Locke (a secret unitarian) claimed to be a Christian, believed Jesus the "Messiah," and often cited the Bible, his groundbreaking notions of "state of nature" and "unalienable rights" were still not at all biblical [that is found within the Bible's text] or even part of the classical Aristotelian understanding of politics. Rather, they were something modern.

Finally, regarding the preachers and pulpits who argued on behalf of revolt. You can read them here in Ellis Sandoz's Founding era collection of sermons. Sandoz's collection is not exhaustive. And the contents are not monolithic. But, overall, (especially when one concentrates on 1750 onwards) Locke, not Calvin, not Rutherford or any other Calvinist DOMINATES the pro-revolt sermons. And even when they read the Bible, they do so through a Lockean lens that takes Locke's a-biblical ideas that God grants men inalienable rights to life, political liberty, property, equality and "happiness" as "self-evident" givens, discoverable in "nature" -- without the assistance of the Bible. And those a-biblical "discoveries" from natural reason are given at LEAST the very same "Truth" status as that which is revealed in the Bible.

And also note, it's not just unitarians who elevated the discoveries of man's unaided reason in nature to the same level as scripture. It was also orthodox Trinitarians who did this, for instance, John Witherspoon, whom many folks are surprised to learn was a Locke imbibed philosophical rationalist.

Majority of American Christians are not Christian!

At Secular Right, David Hume points us to a survey that hints at the idea that most self described "American Christians" (about 80% of the population defines itself as "Christian") probably wouldn't pass the strict test of orthodoxy that the "Christian" Barack Obama apparently flunked.

This dynamic is key to my historical research on the Founding & Christianity. There are many possible meanings of a "Christian nation" some valid and some not. The meaning posited by the "Christian America" proponents defines "Christianity" and "a Christian" fairly tightly according to its orthodox biblical ideas. They really do believe that "God" (meaning their specific understanding of God) founded America and as such He would use "real Christians" in a born-again, regenerate sense to do his bidding. They are probably already confounded by the fact that God would raise up John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, who clearly were not "Christians" in this sense (though they understood themselves to be "Christians" not "Deists") to be second and third Presidents (many of them are ignorant of Adams' heterodoxy, however). And they desperately try to latch on to whatever thin evidence there is that Washington and Madison were "real Christians." If the first four (or five) Presidents from Washington to Monroe were indeed non-Trinitarians who rejected eternal damnation, salvation through Christ alone, and probably didn't believe the Bible the inerrant, infallible Word of God, why would God raise up such leaders to "Found" America, His nation?

I'll again stress that the key Founders who believed what I put in bold did NOT tend to consider themselves "Deists" but "Christians." This was the kind of "Christianity" that drove the American Founding from the top (not necessarily from the bottom), if it's fair to even call it "Christianity."

The key Founders, in a sense, had to call it "Christianity"; if they called themselves Deists and rejected "Christianity" out of hand, the orthodox easier would have been able to separate themselves from this religious system; but, were that to happen, the different sects couldn't have come together to "Found" America. Instead, the key Founders had to convince the orthodox that the "American project" really did derive from "Christianity," properly understood. [Note: I am NOT arguing the key Founders were secret Deists; from reading their letters, I conclude they really were secret unitarians who thought of their system as a purified, rational form of "Christianity."] And they left quotations to be taken out of context by folks who wish for an orthodox Christian Founding. For instance, one of Christian America proponents favorite proof quotes, from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, June 28, 1813:

The general principles, on which the Fathers Atchieved [sic] Independence, were…the general Principles of Christianity, in which all those Sects were United: and the general Principles of English and American Liberty…Now I will avow, that I then believed, and now believe, that those general Principles of Christianity, are as eternal and immutable, as the Existence and Attributes of God; and that those Principles of Liberty, are as unalterable as human Nature and our terrestrial, mundane System.

The problem is what Adams meant by "general principles of Christianity." The orthodox reading such a quotation might HOPE that Adams meant such things as original sin, the trinity, incarnation, atonement, infallibility of the Bible, regeneration, eternal damnation. But alas, he didn't. In fact, Adams and Jefferson rejected every single one of those tenets. And elsewhere in that very letter Adams explains exactly what he meant by "general principles of Christianity."

Who composed that Army of fine young Fellows that was then before my Eyes? There were among them, Roman Catholicks, English Episcopalians, Scotch and American Presbyterians, Methodists, Moravians, Anababtists, German Lutherans, German Calvinists Universalists, Arians, Priestleyans, Socinians, Independents, Congregationalists, Horse Protestants and House Protestants, Deists and Atheists; and “Protestans qui ne croyent rien ["Protestants who believe nothing"].” Very few however of several of these Species. Nevertheless all Educated in the general Principles of Christianity: and the general Principles of English and American Liberty.

How could a Deist or even an “atheist” be “united” with the orthodox on any Christian principles? The answer is simple. According to Adams being a Christian meant being a good person. If an atheist was a good person, he was a “Christian.” As he put it:

“I believe with Justin Martyr, that all good men are Christians, and I believe there have been, and are, good men in all nations, sincere and conscientious.”

– John Adams to Samuel Miller, July 8, 1820.

To conclude, if we define "Christianity" broadly to include the heterodox ideas of Founding era figures, Adams and Jefferson, and from today, Obama [and many other liberal, moderate, and conservative politicians], then yes, America could be said to have had a "Christian" Founding and still is a "Christian nation."

The problem is that's not how proponents of the "Christian America" thesis understand "Christianity." They don't want what they regard as false, heretical and nominally Christian teachings to have *any* place in the definition of "Christianity," certainly not in the "Christian" that qualifies "Nation" when they argue America was founded to be a "Christian Nation."

South Park Refutes Pascal's Wager:

Brilliantly. That "Ooohw" at the end of the stint was priceless.

Demons, not Drugs...Tortured Souls:

My coblogger DA Ridgely offers an explanation for why creative geniuses might seem more likely to be addicted to drugs and alcohol without attributing the creativity to such addiction. I don't agree with his line of reasoning; but I do want to clarify that I don't see drug or alcohol use, certainly not addiction, as causing creativity. That would be silly. I mentioned tangentially how many artistic geniuses seem to struggle with mental illness or even madness. I think that's where the drug and alcohol addiction comes in. They fuel the demons. And it's the demons that in many ways cause great art.

When I was in music school a lot of rockers were impressed by "virtuosos." Rock music started as something crude, not refined like classical or even jazz. But as the genre evolved some rockers took their level of "technique" to roughly on par with the great classical and jazz virtuosos. Guitarist Paul Gilbert comes to mind as a fellow who can play most classical virtuoso violin pieces or passages, flawlessly and at the same tempo as a classical violin virtuoso would. I like Dream Theater and the great prog rockers of the 70s like Keith Emerson and Rick Wakeman who loved to show off technically how good they were.

But ultimately, all that technical stuff is icing on the cake and can get in the way of REAL substance. The real substance can be summed up in one word: soul. And soul can be expressed in very refined or very crude ways, and all over and in between.

Much of the great works of art, I have observed, comes from demon haunted souls, not the dot your i cross your t vanilla souls of accountants, or from Nietzsche's contemptibly self satisfied, bourgeois "last man."

Roy Buchanan. He was another man whose artistic genius was fueled by his tortured soul.



Great artists don't often meet with happy endings. And Buchanan certainly didn't.

Babka's Continued Christian Defense of Revolution-Romans 13:

Responding to my media appearance among me, Jim, and Herb Titus, Jim Babka writes:

Jon, Picking up on one aspect of Chris Smith’s valuable comment… Let me add that both Herb and I have provided to you a Calvinist method of standing up to tyrants called Interposition. The evidence is abundant. Mr. Smith mentions that a Unitarian version (with which you are quite familiar) and a Nonconformist interpretation exist as well.

I am absolutely not a Calvinist, as I made clear in my piece on Romans 13. However, I do like the work done by the Huguenots and the Scottish Calvinists. I also demonstrated, in that same piece, that the Calvinist Doctrine of Interposition was in perfect concert with how history unfolded in the American Revolution — that it was the British King who declared his subjects in rebellion, BEFORE the subjects declared they would rebel.

It didn’t occur to me to write about this because I think Interposition to be so direct, seamless, and thorough, but I am a Non-conformist, and question human authority almost as a theological instinct. It’s not just a neo-Calvinist interpretation of Romans 13 and Acts 4 & 5 that animates me.

I’m a religious mutt, but two of the dominant strains of my faith could be described as Wesleyan and Anabaptist. I was raised in a Regular Baptist church. My wife and two of my children were baptized while we were members of Nazarene churches.

Anabaptists are anti-magisterium. It is my Anabaptist side that opposes foreign wars and saluting the symbols of war. Wesleyans (Methodists, Nazarenes, Wesleyans, and Pentecostals) have Bishops or District Superintendents, but in general, still seek to decentralize power into the local churches, and recognize that the priesthood resides with all believers.

Let me suggest that you are only versed in the Unitarian and “strict literalist” (the Tories and John MacArthur) views of Romans 13. Thus, per your view, the Unitarian cherry-picks the Scripture to begin with and elevates his own reason, and the literalist realizes he can’t support the rebellion. This is a brick in your theory that a) the Bible is unconcerned with individual/political Liberty, and b) modern Christians who admire the Founders are either ill-informed or engaging in “cafeteria Christianity” — choosing the parts they like, discarding the rest.

Further, in your writing the only time you concede that there are other legitimate views of Romans 13 that permit proper rebellion is when someone informed challenges you on the matter. You are gracious and fair. But there is an implicit assumption in the rest of your work, I suspect following MacArthur disciple Gregg Frazer, that there can only be these two approaches.

I was moderating that interview between you and Titus, and I re-listened to it again before posting. It’s been a couple of days since I heard it, but I’m reasonably sure it was something you said that caused us to “veer off to Romans 13.” But it was hardly a rabbit trail. This is pretty fundamental stuff. Is there an intellectually consistent marriage of reason and revelation sufficient to explain the Founders as both true to Christian principles and rebels against tyranny? …and were the Founders aware of it?

The answers are yes, and yes. Mr. Titus and I have explained the Calvinist method and answer. Mr. Smith has just referred you to the Non-conformist way of thinking. Like most past events and present decisions, there are more than two answers to this question.

All that said, this is one of the few areas where I sense any disagreement between you and I about the subject of Christian influence on the founding. I still think your writings are splendid and should receive a wider audience. I was glad you were on the show.

I noted to him that:

For all that I’ve written on the subject, it occurred to me that I still HAVEN’T made the case for why what the Founders did, DOESN’T fit with Calvin himself’s understanding of interposition, but rather with the later Calvinists’ position of interposition. Frazer explains this in his thesis; and I’ve only alluded to these arguments so far.

I also mentioned the notion of “living Calvinism” which again, I didn’t have the time to get into in detail. Systems of thought “live” and “evolve” much like the common law did. I noted America’s Founders as arguably “living Lockeans” in this sense (how they consciously took Locke’s ideas further).

So after I reproduce your comment, I’ll later work on a post where I try to show you Frazer’s understanding of interposition and why it had to take place in accord with the governing positive law (something you and Herb seemed surprised to hear me assert).

Chris Smith on Romans 13:

Christopher Smith makes an apt comment responding to my discussion of Romans 13 with Herb Titus and Jim Babka:

On the Romans 13 issue, I don’t think it’s a matter of Christianity vs. Americanism as much as of Anglicanism vs. Dissent– i.e. two very different understandings of Christianity. In other words, belief in the right to revolution can spring from the very heart of one’s Christian faith without exhausting all possible interpretations of Christianity. This is part of the problem with historic Christian diversity; the different sects do not agree on what the faith is, what it teaches, or what is at its core. What is at the core of one Christian’s faith may be totally inconceivable from the perspective of another.

I’d like to quote briefly from Timothy T. Larsen’s book Contested Christianity: The Political and Social Contexts of Victorian Theology, you might want to have a look at chapter 10, titled “Free Church Politics and the Gathered Church: The Evangelical Case for Religious Pluralism.” Larsen is working with a slightly later context– the nineteenth rather than eighteenth century– but much of what he says applies to earlier Dissent as well. Larsen writes,

“It is not enough merely to discuss their [i.e. evangelical Nonconformists'] reforming efforts in terms of political tactics, because the mentalist and rhetoric of evangelical Dissenters was profoundly religious. The reform movement that came clearly to the surface in the 1830’s in Nonconformist circles was a public manifestation of biblical, theological, and religious lines of thought that were deeply ingrained in the Dissenting community. In this subculture, one was more apt to discuss the nature of the church than the role of the state; more apt to be moved by what appeared to be righteous than what was perceived to be expedient; just as apt to discuss the rights of Christ as the rights of man.”

The so-called “voluntary principle” was central not only to evangelicals, but also to Anabaptists, Unitarians, and a variety of other marginalized Christian movements. Priestley saw his defense of free inquiry as deeply Christian and, more than that, deeply Protestant, and his vision of Unitarian revolution sweeping Europe and overthrowing the state churches was based on an apocalyptic, post-millennial interpretation of the book of Revelation!

The Orthodox Protestant Case FOR The Natural Law:

Jordan J. Ballor of the Acton Institute points us to some valuable sources that make this case. He parenthetically mentions one of my posts describing the Protestant case against the natural law. I hope he didn't get the message that I took a position that the natural law is incompatible with orthodox Protestantism. (Though I have my suspicions on whether it is.)

Note, because I'm not a believer I don't take an official prescriptive position on whether natural law is compatible with orthodox Christianity, Protestant, Catholic or otherwise; I just want to describe what's out there. The Roman Catholic Church because it is a top down organization, has officially embraced the natural law since Aquinas incorporated Aristotle's teachings into Christendom. Because Protestantism is by its nature decentralized, the sects (obviously) differ. I was simply noting Francis Schaeffer's rejection of the natural law and how some orthodox Protestants today likewise reject it.

There is a case to be made, I understand, that many of the great orthodox Protestant thinkers of the past embraced the natural law more so than most folks realize. And I'm all ears (or eyes) when it comes to learning more about it.

Richard Manuel:

My favorite member of The Band. He was another one of those artistic geniuses with a tortured soul. As Eric Clapton said about him:

For me he was the true light of the Band. The other guys were fantastic talents, of course, but there was something of the holy madman about Richard. He was raw. When he sang in that high falsetto the hair on my neck would stand on end. Not many people can do that.

I agree. Most males have falsettos that are unlistenable, at least for more than a few seconds. Which is why most male vocalists usually break into falsetto for brief bits either for effect or to reach a necessary high note. Think of how annoying the The Bee Gees continued falsetto vocals can be!

But not Richard. He had a falsetto that you could listen to...that you'd want to listen to for the whole song. Here's "Whispering Pines":



When asked in Martin Scorsese's monumental documentary of The Band's finale "The Last Waltz" why they were calling it quits seemingly in their prime, Robbie Robertson aptly noted how "the road" took many of the great ones, describing it as a "goddamn impossible way of life."

And how sadly prophetic he turned out to be. The Band reunited sans Robbie in the early 80s. Richard Manuel committed suicide in 1986 at age 42. Bassist Rick Danko, who had long struggled with addiction (for instance, he was busted with heroin in 1997) died in 1999 at age 56. It was kind of sad; Danko was a thin handsome guy when The Band was in its prime. But he had put on a tremendous amount of weight shortly before his death.

When I saw The Band in the mid-90s, at Waterfront Stadium in Trenton, NJ, Manuel was dead, Danko was alive, and Robertson of course, had ceased to tour with them. Besides Danko, drummer Levon Helm (you've probably seen him in movies) and keyboardist Garth Hudson were the original members still touring. Not only were they great but Stephen Seagal joined them on stage for a few songs (he was filming a movie where he played in a band; and Seagal really did play the instruments).

Here is an article on Richard that shows him warts and all. From the article:

Manuel's carelessness often amused his friends and fellow musicians. He was notorious for crashing his Ferrari, and he once gave himself third-degree burns while trying to light a gas grill. But his habits were no laughing matter. When he moved out of a house in Malibu, he left behind 2,000 empty bottles of Grand Marnier, his favorite poison.

After the Band broke up in 1976, Manuel quit drinking and met his second wife, Arlie Litvak. (His first wife left him to become a Jehovah's Witness.) For a while, he was determined. "He said if he ever started drinking again, he'd kill himself," Litvak has said.

By the mid-'80s, however, with the Band (minus Robertson) reunited, the singer had fallen off the wagon. Some blame his disappointment that the Band was playing small markets, small venues; others believe he thought he was letting his bandmates down. After a gig in Winter Park, Fla., Manuel and his wife retired to their room at a Quality Inn, where he polished off a bottle of Grand Marnier, finished the last of his cocaine and went to sleep. In the morning, Litvak got up and went out in search of breakfast. When she returned, she went into the bathroom for the first time that day. There she found her husband, hanging by his belt from the shower curtain rod. It took Helm and Danko five minutes to haul the body down.

Ugh. Imagine having to do that. On a personal note I was born in Winter Park, Fla.

Opus Insert:

I rank Kansas' Leftoverture as good an album as any (anything by the Beatles, the Stones, Zeppelin). The following is "Opus Insert." I'm not sure how long this might stay up (because it's a reproduction from the original). But for rock/prog-rock, whatever, this is as good as it gets.

Mercer, O'Reilly and Christmas:

Ilana Mercer has an article at WorldNetDaily entitled O'Reilly won the battle – but lost the debate. She discusses Bill O'Reilly and the Christmas Wars. She doesn't like the way O'Reilly defended public Christmas displays. As she writes:

He defends the country's founding faith on the frivolous grounds that it is a federal festival like any other – an "uplifting tradition … where peace and love are the theme of the great day." The substance of O'Reilly's claim against those who'd disrespect a Christmas display is: "Be nice, because Christmas is nice." And because the feds have told you to.

As she argues:

O'Reilly's problem[ is that h]e's forever arguing his case from the stance of the positive law. The "Law.com Dictionary" defines legal positivism as "man-made law, as compared to 'natural law,' which is purportedly based on universally accepted moral principles." Believers call the natural law "God's law"; others, like myself, refer to law derived from reason.

Whatever the case, the natural law is the law O'Reilly seldom defers to.

[...]

...Christmas ought to be defended on the basis that Christianity is America's founding faith.

To defend Christian America with reference to un-Christian State law that has all but banished Christianity from the public square is worse than silly.

I left a comment on her blog which follows:

I disagree that Christmas should be defended because Christianity is America’s Founding Faith. I actually think O’Reilly’s case that the message of Christianity is “be just and good” — something to which secular folks and folks of ALL religions can agree about — is FAR closer to the natural law creed that defines America’s Founding.

Americans were divided on the basis of religion during the Founding era (yes, they were; you cannot form a lowest common denominator of “Christianity generally” because “Christians” like John Adams and Thomas Jefferson took blasphemous positions that the orthodox felt had *no proper place* in the understanding of “Christianity”).

And because they were so divided, they found they could come together on the basis of a natural religion based on “the laws of nature and nature’s God.” Now, this natural religion is, in many ways, entirely compatible with Christianity. But, nonetheless it IS not Christianity and Christianity’s essential and exclusive truths are not discoverable from reason or the natural law.

Private Stimulus:

Part I: The Theory

I just watched Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman speak on today's economic crisis. I'm skeptical about his Keynesianism. But I'll defer to his authority and give him the benefit of the doubt. My mind is open. Krugman said the stimulus of WWII got us out of the Great Depression. He also noted it doesn't necessarily matter where the money was spent -- such that even if government paid one group of folks to dig ditches and another to fill in the dirt (he didn't use that exact example but something close) -- that's ultimately what matters. He noted we should spend a lot on infrastructure. I agree that this is something that government IS relatively competent at doing. If the private market can effectively do it better (which I think they can), I'd rather them do it. But I'm willing to support a publicly funded private/public cooperative to improve roads, bridges, rails and the like and stimulate the economy. Krugman noted military spending could work (after all that's what got us out of the Great Depression). But given today's political climate, that's not a good idea. I agree.

Krugman also noted that stimulus was better if the money is spent on American provided services, not necessarily imported goods. But elsewhere I've seen Krugman note that many of these foreign manufactured goods -- for instance almost everything Walmart sells -- have a great deal of American "value added," as it were.

Finally, Krugman noted the problem of saving or investing government stimulus checks as opposed to immediately spending them which is what government wants you to do.

Part II: My Plan

One thing he scoffed at, though, was the notion that during tough economic times, the rich have a patriotic duty to spend money to stimulate the economy. As a collectivist, Krugman clearly sees this as government's role.

I don't. I think a private stimulus initiative by world billionaires (and to a lesser extent folks worth tens to hundreds of millions of dollars) is a great idea. It's not like the list of billionaires is that hard to find. They are right here. [This will be a world project after all].

Krugman seems chiefly concerned about spending money and spending it fast. How about this for an idea, inspired by the classic movie with the late John Candy, Richard Pryor, and the guy who played Larry Tate on "Bewitched," Brewster's Millions.

Remember Richard Pryor was given, by an unknown rich white relative, 30 million dollars to spend in a month with the catch that he couldn't accumulate any assets. If he could do it, he'd inherit the whole 300 million dollar estate. There was a "wimp clause" that would give him $1,000,000 and the rest to his attorneys (one of whom was the guy who played Larry Tate on Bewitched). Long story short Pryor took the deal and won after almost being foiled by the attorneys.

This is, it seems to me, textbook for engaging in massive stimulus along Keynes'/Krugman's lines. No assets; no investments. Must spend money now on consumable things.

So here's the plan. Get all of the billionaires to liquidate say $500 million of their assets, not much of a big deal for most of them. Perhaps a percentage. Maybe set the standard of Buffet and Gates liquidate a billion each and everyone else using that as a baseline percentage. Put the money in a pot. See if we could get the pot to grow to the 50 or 100 or more billion dollar mark. And hire people to spend the money in the pot with debit cards attached to the fund. Pay the spenders a modest salary of say $30,000 a year and benefits which they could use however they want (to invest, accumulate assets). But the money from the debit cards could not be invested or used to accumulate assets. The spenders should be able to buy assets like cars, jewelry and whatnot with the catch that 1) your time as a spender would be limited to at most a few months. And 2) once that time is up, all assets (like cars, jewelry and whatnot) HAD to be either given back to the millionaires/billionaires or donated to an official charity. [I know there's a potential problem with using the $$ to accumulate assets, stashing it, scramming, leaving the country. Losing the diamond rings which they planned on giving back or donating to charity. But realize the spenders would be on the hook for them.]

If you want to buy assets that you want to keep for the long term, DON'T use the special debit card.

The spenders' job performance would be judged on how much one spent. And if one didn't meet the threshold for spending one could be fired early from one's job term as a "spender."

The obvious benefits of my plan: 1) It might work MUCH better than government stimulus. And 2) it wouldn't cost the taxpayers anything, but, to the contrary, would only increase tax bases.

Now, why isn't this idea workable? And if Krugman is right, why wouldn't the billionaires be willing to part with a fraction of their wealth to get America/the world through this crisis via stimulus.

Drugs & Creativity:

I (born in 1973) was raised on the "war on drugs" propaganda and around age 18 began realizing how much of it was nonsense. Yet, I didn't need all of the "this is your brain on drugs" nonsense to understand there were serious dangers there. That many notable folks from John Belushi to River Phoenix to Jaco Pastorious to Charlie Parker to John Coltrane to Jimi Hendrix to Janis Joplin and on and on died either in large part or exclusively because of their problems with addiction to legal and illegal drugs testifies to their danger. And one didn't need "drug education," just a TV set and access to entertainment news shows to understand this.

Yet, I specifically listed those figures because each was in his own way a creative genius, who did the bulk of his or her creative genius work while high on drugs and died during their creative peak because of such (as Neil Young put it, they burned out instead of, like Paul McCartney or Johnny Rotten to use Young's specific example, faded away into the land of producing mediocre work). I'm not say that drugs made them more creative/fostered their creativity; but I certainly don't close my mind to this possibility. Just that drugs sure as Hell didn't stand in their way of maximizing their creative potential.

Though, I have also noticed that artistic talent -- not of the generic sort, but of the profound -- doesn't come from a place within one's soul that is always happy hunky and dory. From reading the biographies of numbers of notable artists it seems that a disproportionate number of them struggle with severe mental illness, depression and the like. The archetype of a "mad artistic genius" certainly, from my observations of human nature, has a strong kernel of Truth.

[BTW: I didn't mention Kurt Cobain even though he was addicted to drugs and that may have led to his suicide. Cobain also, apropos of this post, struggled with severe mental illness. Indeed he perfectly captures the archetype of the mentally tortured artistic genius. But folks who struggle with severe depression OFTEN take their own lives regardless of addiction to illegal drugs and that's where I put most of the blame for Cobain's suicide.]

Hear My Media Appearance:

Jim Babka has uploaded my media appearance on the show he hosted where I discuss the Christian origins of America with Herb Titus. You can listen to it here. You might have to turn the volume WAY up on my first segment (that lasted for a few minutes). Whether I was speaking too softly or the producers didn't have my volume turned up (or both) I don't know. But the volume issue was taken care of after the first few minute segment during the break.

Babka also provided critical feedback on the debate which you can read here.

I know Babka, as an evangelical Christian, disagrees with the view I often explicate on Romans 13. I'm not a Christian or a believer in the infallibility of the Bible so my understanding is more "academic" or "scholarly." But, evangelicals/fundamentalists/orthodox Christians -- devout believers in the Bible as the infallible Word of God -- throughout history and currently today do believe in this understanding that demands something close to unlimited submission to civil authorities. And if this interpretation of Romans 13 is correct, the American Revolution was a sin.

I’m actually must less passionately wedded to the position that Romans 13 teaches unlimited submission to government than I might seem. I tried to make clear I thought the position that, Herb, Jim, and the many Christians throughout history who argued for the right to resist tyrannical magistrates is a “reasonable” interpretation. I just want folks to be aware that what was central to the American Revolution is not so “clearly” biblical but rather a matter of debate within orthodox Christendom.

Hear Me Live on the Air Today:

At 3:00pm my Positive Liberty Co-blogger Jim Babka hosting. I am going to be discussing the Founding & Religion with Herb Titus, former VP Candidate for the Constitution Party and founding Dean of Regent University School of Law.

You can get the details here. I disagree with the "Christian America" reading of the Founding. But Herb has a JD from Harvard University School of Law and follows in a very respectable scholarly tradition of folks like the late Harvard Law Professor Harold Berman.

Animated Clip on Mormon Theology:

I found this on YouTube. It's quite interesting; though I don't know how much of this is accurate, how much is distortion. I'd like Mormon readers to comment.

Have Yourself a Merry Unitarian Christmas:

Numerous articles and blogs have noted the strong case to doubt Christmas' authentically "Christian" origins. Christ probably wasn't born on Dec. 25. The Puritans banned the holiday because it wasn't authentically Christian. And many of its rituals trace to the pagan celebration of the Winter Solstice or Saturnalia.

The modern understanding of Christmas is also significantly influenced by Charles Dickens' class "A Christmas Carol." Some Christians argue we need to put "Christ" back into Christmas and remind folks what "Christmas" is supposed to be all about. They might want to turn to Dickens' classic in support of that cause; but it would do them no good.

Charles Dickens, you see, was a Unitarian Christian. And "A Christmas Carol" preaches a decidedly (19th Century) Unitarian message on Christmas. To Unitarians, "Christianity" was all about good works and good will, NOT God's grace through Christ's atonement. Indeed, Unitarians view Jesus as the greatest moral teacher, someone who "saved" man through his stellar moral example, not blood atonement. And "A Christmas Carol" hardly ever mentions Jesus at all.

Now, orthodox Christians likewise appreciate good works and good will. But that is secondary to God's grace through the shed blood of Jesus Christ -- God the Son Incarnate. And "A Christmas Carol" celebrates this message that the orthodox could consider at best secondary or incidental, not the central theme of the Christian religion.

That said, have a Merry Unitarian Christmas.

Frazer Responds to Comments:

I posted a note from Dr. Gregg Frazer on my blogs and at American Creation it generated a lively 65 comments. Frazer emailed me this response:

According to the tally, there have been 65 comments in response to my brief post. Clearly, I cannot answer them all. I'd like to make a few brief comments, however.

Kristo: I think Acts 7:55-60 makes it clear that Stephen "counts" under my definition. For the purposes of the historical argument, though, I rely on what 18th century American Christians said Christianity was. It so happens that I agree with the 10 common elements that they affirmed as core doctrines.

Regarding the "key" Founders: I deal with eight, not five; and they represent the three most responsible for writing the Declaration and, arguably, the five most responsible for the content of the Constitution and putting it into effect.

"Majorities" of people simply assent to laws -- they don't frame them. Those who WRITE documents have influence over its content -- not those who merely assent to it. The U.S. Constitution, to which they assented, was "godless" and there was opposition to it on that basis -- but it was ratified anyway. The principles upon which it was based were identified as philosophical and historical (in the convention debates, The Federalist Papers, and their personal correspondence) -- not the Bible or the writings of church fathers/theologians. A number of those principles are non-biblical or even anti-biblical.

As for the Declaration, the fact that we're still arguing about its religious content 232 years later would please and amuse Jefferson. He intentionally wrote it such that everyone could read his own religious beliefs into it and, therefore, all would find it acceptable and supportable. The deist sees what he wants to see, the Jew sees what he wants, the Christian sees what he wants, etc. As theistic rationalists, Jefferson, Adams, & Franklin eschewed particular doctrine as divisive and, consequently, they had no doctrinal "dog in the race," so to speak. So, of course OFT sees Christian content because he wants to and secularists see deist language, etc. Such was the genius of Jefferson.

Jefferson (perhaps my least favorite Founder -- I'd love to leave him out) is important and included because he is most responsible for the content of the Declaration, the nation's formative philosophical document. Several complained in this discussion that TJ was the most aberrant where theology was concerned -- BUT THAT'S MY MAJOR POINT -- HE WASN'T ABERRANT AT ALL. The other seven I write about held fundamentally the same beliefs as Jefferson (Adams even said so).

Mr. Van Dyke: I would be the last person who would want Christianity or Christian influence "scrubbed" from anywhere. I began my project partly to correct the record concerning the Establishment Clause which the Court has butchered since 1947. BUT you can't scrub Christianity from places in which it doesn't exist. AND it does no favor to Christianity (rather, it harms it) when you ascribe the label "Christian" or "Christianity" to people or ideas or documents which are not really Christian. The Gospel becomes corrupted and muddled and the Word of God is tainted by non-biblical influences. It also exalts what God hates: generic, moralizing "religion."

To clarify my lack of desire to "scrub" any Christian influence away, let me say that there certainly were Christians involved in the Founding -- some of whom played important roles. For example, John Jay and Roger Sherman and John Witherspoon were Christians by my definition and by that of 18th century Americans. But they didn't have as much influence on the founding documents as the eight I studied.

As for the state constitution issue: the differences in the state constitutions point up the concerns of the theistic rationalists. There were many religious sects -- even among Protestants (especially among Protestants), so any attempt to establish any one of them on a national basis would have been disastrous and prevented a unified country. The theistic rationalists who were most influential in constructing and implementing the U.S. Constitution were in a perfect position to make a nonsectarian, non-Christian country because they did not adhere to particular (divisive, in their view) Christian doctrines. That is not to say that they didn't want the people to be religious or that they didn't want to promote religion -- they most certainly did. They did not, however, aspire to making a specifically "Christian" country and did not necessarily want the people to be "Christian." They wanted religion and religious people because the result would be a morality that would undergird the nation.

Jon: You were correct to take issue with my superlative concerning their use of "Christ" -- I should have said "almost never" or "very rarely." Turnabout is fair play: I have to take issue with you regarding your claim about the Bible's supposed "ambivalence toward chattel slavery." The form of slavery supported in the Bible is not what you think of as slavery, not the form of slavery practiced in the U.S., and not even the norm of slavery in the ancient world. Slavery in the Mosaic Commonwealth was voluntary and was actually a gracious provision for the poor. One who was economically inept could sell himself into slavery in order to provide for himself and/or his family. He was to be treated as a member of the family and strictly protected against any kind of abuse. There was not even a social stigma against the slave. Slaves were freed from their commitment after six years. In the Jubilee year, all slaves were released -- whether the six years were up or not. They could always be "bought back" at any time by any kinsman for the amount they owed. The kidnapping of persons to sell or use as slaves was a capital crime (Exodus 21:16). One could become a perpetual slave by one's own choice -- otherwise, it was not allowed.

Jerusalem or Mythological Rome?

That's one of the themes in Gary North's "Conspiracy In Philadelphia." I am going to reproduce this passage from Dr. North's E-Book because its analysis is so spot on:

We do not find authoritative references to the Bible or church history in either The Federalist Papers or the Antifederalist tracts. Adrienne Koch’s compilation of primary source documents, The American Enlightenment, is not mythological, even though it is self-consciously selective.36 There was an American Enlightenment, though subdued in its hostility to Christianity.37 Jefferson, after all, kept hidden his cut-up, re-pasted New Testament, purged of the miraculous and supernatural; he knew what his constituents would have thought of such a theology.38 He refused to publish this book, he told his friend, Christian physician Benjamin Rush, because he was “averse to the communication of my religious tenets to the public, because it would countenance the presumption of those who have endeavored to draw them before that tribunal, and to seduce public opinion to erect itself into that inquest over the rights of conscience, which the laws have so justly proscribed.”39 That is, if word got out to the American voters, who were overwhelmingly Christian in their views, regarding what he really believed about religion, he and his party might lose the next election, despite a generation of systematic planning by him and his deistic Virginia associates to get Christianity removed from the political arena in both Virginia and in national elections. (The book was not made public until 1902. In 1904, the 57th Congress reprinted 9,000 copies, 3,000 for use by Senators and 6,000 for the House.40 It was a very different America in 1904.)

The Framers rhetorically appealed back to Roman law and classical political models in their defense of the Constitution. Madison, Jay, and Hamilton used the Roman name “Publius” in signing the Federalist Papers. Publius was a prominent founder of the Roman Republic. The Antifederalists responded with pseudo-Roman names. Yet both groups were heavily dependent on late seventeenth-century political philosophy, as well as on early eighteenth-century Whig republicanism....41 They shared a common universe of political discourse, and trinitarian Christianity was what both sides were attempting to downplay. The political discourse of the age was dominated by classical allusions, not by Hebraic ones....

....What we must understand is that the U.S. Constitution is in large part a product of a rhetorical Enlightenment appeal back to the Greco-Roman world, yet it was in fact something quite modern: specifically, a reaction against the Puritanism of both seventeenth-century American colonialism and the Puritanism of the Cromwellian revolution of 1642–60.

To what extent was this verbal appeal back to Rome rhetorical? [Thomas] Pangle believes, as I do, that the Framers were essentially “moderns” rather than “ancients.” They were far more influenced by late seventeenth-century social thought than by the events of Roman history, let alone classical political philosophy, which had little impact on them except in a negative sense. “Generally speaking, the ancients, in contrast to the American Founders, appear to place considerably less emphasis on protecting individuals and their ‘rights’ – rights to private property and family safety, to property, to freedom of religion, and to the ‘pursuit of happiness.’”45 Also, he argues – I believe correctly – that the classical philosophers put virtue above fraternity and liberty.46 The Framers, while they discussed the need for virtue and religion – always carefully undefined – did so as defenders of political and economic freedom. Virtue was therefore instrumental for them – a means of achieving social stability and progress, liberty and security.47

This was also their view of religion. In this, they were not fundamentally different in principle from Robespierre, who established a formal civic religion of nature and reason in the midst of the Terror in 1794. De-Christianization was morally debilitating, Robespierre concluded; it had to be followed by the establishment of a new civic religion.48 He knew that men needed to believe in God’s sanctions in order to keep them obedient. Talmon calls this impulse “cosmic pragmatism.”49 The major figures among the Framers were wiser men than Robespierre, and more influenced by traditional Christianity, but they were Enlightenment men to the core. Their veneer and their constituencies were different from those of the French Revolutionaries, but not their theology. Their religion was civic religion. The difference is, they saw civic religion as a decentralized, individual matter rather than as a state affair; it was to aid the national government but not be part of the national government. John Adams, a theological unitarian, wrote in his autobiography, presumably for himself and not the electorate:

"One great advantage of the Christian religion is that it brings the great principle of the law of nature and nations, Love your neighbour as yourself, and do to others as you would that others should do to you, to the knowledge, belief and veneration of the whole people. Children, servants, women and men are all professors in the science of public as well as private morality. No other institution for education, no kind of political discipline, could diffuse this kind of necessary information, so universally among all ranks and descriptions of citizens. The duties and rights of the man and the citizen are thus taught, from early infancy to every creature. The sanctions of a future life are thus added to the observance of civil and political as well as domestic and private duties. Prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude, are thus taught to be the means and conditions of future as well as present happiness."50

Not a word about the atonement; not a word about the sacraments: the entire passage is geared to the requirements for public morality. The churches are viewed as effective educational institutions; no other institution could accomplish this task more effectively. Hence, Christianity is a good thing socially. The whole perspective is civic. pp. 27-32.

Munoz on James Madison & Religion:

Dr. Phillip Munoz of Tufts University is one of the best and brightest right of center scholars of religion and the Founding I've come across. The religious beliefs of the Founding Fathers will always be a matter of dispute. I've referred to James H. Hutson's (another fantastic right of center scholar) outstanding article on James Madison and religion a number of times when controversy erupts over what it is that Madison exactly believed. Now I am going to shine the light on Munoz's.

The article is entitled Religion in the Life, Thought, and Presidency of James Madison. There's much good in it and the entire thing is worth a read (please do). However I am going to focus on the part that discusses Madison's personal creed.

First Munoz summarizes the enigmatic dynamic to Madison's religious beliefs. The following seems to be the most telling passage:

The disagreement over Madison’s personal faith results, in part, from the fact that after 1776 Madison wrote almost nothing about his religious convictions—in the words of William Lee Miller, “he kept his mouth shut” about his religious beliefs.9

Keeping one's mouth shut (as did GW) is a telltale sign that someone has something to hide (i.e., unnacceptably heretical-heterodox beliefs; the very same beliefs that J. Adams, Jefferson and Franklin explicated in detail in their private letters).

Of course Munoz notes Madison's letter William Bradford, 25 September 1773 that Christian America proponents oft-cite where Madison supports his friend's desire to enter the ministry. As Madison wrote:

I have sometimes thought there could be no stronger testimony in favor of Religion or against temporal Enjoyments even the most rational and manly than for men who occupy the most honorable and gainful departments and are rising in reputation and wealth, publicly to declare their unsatisfactoriness by becoming fervent Advocates in the cause of Christ, & I wish you may give in your Evidence in this way.

But as Munoz aptly observes: "Such statements disappear from Madison’s writings after 1776. Whether he maintained his belief in an afterlife beyond his youth he does not say...."

Although Munoz doesn't cite him, Bishop Meade who knew Madison personally thought at around this time (1776) Madison ceased strict adherence to orthodox Christianity based on his political associations other "infidel" Founding Fathers (he doesn't mention them but was certainly referring to at least Jefferson):

His political associations with those of infidel principles, of whom there were many in his day, if they did not actually change his creed, yet subjected him to the general suspicion of it.

Meade also notes his personal impression of Madison was that he didn't strictly believe in the Bible:

I was never at Mr. Madison’s but once, and then our conversation took such a turn—though not designed on my part—as to call forth some expressions and arguments which left the impression on my mind that his creed was not strictly regulated by the Bible.

See the original here.

Munoz's most interesting analysis is of James Madison's letter to to Frederick Beasley, dated 20 November 1825 where Madison appeals to the Arian Anglican Divine Samuel Clarke (NOT John Witherspoon) for authority and otherwise speaks as a dyed in the wool philosophical rationalist. As Madison wrote:

DEAR SIR I have duly recd the copy of your little tract on the proofs of the Being & Attributes of God. To do full justice to it, would require not only a more critical attention than I have been able to bestow on it, but a resort to the celebrated work of Dr. Clarke, which I read fifty years ago only, and to that of Dr. Waterland also which I never read. . . .

The finiteness of the human understanding betrays itself on all subjects, but more especially when it contemplates such as involves infinity. What may safely be said seems to be, that the infinity of time & space forces itself on our conception, a limitation of either being inconceivable; that the mind prefers at once the idea of a self-existing cause to that of an infinite series of cause & effect, which augments, instead of avoiding the difficulty; and that it finds more facility in assenting to the self-existence of an invisible cause possessing infinite power, wisdom & goodness, than to the self-existence of the universe, visibly destitute of those attributes, and which may be the effect of them. In this comparative facility of conception & belief, all philosophical Reasoning on the subject may perhaps terminate.18

And Munoz's analysis of said passage:

Madison posits that philosophical reasoning can deduce two possible alternatives to explain the cause of existence: an invisible self-caused cause that itself is the cause of all that exists or, alternatively, the infinite self-existence of the universe. The mind, he says, “prefers at once” the former. It “finds more facility” in assenting to belief in an invisible cause possessing “infinite power, wisdom, and goodness” than it does to the self-existence of the universe without such attributes.

But why? Why, we might ask, does the mind prefer the self-existing cause possessing infinite power, wisdom, and goodness?...

Madison says the possibility of an infinite series of cause and effect “augments, instead of avoiding the difficulty.” Perhaps Madison means to suggest that belief in the eternal existence of the universe with an infinite series of cause and effect fails to offer a satisfactory resolution to the question of how existence itself came into being since our finite minds struggle to contemplate infinity. If this is correct, then it is the finiteness of our minds that leads it to prefer belief in an invisible self-caused cause over the eternal existence of the world—that is, Madison does not claim that reason itself sides with belief in an invisible cause possessing infinite power, wisdom, and goodness over belief in the eternal existence of the world. This conclusion would seem to be confirmed by Madison’s statement that “in this comparative facility of conception & belief, all philosophical Reasoning must terminate.” Madison suggests that philosophical reasoning alone cannot arbitrate between the possibility of the eternity of the world and the existence of a self-caused cause. In short, Madison’s position seems to be that reason suggests the possibility of but does not confirm the existence of a creator God possessing infinite power, wisdom, and goodness.

Strikingly, what we do not find in Madison’s writings in an explicit appeal to Scripture to decide the question. We have copies of the notes Madison took from his study of the Bible as a young man,19 but as far as I can tell, Madison never cites Scripture to resolve questions pertaining to the existence or nature of God.

Munoz then notes one time in the Federalist Papers (Federalist 37) where Madison alluded to revelation, and, according to Munoz, "Madison seems to question the certainty with which man can apprehend the meaning of divine revelation." As Madison wrote:

When the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own language, his meaning, luminous as it may be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated.20

Examining the available evidence, Munoz concludes:

On theological matters, Madison was first and foremost a rationalist. The starting point (and perhaps the end point) of his reflections seems to have been unaided philosophical reasoning—not so much reason aided by faith but human reason simply. [Bold mine.]

Munoz notes there is a strong mystery in how unaided philosophical reason lead Madison to belief in God's existence, but simply, that it did: "In the aforementioned response to Beasley, Madison also states,

"But whatever effect may be produced on some minds by the more abstract train of ideas which you so strongly support, it will probably always be found that the course of reasoning from the effect to the cause, 'from Nature to Nature’s God,' Will be the more universal & more persuasive application.21

"Madison seems to reveal the type of reasoning that he himself found most persuasive—'from Nature to Nature’s God.'"

John Adams' Penultimate Statement of Rationalism:

I tend to focus on John Adams so much to explicate the political-theology of the American Founding precisely because he is properly regarded as so "mainstream" a figure. There is a tendency to note (improperly) that Thomas Jefferson and Ben Franklin were "Deists" (in the strict sense of the term, which they weren't) and cast them off as outliers. Well, whatever their political differences, John Adams believed virtually exactly as did Jefferson and Franklin on their personal religious creed. And this tells me just how mainstream this personal creed was among the notable Founding Fathers.

They were "rationalists" in the sense that they believed the Bible was partially inspired and reason was the ultimate determiner of truth, including what parts of the Bible were legitimately revealed. The natural law [or as they put it in the Declaration of Independence, "the laws of nature and nature's God"] was that substantive law -- both scientific and moral -- which man could "discover" thru the use of his unaided reason. Though they believed some connection between the natural and revealed law (the same God who wrote the natural law also PARTIALLY inspired the Bible) the key Founders elevated natural (what man discovered from reason) over revealed (what's written in the Bible).

At least that is what John Adams does in his letter to Jefferson Sept. 12, 1813. Adams elevates reason so far over revelation that he notes even if he were on Mt. Sinai with Moses and God told him of the Trinity he still couldn't believe it because reason proves 1+1+1=3, not 1. Even as a secular minded fellow, I can see this as an arrogant elevation of reason over all else. As Adams noted:

Dear Sir,

. . . the human Understanding is a revelation from its Maker which can never be disputed or doubted. There can be no Scepticism, Phyrrhonism or Incredulity or Infidelity here. No Prophecies, no Miracles are necessary to prove this celestial communication. This revelation has made it certain that two and one make three; and that one is not three; nor can three be one. We can never be so certain of any Prophecy, or the fulfillment of any Prophecy; or of any miracle, or the design of any miracle as We are, from the revelation of nature i.e. natures God that two and two are equal to four. Miracles or Prophecies might frighten us out of our Witts [sic]; might scare us to death; might induce Us to lie; to say that We believe that 2 and 2 make 5. But we should not believe it. We should know the contrary

Had you and I been forty days with Moses on Mount Sinai and admitted to behold, the divine Shekinah, and there told that one was three and three, one: We might not have had courage to deny it. But We could not have believed it.

The whole thing is worth reading. Adams also denies eternal damnation and notes the dynamic that still persists to this day of orthodox Trinitarians not considering his theology to be "real Christianity," to which Adams responds:

Howl, Snarl, bite, Ye Calvinistick! Ye Athanasian Divines, if you will. Ye will say, I am no Christian: I say Ye are no Christians: and there the Account is balanced [sic]. Yet I believe all the honest men among you, are Christians in my Sense of the Word . . . .

Protestant Case Against The Natural Law:


Natural law doesn't bode well for the "Sola-Scriptura" the Bible trumps understanding of orthodox Protestantism.

Francis Schaeffer makes it here. As it relates to the context of the American Founding I am going to quote some arguments from Gary North's book "Conspiracy in Philadelphia." Note, though Dr. North is an extremist Reconstructionist, he has a PhD in history from University of California at Riverside and studied under Douglass Adair. Let his arguments in this regard rise and fall on their own merits.

Dr. North deals with Blackstone's Christian natural law synthesis. Christian Nationalists invariably cite Blackstone as authority for the "laws of nature and nature's God" because parts of his commentaries discuss the proper relationship between reason and revelation and Blackstone has a smoking gun quotation that gives revelation the edge. James Wilson, who unlike Blackstone, was actually an American Founder, also discussed the proper relationship between reason and revelation but, as I read him, is far more ambiguous on which can trump what, though he does, like Blackstone, assert their by in large agreement. Wilson also notes the two are incomplete without the other, but are supposed to work together. At one point Wilson notes:

These considerations show, that the scriptures support, confirm, and corroborate, but do not supercede the operations of reason and the moral sense. The information with regard to our duties and obligations, drawn from these different sources, ought not to run in unconnected and diminished channels: it should flow in one united stream, which, by its combined force and just direction, will impel us uniformly and effectually towards our greatest good.

As noted, Blackstone "theoretically" puts his cards more clearly on scripture's side. The passage Christian America apologists invariably stress follows:

This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.

But in order to apply this to the particular exigencies of each individual, it is still necessary to have recourse to reason; whose office it is to discover, as was before observed, what the law of nature directs in every circumstance of life; by considering, what method will tend the most effectually to our own substantial happiness. And if our reason were always, as in our first ancestor before his transgression, clear and perfect, unruffled by passions, unclouded by prejudice, unimpaired by disease or intemperance, the task would be pleasant and easy; we should need no other guide but this. But every man now finds the contrary in his own experience; that his reason is corrupt, and his understanding full of ignorance and error.

....The doctrines thus delivered we call the revealed or divine law, and they are to be found only in the holy scriptures. These precepts, when revealed, are found upon comparison to be really a part of the original law of nature, as they tend in all their consequences to man's felicity. But we are not from thence to conclude that the knowlege of these truths was attainable by reason, in it's present corrupted state; since we find that, until they were revealed, they were hid from the wisdom of ages. As then the moral precepts of this law are indeed of the same original with those of the law of nature, so their intrinsic obligation is of equal strength and perpetuity. Yet undoubtedly the revealed law is (humanly speaking) of infinitely more authority than what we generally call the natural law. Because one is the law of nature, expressly declared so to be by God himself; the other is only what, by the assistance of human reason, we imagine to be that law. If we could be as certain of the latter as we are of the former, both would have an equal authority; but, till then, they can never be put in any competition together.

UPON these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws; that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict these.

Here is Dr. North's critical commentary of Blackstone's remarks:

Having said this, he then spent four volumes describing English common law with only a few footnote references to the Bible. In the first three volumes, running almost 500 pages each, each has one footnote reference to the Bible. The fourth volume, on criminal law (Public Wrongs), has ten references. Not one of them is taken by Blackstone as authoritative for civil law; they were seen merely as historical examples. There is not a single reference to “Bible,” “Moses,” or “Revelation” in the set’s index.

How could this be if he was persuaded that biblical law and natural law are the same, but with biblical law so much clearer to us? Blackstone’s preliminary remarks were familiar in his era. Englishmen commonly tipped the brim of their epistemological caps to God and the Bible, but they did not take off their caps in the presence of God. They pursued their academic specialties just as Christians do today: with no systematic study of what biblical law specifically reveals regarding those disciplines. It was considered sufficient for Blackstone to have formally equated biblical law with natural law. Having done so, he could then safely ignore biblical law.

[...]

This raises another question: Was Blackstone in fact deliberately lying? In a perceptive essay by David Berman, we learn of a strategy that had been in use for over a century: combating a position by supporting it with arguments that are so weak that they in fact prove the opposite….If he was not lying, then he was naive beyond description, for his lame defense of biblical revelation greatly assisted the political triumph of the enemies of Christianity in the American colonies. pp. 22-24.

North also explains the context of how "educated" men like America's key Founders and the English Whig intellectuals they followed dealt with the reason v. revelation issue [Note: This is what's in between the ellipses in North's above quotation right before North's speculation that Blackstone might be lying.]:

This common equation of biblical law with natural law faced two monumental problems in the eighteenth century: (1) the continuing negative legacy of the English Civil War, 1642–60, in which the various Christian churches and sects had failed to agree on much of anything, a social and political experiment which ended with the restoration of Charles II; (2) the intellectual legacy of Isaac Newton, which had created a blinding illusion of the near-perfectability of reason’s ability to discern the perfect laws of nature in the physical world, and which therefore held out hope that this could also be accomplished in the moral and social realms.18 This dual legacy indicated that biblical revelation – or at least men’s understanding of that revelation – is far less certain as a guide to human action than unaided, unregenerate reason. Biblical higher criticism was a century old in English religious thought and politics by the time Blackstone wrote his Commentaries.19 Thus, by the time that the Commentaries appeared, the foundation of his defense of the superiority of biblical law to natural law – the greater clarity of biblical revelation compared to reason’s perception of natural law – was not believed by most men who called themselves educated. p. 23

And indeed, educated men Jefferson and J. Adams, in their private letters, demonstrate far more clearly than Wilson in his "Works" that they believed revelation subservient to man's reason. Wilson's Works (which were public) I admit are somewhat ambiguous on the proper relationship between reason & revelation, far more so than Blackstone. I would bet if his private letters were uncovered, we'd see something not unlike what follows from J. Adams and Jefferson on the superiority of reason over revelation.

First from Adams:

Philosophy, which is the result of reason, is the first, the original revelation of the Creator to his creature. man. When this revelation is clear and certain, by intuition or necessary inductions, no subsequent revelation, supported by prophecies or miracles, can supersede it. Philosophy is not only the love of wisdom, but the science of the universe and its cause. There is, there was, and there will be but one master of philosophy in the universe. Portions of it, in different degrees, are revealed to creatures. Philosophy looks with an impartial eye on all terrestrial religions. I have examined all, as well as my narrow sphere, my straitened means, and my busy life would allow me ; and the result is, that the Bible is the best book in the world. It contains more of my little philosophy than all the libraries I have seen; and such parts of it as I cannot reconcile to my little philosophy, I postpone for future investigation.

-- To Thomas Jefferson, Dec. 25, 1813.

Adams entire letter is worth a read, small parts of which have often been quoted out of context. Adams makes a number of notable claims: 1) That reason, not revelation is penultimate; 2) that, nonetheless, the Bible is the "best book"; and 3) that Hinduism and many exotic world religions teach the same truth as Christianity.

Here is Dr. Gregg Frazer's commentary on the letter:

In context, he has just said: “Philosophy, which is the result of reason, is the first, the original revelation of the Creator to his creature, man. … no subsequent revelation, supported by prophecies or miracles, can supersede it.” [the latter refers, of course, to the Bible and its inferiority to philosophy] He goes on to say: “Philosophy looks with an impartial eye on all terrestrial religions” and then talks about the Bible further. About the Bible, he then says: “such parts of it as I cannot reconcile to my little philosophy, I postpone for future investigation.” He then talks about Joseph Priestley (his spiritual mentor) and about various religious systems he and Priestley have encountered, including Zoroastrianism, Confucianism, Plato, the Brahmins, and then the Shastra — and the quoted commentary on the Shastra. A paragraph later, he says “these doctrines, sublime, if ever there were any sublime, Pythagoras learned in India, and taught them to Zaleucus and his other disciples.” Earlier in the same letter, he said: “The preamble to the laws of Zaleucus, which is all that remains, is as orthodox as Christian theology as Priestley’s ….” This is critical because Priestley is Adams’s (& Jefferson’s) spiritual mentor and because the laws of Zaleucus were supposedly handed down to pagans from Athena! SO YOU SEE THAT HE SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED CHRISTIANITY IN THE COMPARISON! Further, if a set of laws supposedly handed down from Athena 600 years before the birth of Christ can be considered “Christian” — what real meaning does the term have for Adams?

And Jefferson's exaltation of reason:

Fix reason firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal every fact, every opinion. Question with boldness even the existence of a God; because, if there be one, he must more approve of the homage of reason, than that of blindfolded fear. You will naturally examine first, the religion of your own country. Read the Bible, then as you would read Livy or Tacitus. The facts which are within the ordinary course of nature, you will believe on the authority of the writer, as you do those of the same kind in Livy & Tacitus. The testimony of the writer weighs in their favor, in one scale, and their not being against the laws of nature, does not weigh against them. But those facts in the Bible which contradict the laws of nature, must be examined with more care, and under a variety of faces. Here you must recur to the pretensions of the writer to inspiration from God. Examine upon what evidence his pretensions are founded, and whether that evidence is so strong, as that its falsehood would be more improbable than a change in the laws of nature, in the case he relates. For example, in the book of Joshua, we are told, the sun stood still several hours. Were we to read that fact in Livy or Tacitus, we should class it with their showers of blood, speaking of statues, beasts, &c. But it is said, that the writer of that book was inspired. Examine, therefore, candidly, what evidence there is of his having been inspired. The pretension is entitled to your inquiry, because millions believe it. On the other hand, you are astronomer enough to know how contrary it is to the law of nature that a body revolving on its axis, as the earth does, should have stopped, should not, by that sudden stoppage, have prostrated animals, trees, buildings, and should after a certain time gave resumed its revolution, & that without a second general prostration. Is this arrest of the earth's motion, or the evidence which affirms it, most within the law of probabilities?

-- To Peter Carr, August 10, 1787.

A passage from James Wilson's Works intimates such an understanding:

The law of nature is immutable; not by the effect of an arbitrary disposition, but because it has its foundation in the nature, constitution, and mutual relations of men and things. While these continue to be the same, it must continue to be the same also. This immutability of nature's laws has nothing in it repugnant to the supreme power of an all-perfect Being. Since he himself is the author of our constitution; he cannot but command or forbid such things as are necessarily agreeable or disagreeable to this very constitution. He is under the glorious necessity of not contradicting himself. This necessity, far from limiting or diminishing his perfections, adds to their external character, and points out their excellency.

Finally let me address the fact that these "educated" men sometimes quoted from the Bible as though it were a history book. Men like Ben Franklin and James Wilson did indeed sometimes quote the Bible as though its history were true and better respected it as a history book than today's intellectuals do. However, they still didn't necessarily believe it infallible or *the* authoritative source of history, just one of many valid sources. As Dr. North put it:

I am not arguing that Englishmen trusted a priori reason as the sole guide to human institutions; they also placed great weight on historical experience. My point is only that they placed almost zero practical weight on Old Testament law and experience, and when they cited the Old Testament, they did so because it was merely one historical source among many. p. 24 footnote 21.

Putting James Wilson in Context:

In reading James Wilson's work, one understands why many Roman Catholics may feel an affinity for the US Founding, despite the fact that the "Protestant" US Founders oft-expressed appalling anti-Roman Catholic bigotry: The US Founding heavily relied on natural law theory and Roman Catholics have embraced natural law through the teachings of Aquinas, who in turned adopted natural law from Aristotle.

Protestants have differed on whether natural law with its excessive use of reason and its antecedents in Aristotle is compatible at all with biblical Christianity. Francis Schaeffer, for instance, didn't think so. Tom Van Dyke, in this comment, nicely sums up why Christianity and natural law are compatible:

Paul in the Epistles sez that the natural law is written on man's heart. That's how Aquinas could give the pagan pre-Christian-era Aristotle his props.

It's not "reason" exactly. It's our human nature, our humanity itself, just as God created us. Some soft spot that lets us love art and not be robots. Aristotle found his way not only with an open mind but with an open heart. Aristotle was a mensch. If you know your Yiddish, a mensch has a brain and a heart. Otherwise, he's not a man.

Compare Aristotle with [the modernist] Thomas Hobbes, who made a damn good argument that we're just sophisticated and calculating social animals, and you see the difference.

America's Protestant natural lawyers rarely cited Aquinas but they did cite Locke, who in turn cited Hooker who in turn was the Anglican heir to Aquinas. AND the Founders loved Aristotle as well.

But one thing to understand about the natural law -- and this is something that Christian America apologists often don't get -- is that it defines as what man discovers from reason. And, though, ultimately "Christian" natural law believes in the synthesis and perfect agreement of reason and revelation, it eschews simply looking up verses and chapters of the Bible as proof texts and quoting them as trumping authority. So if one is a Protestant like Francis Schaeffer who likes to do that because man's unregenerate reason is the "devil's whore" as it were, the natural law of the American Founding (i.e., "the laws of nature and nature's God") is not likely to resonate with you.

And so it is that I am going to post a long excerpt from James Wilson's Works. Wilson was one of the most important Founding Fathers, one of six (I believe) who signed the Declaration and the US Constitution. And he played a key role at the Constitutional Convention. And, as a common lawyer and expositor of how Americans viewed "the laws of nature and nature's God," he is a much better authority than Blackstone who was an English Tory who believed in the very Parliamentary supremacy against which America revolted.

Wilson's theories, as we will see shortly, are certainly reminiscent of Aquinas'. After quoting this long excerpt, my next post will feature some reasons why evangelicals/fundamentalists don't embrace the natural law. In short, it's too "man" centered and philosophical. It DOESN'T view the Bible as central. I quoted all of Chapter 1 and about half of Chapter 2. I end at a point in Chapter 2 where Wilson refers to the natural law as that which is written on man's heart by God, the point of connection between the Bible and Aristotle to which Mr. Van Dyke alluded. Wilson rarely cites scripture in an authoritative "verse and chapter" sense. There are however, some biblical references very mildly peppered throughout; the bulk of said contents are derived from natural law reasoning-philosophical rationalism. The same thing can be said of John Witherspoon's Lectures on Moral Philosophy which are not at all Calvinistic but rather the product of Witherspoon's naturalism and rationalism. Indeed there Witherspoon relies on Samuel Clarke the British naturalist-rationalist Anglican divine who was nearly defrocked for peddling Arianism in the Church.

Anyway, here is a long excerpt from Works which hopefully helps to put Wilson's theology of law into better context:

PART I.


CHAPTER I.


INTRODUCTORY LECTURE.


OF THE STUDY OF THE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES.


LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,


THOUGH I am not unaccustomed to speak in publick, yet, on this occasion, I rise with much diffidence to address you. The character, in which I appear, is both important and new. Anxiety and selfdistrust are natural on my first appearance. These feelings are greatly heightened by another consideration, which operates with peculiar force. I never before had the honour of addressing a fair audience. Anxiety and selfdistrust, in an uncommon degree, are natural, when, for the first time, I address a fair audience so brilliant as this is. There is one encouraging reflection, however, which greatly supports me. The whole of my very respectable audience is as much distinguished by its politeness, as a part of it is distinguished by its brilliancy. From that politeness, I shall receive ― what I feel I need ― an uncommon degree of generous indulgence.


It is the remark of an admired historian, that the high character, which the Grecian commonwealths long possessed among nations, should not be ascribed solely to their excellence in science and in government. With regard to these, other nations, he thinks, and particularly that of which he was writing the history, were entitled to a reputation, not less exalted and illustrious. But the opinion, he says, of the superiour endowments and achievements of the Grecians has arisen, in a considerable degree, from their peculiar felicity in having their virtues transmitted to posterity by writers, who excelled those of every other country in abilities and elegance.


Alexander, when master of the world, envied the good fortune of Achilles, who had a Homer to celebrate his deeds.


The observation, which was applied to Rome by Sallust, and the force of which appears so strongly from the feelings of Alexander, permit me to apply, for I can apply it with equal propriety, to the States of America.


They have not, it is true, been long or much known upon the great theatre of nations: their immature age has not hitherto furnished them with many occasions of extending their renown to the distant quarters of the globe. But, in real worth and excellence, I boldly venture to compare them with the most illustrious commonwealths, which adorn the records of fame. When some future Xenophon or Thucydides shall arise to do justice to their virtues and their actions; the glory of America will rival ― it will outshine the glory of Greece.


Were I called upon for my reasons why I deem so highly of the American character, I would assign them in a very few words ― That character has been eminently distinguished by the love of liberty, and the love of law.


I rejoice in my appointment to this chair, because it gives me the best opportunities to discover, to study, to develop, and to communicate many striking instances, hitherto little known, on which this distinguished character is founded.


In free countries ― in free countries, especially, that boast the blessing of a common law, springing warm and spontaneous from the manners of the people ― Law should be studied and taught as a historical science.


The eloquent Rousseau complains, that the origin of nations is much concealed by the darkness or the distance of antiquity.


In many parts of the world, the fact may be as he represents it; and yet his complaint may be without foundation: for, in many parts of the world, the origin of nations ought to be buried in oblivion. To succeeding ages, the knowledge of it would convey neither pleasure nor instruction.


With regard to the States of America, I am happy in saying, that a complaint concerning the uncertainty of their first settlements cannot be made with propriety or truth; though I must add, that, if it could be made with propriety or truth, it would be a subject of the deepest regret.


If the just and genuine principles of society can diffuse a lustre round the establishment of nations; that of the States of America is indeed illustrious. Fierce oppression, rattling, in her left hand, the chains of tyranny; and brandishing, in her right hand, the torch of persecution, drove our predecessors from the coasts of Europe: liberty, benevolent and serene, pointing to a cornucopia on one side, and to a branch of olive on the other, invited and conducted them to the American shores.


In discharging the duties of this office, I shall have the pleasure of presenting to my hearers what, as to the nations in the Transatlantick world, must be searched for in vain ― an original compact of a society, on its first arrival in this section of the globe. How the lawyers, and statesmen, and antiquarians, and philosophers of Europe would exult, on discovering a similar monument of the Athenian commonwealth! and yet, perhaps, the historical monuments of the states of America are not, intrinsically, less important, or less worthy of attention, than the historical monuments of the states of Greece. The latter, indeed, are gilded with the gay decorations of fable and mythology; but the former are clothed in the neater and more simple garb of freedom and truth.


The doctrine of toleration in matters of religion, reasonable though it certainly is, has not been long known or acknowledged. For its reception and establishment, where it has been received and established, the world has been thought to owe much to the inestimable writings of the celebrated Locke. To the inestimable writings of that justly celebrated man, let the tribute of applause be plenteously paid: but while immortal honours are bestowed on the name and character of Locke; why should an ungracious silence be observed, with regard to the name and character of Calvert?


Let it be known, that, before the doctrine of toleration was published in Europe, the practice of it was established in America. A law in favour of religious freedom was passed in Maryland, as early as the year one thousand six hundred and forty nine.


When my Lord Baltimore was afterwards urged ― not by the spirit of freedom ― to consent that this law should be repealed; with the enlightened principles of a man and a christian, he had the fortitude to declare, that he never would assent to the repeal of a law, which protected the natural rights of men, by ensuring to every one freedom of action and thought. Indeed, the character of this excellent man has been too little known. He was truly the father of his country. To the legislature of Maryland he often recommended a maxim, which deserves to be written in letters of gold: "By concord a small colony may grow into a great and renowned nation; but, by dissensions, mighty and glorious kingdoms have declined and fallen1 into nothing."


1. Chal. 363.


Similar to that of Calvert, has been the fate of many other valuable characters in America. They have been too little known. To those around them, their modest merits have been too familiar, perhaps too uniform, to attract particular and distinguished attention: by those at a distance, the mild and peaceful voice of their virtue has not been heard. But to their memories, justice should be done, as far as it can be done, by a just and grateful country.


In the European temple of fame, William Penn is placed by the side of Lycurgus. Will America refuse a temple to her patriots and her heroes? No; she will not. The glorious dome already rises. Its architecture is of the neatest and chastest order: its dimensions are spacious: its proportions are elegant and correct. In its front a number of niches are formed. In some of them statues are placed. On the left hand of the portal, are the names and figures of Warren, Montgomery, Mercer. On the right hand, are the names and figures of Calvert, Penn, Franklin. In the middle, is a niche of larger size, and decorated with peculiar ornaments. On the left side of it, are sculptured the trophies of war on the right, the more precious emblems of peace. Above it, is represented the rising glory of the United States. It is without a statue and without a name. Beneath it, in letters very legible, are these words ― "FOR THE MOST WORTHY." By the enraptured voice of grateful America ― with the consenting plaudits of an admiring world, the designation is unanimously made. Late ― very late ― may the niche be filled.2


2. General Washington, then President of the United States, was present when this lecture was delivered. Ed.



But while we perform the pleasing duties of gratitude, let not other duties be disregarded. Illustrious

examples are displayed to our view, that we may imitate as well as admire. Before we can be distinguished by the same honours, we must be distinguished by the same virtues.


What are those virtues? They are chiefly the same virtues, which we have already seen to be descriptive of the American character ― the love of liberty, and the love of law. But law and liberty cannot rationally become the objects of our love, unless they first become the objects of our knowledge. The same course of study, properly directed, will lead us to the knowledge of both. Indeed, neither of them can be known, because neither of them can exist, without the other. Without liberty, law loses its nature and its name, and becomes oppression. Without law, liberty also loses its nature and its name, and becomes licentiousness. In denominating, therefore, that science, by which the knowledge of both is acquired, it is unnecessary to preserve, in terms, the distinction between them. That science may be named, as it has been named, the science of law.


The science of law should, in some measure, and in some degree, be the study of every free citizen, and of every free man. Every free citizen and every free man has duties to perform and rights to claim. Unless, in some measure, and in some degree, he knows those duties and those rights, he can never act a just and an independent part.


Happily, the general and most important principles of law are not removed to a very great distance from common apprehension. It has been said of religion, that though the elephant may swim, yet the lamb may wade in it. Concerning law, the same observation may be made.


The home navigation, carried on along the shores, is more necessary, and more useful too, than that, which is pursued through the deep and expanded ocean. A man may be a most excellent coaster, though he possess not the nautical accomplishments and experience of a Cook.


As a science, the law is far from being so disagreeable or so perplexed a study, as it is frequently supposed to be. Some, indeed, involve themselves in a thick mist of terms of art; and use a language unknown to all, but those of the profession. By such, the knowledge of the law, like the mysteries of some ancient divinity, is confined to its initiated votaries; as if all others were in duty bound, blindly and implicitly to obey. But this ought not to be the case. The knowledge of those rational principles on which the law is founded, ought, especially in a free government, to be diffused over the whole community.


In a free country, every citizen forms a part of the sovereign power: he possesses a vote, or takes a still more active part in the business of the commonwealth. The right and the duty of giving that vote, the right and the duty of taking that share, are necessarily attended with the duty of making that business the object of his study and inquiry.


In the United States, every citizen is frequently called upon to act in this great publick character. He elects the legislative, and he takes a personal share in the executive and judicial departments of the nation. It is true, that a man, who wishes to be right, will, with the official assistance afforded him, be seldom under the necessity of being wrong: but it is equally true, and it ought not to be concealed, that the publick duties and the publick rights of every citizen of the United States loudly demand from him all the time, which he can prudently spare, and all the means which he can prudently employ, in order to learn that part, which it is incumbent on him to act.


On the publick mind, one great truth can never be too deeply impressed ― that the weight of the government of the United States, and of each state composing the onion, rests on the shoulders of the people. I express not this sentiment now, as I have never expressed it heretofore, with a view to flatter:


I express it now, as I have always expressed it heretofore, with a far other and higher aim ― with an aim to excite the people to acquire, by vigorous and manly exercise, a degree of strength sufficient to support the weighty burthen, which is laid upon them ― with an aim to convince them, that their duties rise in strict proportion to their rights; and that few are able to trace or to estimate the great danger, in a free government, when the rights of the people are unexercised, and the still greater danger, when the rights of the people are ill exercised.


At a general election, too few attend to the important consequences of voting or not voting; and to the consequences, still more important, of voting right or voting wrong.


The rights and the duties of jurors, in the United States, are great and extensive. No punishment can be inflicted without the intervention of one ― in much the greater number of cases, without the intervention of more than one jury. Is it not of immense consequence to the publick, that those, who have committed crimes, should not escape with impunity? Is it not of immense consequence to individuals, that all, except those who have committed crimes, should be secure from the punishment denounced against their commission? Is it not, then, of immense consequence to both, that jurors should possess the spirit of just discernment, to discriminate between the innocent and the guilty? This spirit of just discernment requires knowledge of, at least, the general principles of the law, as well as knowledge of the minute particulars concerning the facts.


It is true, that, in matters of law, the jurors are entitled to the assistance of the judges; but it is also true, that, after they receive it, they have the right of judging for themselves: and is there not to this right the great corresponding duty of judging properly?


Surely, therefore, those who discharge the important and, let me add, the dignified functions of jurors, should acquire, as far as they possibly can acquire, a knowledge of the laws of their country: for, let me add further, the dignity, though not the importance of their functions, will greatly depend on the abilities; with which they discharge them.


But in the administration of justice ― that part of government, which comes home most intimately to the business and the bosoms of men ― there are judges as well as jurors; those, whose peculiar province it is to answer questions of law, as well as those, whose peculiar province it is to answer questions of fact.


In many courts ― in many respectable courts within the United States, the judges are not, and, for a long time, cannot be gentlemen of professional acquirements. They may, however, fill their offices usefully and honourably, the want of professional acquirements notwithstanding. But can they do this, without a reasonable degree of acquaintance with the law?


We have already seen, that, in questions of law, the jurors are entitled to the assistance of the judges: but can the judges give assistance, without knowing what answers to make to the questions which the jury may propose? can those direct others, who themselves know not the road?


Unquestionably, then, those who fill, and those who expect to fill the offices of judges in courts, not, indeed, supreme, but rising in importance and in dignity above the appellation of inferiour, ought to make the strongest efforts in order to obtain a respectable degree of knowledge in the law.


Let me ascend to a station more elevated still. In the United States, the doors of publick honours and publick offices are, on the broad principles of equal liberty, thrown open to all. A laudable emulation, an emulation that ought to be encouraged in a free government, may prompt a man to legislate as well as to decide for his fellow citizens ― to legislate, not merely for a single State, but for the most august Union that has yet been formed on the face of the globe.


Should not he, who is to supply the deficiencies of the existing law, know when the existing law is defective? Should not he, who is to introduce alterations into the existing law, know in what instances the existing law ought to be altered?


The first and governing maxim in the interpretation of a statute is, to discover the meaning of those, who made it. The first rule, subservient to the principle of the governing maxim, is, to discover what the law was, before the statute was made. The inference, necessarily resulting from the joint operation of the maxim and the rule, is this, that in explaining a statute, the judges ought to take it for granted, that those, who made it, knew the antecedent law. This certainly implies, that a competent knowledge of, at least, the general principles of law, is of indispensable necessity to those, who undertake the transcendent office of legislation.


I say, a knowledge of the general principles of law for though an accurate, a minute, and an extensive knowledge of its practice and particular rules be highly useful; yet I cannot conceive it to be absolutely requisite to the able discharge of a legislative trust.


Upon this distinction ― and it is an important one ― I cannot, perhaps, explain myself better, than by delivering the sentiments, which were entertained, some centuries ago, by a very learned and able judge ― I mean the Lord Chancellor Fortescue.


In his excellent book, which he wrote in praise of the laws of England, he uses a number of arguments with his pupil, the prince of Wales, to excite him to the study of the law. Of these arguments the prince feels and acknowledges the full force. "But," says he, "there is one thing, which agitates my mind in such a manner, that, like a vessel tossed in the tumultuous ocean, I know not how to direct my course: it is, that when I recollect the number of years, which the students of the law employ, before they acquire a sufficient degree of knowledge, I am apprehensive lest, in studies of this nature, I should consume the whole of my youth."


To relieve his pupil from this anxiety, the chancellor cites a passage from the writings of Aristotle, to the following purpose: "We are then supposed to know a thing, when we apprehend its causes and its principles, as high as its original elements."


This maxim the chancellor illustrates, by a reference to several of the sciences; and then draws this general conclusion. "Whoever knows the principles and elements of any science, knows the science itself ― generally, at least, though not completely." This conclusion he then applies to the science of law. "In the same manner, when you shall become acquainted with the principles and the elements of law, you may be denominated a lawyer. It will not be necessary for you, at a great expense of your time, to scrutinize curious and intricate points of discussion. I know the quickness of your apprehension, and the strength of your genius. Though the legal knowledge accumulated in a series of twenty years is not more than sufficient to qualify one for being a judge; yet, in one year, you will be able to acquire a degree of it sufficient for you; without, even in that year, neglecting your other studies and improvements."3


That a law education is necessary for gentlemen intended for the profession of the law, it would be as ridiculous to prove as to deny. In all other countries, publick institutions bear a standing testimony to this truth. Ought this to be the only country without them? Justinian, who did so much for the Roman law, was, as might have been expected, uncommonly attentive to form and establish a proper plan for studying it. All the modern nations of Europe have admitted the profession of their municipal jurisprudence, into their universities and other seminaries of liberal education.


In England, numerous and ample provisions have been made for this purpose. For young gentlemen, there are eight houses of chancery, where they learn the first elements of law. For those more advanced in their studies, there are four inns of court. "All these together," says my Lord Coke,4 with conscious professional pride, "compose the most illustrious university in the world, for the profession of law." Here lectures have been read, exercises have been performed, and degrees in the common law have been conferred, in the same manner as degrees in the civil and canon law, in other universities.


Besides all these, the Vinerian professorship of law has, not many years ago, been established in the university of Oxford. Of this professorship, the celebrated Sir William Blackstone was the first, who filled the chair.


3. Fort. de Laud. c. 7, 8.


4. 3 Rep. Pref. 20.


A question deeply interesting to the American States now presents itself. Should the elements of a law education, particularly as it respects publick law, be drawn entirely from another country ― or should they be drawn, in part, at least, from the constitutions and governments and laws of the United States, and of the several States composing the Union?


The subject, to one standing where I stand, is not without its delicacy: let me, however, treat it with the decent but firm freedom, which befits an independent citizen, and a professor in independent states.


Surely I am justified in saying, that the principles of the constitutions and governments and laws of the United States, and the republicks, of which they are formed, are materially different from the principles of the constitution and government and laws of England; for that is the only country, from the principles of whose constitution and government and laws, it will be contended, that the elements of a law education ought to be drawn. I presume to go further: the principles of our constitutions and governments and laws are materially better than the principles of the constitution and government and laws of England.


Permit me to mention one great principle, the vital principle I may well call it, which diffuses animation and vigour through all the others. The principle I mean is this, that the supreme or sovereign power of the society resides in the citizens at large; and that, therefore, they always retain the right of abolishing, altering, or amending their constitution, at whatever time, and in whatever manner, they shall deem it expedient.


By Sir William Blackstone, from whose Commentaries, a performance in many respects highly valuable, the elements of a foreign law education would probably be borrowed ― by Sir William Blackstone, this great and fundamental principle is treated as a political chimera, existing only in the minds of some theorists; but, in practice, inconsistent with the dispensation of any government upon earth. Let us hear his own words.


'It must be owned that Mr. Locke and other theoretical writers have held, that "there remains still inherent in the people, a supreme power to alter the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them; for when such trust is abused, it is thereby forfeited, and devolves to those, who gave it." ' But, however just this conclusion may be in theory, we cannot admit it, nor argue from it, under any dispensation of government, at present actually existing. For this devolution of power to the people at large, includes a dissolution of the whole form of government established by that people; reduces all the members to their original state of equality; and, by annihilating the sovereign power, repeals all positive laws whatsoever before enacted. No human laws will therefore suppose a case, which at once must destroy all law, and compel men to build afresh upon a new foundation; nor will they make provision for so desperate an event, as must render all legal provisions ineffectual.5


5. 1 Bl. Com. 161, 162.


And yet, even in England, there have been revolutions of government: there has been one within very little more than a century ago. The learned Author of the Commentaries admits the fact; but denies it to be a ground on which any constitutional principle can be established.


If the same precise "conjunction of circumstances" should happen a second time; the revolution of one thousand six hundred and eighty eight would form a precedent: but were only one or two of the circumstances, forming that conjunction, to happen again; "the precedent would fail us."6


6. 1 Bl. Com. 245.


The three circumstances, which formed that conjunction, were these: 1. An endeavour to subvert the constitution, by breaking the original contract between the king and people. 2. Violation of the fundamental laws. 3. Withdrawing out of the kingdom.


Now, on this state of things, let us make a supposition ― not a very foreign one ― and see the consequences, which would unquestionably follow from the principles of Sir William Blackstone. Let us suppose, that, on some occasion, a prince should form a conjunction of only two of the circumstances; for instance, that he should only violate the fundamental laws, and endeavour to subvert the constitution: let us suppose, that, instead of completing the conjunction, by withdrawing out of his government, he should only employ some forty or fifty thousand troops to give full efficacy to the two first circumstances: let us suppose all this ― and it is surely not unnatural to suppose, that a prince, who shall form the two first parts of the conjunction, will not, like James the second, run away from the execution of them ― let


us, I say, suppose all this; and what, on the principles of Sir William Blackstone, would be the undeniable consequence? In the language of the Commentaries, "our precedent would fail us."


But we have thought, and we have acted upon revolution principles, without offering them up as sacrifices at the shrine of revolution precedents.


Why should we not teach our children those principles, upon which we ourselves have thought and acted? Ought we to instil into their tender minds a theory, especially if unfounded, which is contradictory to our own practice, built on the most solid foundation? Why should we reduce them to the cruel dilemma of condemning, either those principles which they have been taught to believe, or those persons whom they have been taught to revere?


It is true, that the learned Author of the Commentaries concludes this very passage, by telling us, that "there are inherent, though latent powers of society, which no climate, no time, no constitution, no contract can ever destroy or diminish." But what does this prove? not that revolution principles are, in his opinion, recognized by the English constitution; but that the English constitution, whether considered as a law, or as a contract, cannot destroy or diminish those principles.


It is the opinion of many, that the revolution of one thousand six hundred and eighty eight did more than set a mere precedent, even in England. But be that as it may: a revolution principle certainly is, and certainly should be taught as a principle of the constitution of the United States, and of every State in the Union.


This revolution principle ― that, the sovereign power residing in the people, they may change their constitution and government whenever they please ― is not a principle of discord, rancour, or war: it is a principle of melioration, contentment, and peace. It is a principle not recommended merely by a flattering theory it is a principle recommended by happy experience. To the testimony of Pennsylvania ― to the testimony of the United States I appeal for the truth of what I say.


In the course of these lectures, my duty will oblige me to notice some other important principles, very particularly his definition and explanation of law itself, in which my sentiments differ from those of the respectable Author of the Commentaries. It already appears, that, with regard to the very first principles of government, we set out from different points of departure.


As I have mentioned Sir William Blackstone, let me speak of him explicitly as it becomes me. I cannot consider him as a zealous friend of republicanism. One of his survivers or successours in office has characterized him by the appellation of an antirepublican lawyer. On the subject of government, I think I can plainly discover his jealousies and his attachments.


For his jealousies, an easy and natural account may be given. In England, only one specimen of a commonwealth has been exhibited to publick examination; and that specimen was, indeed, an unfavourable one. On trial, it was found to be unsound and unsatisfactory. It is not very surprising that an English lawyer, with an example so inauspicious before his eyes, should feel a degree of aversion, latent, yet strong, to a republican government.


An account, perhaps equally natural and easy, may he given for his attachments. With all reigning families, I believe, it is a settled maxim, that every revolution in government is unjustifiable, except the single one, which conducted them to the throne. The maxims of the court have always their diffusive influence. That influence, in favour of one species of government, might steal imperceptibly upon a mind, already jealous of another species, viewed as its rival, and as its enemy.


But, with all his prejudices concerning government, I have the pleasure of beholding him, in one conspicuous aspect, as a friend to the rights of men. To those rights, the author of the beautiful and animated dissertations concerning juries could not be cold or insensible.


As author of the Commentaries, he possessed uncommon merit. His manner is clear and methodical; his sentiments ― I speak of them generally ― are judicious and solid; his language is elegant and pure. In publick law, however, he should be consulted with a cautious prudence. But, even in publick law, his principles, when they are not proper objects of imitation, will furnish excellent materials of contrast. On every account, therefore, he should be read and studied. He deserves to be much admired; but he ought not to be implicitly followed.


This last admonitory remark should not be confined to Sir William Blackstone: it ought to be extended to all political writers ― must I say? ― almost without exception. This seems a severe sentence: but, if it is just, it must be pronounced. The cause of liberty, the rights of men require, that, in a subject essential to that cause and to those rights, errour should be exposed, in order to be avoided.


The foundations of political truth have been laid but lately: the genuine science of government, to no human science inferiour in importance, is, indeed, but in its infancy: and the reason of this can be easily assigned. In the whole annals of the Transatlantick world, it will be difficult to point out a single instance of its legitimate institution: I will go further, and say, that, among all the political writers of the Transatlantick world, it will be difficult to point out a single model of its unbiassed theory.


The celebrated Grotius introduces what he says concerning the interesting doctrine of sovereignty, with the following information. "Learned men of our age, each of them handling the argument, rather according to the present interest of the affairs of his country, than according to truth, have greatly perplexed that, which, of itself, was not very clear."7 In this, the learned men of every other age have resembled those of the age of Grotius.


7. Gro. b. i. c. 3. e. 5.


Indeed, it is astonishing, in what intricate mazes politicians and philosophers have bewildered themselves upon this subject. Systems have been formed upon systems, all fleeting, because all unfounded. Sovereignty has sometimes been viewed as a star, which eluded our investigation by its immeasurable height: sometimes it has been considered as a sun, which could not be distinctly seen by reason of its insufferable splendour.


In Egypt, the Nile is an object truly striking and grand. Its waters, rising to a certain height, and spreading to a certain distance, are the cause of fertility and plenty: swelling higher, and extending further, they produce devastation and famine. This stupendous stream, at some times so beneficial, at other times so destructive, has, at all times, formed a subject of anxious inquiry. To trace its source has been the unceasing aim of the mighty and the learned. Kings, attended with all the instruments of strength; sages, furnished with all the apparatus of philosophy, have engaged, with ardour, in the curious search; but their most patient and their most powerful enterprises have been equally vain.


The source of the Nile continued still unknown; and because it continued still unknown, the poets fondly fabled that it was to be found only in a superiour orb; and, of course, it was worshipped as a divinity.


We are told, however, that, at last, the source of the Nile has been discovered; and that it consists of ― what might have been supposed before the discovery ― a collection of springs small, indeed, but pure.


The fate of sovereignty has been similar to that of the Nile. Always magnificent, always interesting to mankind, it has become alternately their blessing and their curse. Its origin has often been attempted to be traced. The great and the wise have embarked in the undertaking; though seldom, it must be owned, with the spirit of just inquiry; or in the direction, which leads to important discovery. The source of sovereignty was still concealed beyond some impenetrable mystery; and, because it was concealed, philosophers and politicians, in this instance, gravely taught what, in the other, the poets had fondly fabled, that it must be something more than human: it was impiously asserted to be divine.


Lately, the inquiry has been recommenced with a different spirit, and in a new direction; and although the discovery of nothing very astonishing, yet the discovery of something very useful and true, has been the result. The dread and redoubtable sovereign, when traced to his ultimate and genuine source, has been found, as he ought to have been found, in the free and independent man.


This truth, so simple and natural, and yet so neglected or despised, may be appreciated as the first and fundamental principle in the science of government.


Besides the reasons, which I have already offered; others may be suggested, why the elements of a law education ought to be drawn from our own constitutions and governments and laws.


In every government, which is not altogether despotical, the institution of youth is of some publick consequence. In a republican government, it is of the greatest. Of no class of citizens can the education be of more publick consequence, than that of those, who are destined to take an active part in publick affairs. Those who have had the advantage of a law education, are very frequently destined to take this active part. This deduction clearly shows, that, in a free government, the principles of a law education are matters of the greatest publick consequence.


Ought not those principles to be congenial with the principles of government? By the revolution in the United States, a very great alteration ― a very great improvement ― as we have already seen, has taken place in our system of government: ought not a proportioned alteration ― ought not a proportioned improvement to be introduced into our system of law education?


We have passed the Red Sea in safety: we have survived a tedious and dangerous journey through the wilderness: we are now in full and peaceable possession of the promised land: must we, after all, return to the flesh pots of Egypt? Is there not danger, that when one nation teaches, it may, in some instances, give the law to another?


A foundation of human happiness, broader and deeper than any that has heretofore been laid, is now laid in the United States: on that broad and deep foundation, let it be our pride, as it is our duty, to build a superstructure of adequate extent and magnificence.


But further; many parts of the laws of England can, in their own nature, have neither force nor application here. Such are all those parts, which are connected with ecclesiastical jurisdiction and an ecclesiastical establishment. Such are all those parts, too, which relate to the monarchical and aristocratick branches of the English constitution. Every one, who has perused the ponderous volumes of the law, knows how great a proportion of them is filled with the numerous and extensive titles relating to those different subjects. Surely they need not enter into the elements of a law education in the United States.


I mean not, however, to exclude them from the subsequent investigation of those, who shall aspire at the character of accomplished lawyers. I only mean, that they ought not to be put into the hands of students, as deserving the same time and the same attention with other parts, which are to have a practical influence upon their future conduct in their profession.


The numerous regulations, in England, respecting the poor, and the more artificial refinements and distinctions concerning real estates, must be known; but known as much in order to be avoided as to be practised. The study of them, therefore, need not be so minute here as in England.


Concerning many other titles of the English law, similar observations might be made. The force and the extent of each will increase day after day, and year after year.


All combine in showing, that the foundation, at least, of a separate, an unbiassed, and an independent law education should be laid in the United States.


Deeply impressed with the importance of this truth, I have undertaken the difficult, the laborious, and the delicate task of contributing to lay that foundation. I feel most sensibly the weight of the duty, which I have engaged to perform. I will not promise to perform it successfully ― as well as it might be performed: but I will promise to perform it faithfully ― as well as I can perform it. I feel its full importance.


It may be asked ― I am told it has been asked ― is it proper that a judge of the supreme court of the United States should deliver lectures on law? It will not surely be suspected, that I deem too lightly of the very dignified and independent office, which I have the honor to hold, in consequence of the favourable sentiments entertained concerning me by those, whose favourable sentiments are indeed an honour. Had I thought that the dignity of that seat could be disparaged by an alliance with this chair, I would have spurned it from me. But I thought, and I still think in a very different manner. By my acceptance of this chair, I think I shall certainly increase my usefulness, without diminishing my dignity, as a judge; and I think, that, with equal certainty, I shall, as a judge, increase my usefulness, I will not say my dignity, in this chair. He, who is well qualified to teach, is well qualified to judge; and he, who is well qualified to judge, is well qualified to teach. Every acquisition of knowledge ― and it is my duty to acquire much ― can, with equal facility, and with equal propriety, be applied to either office: for let it be remembered, that both offices view the same science as their common object.


Any interference as to the times of discharging the two offices ― the only one that strikes me as possible ― will be carefully avoided.


But it may be further asked ― ought a judge to commit himself by delivering his sentiments in a lecture? To this question I shall give a very explicit answer: and in that answer I shall include the determination, which I have taken both as a professor and as a judge. When I deliver my sentiments from this chair, they shall be my honest sentiments: when I deliver them from the bench, they shall be nothing more. In both places I shall make ― because I mean to support ― the claim to integrity: in neither shall I make ― because, in neither, can I support ― the claim to infallibility.


My house of knowledge is, at present, too small. I feel it my duty, on many accounts, to enlarge it. But in this, as in every other kind of architecture, I believe it will be found, that he, who adds much, must alter some.


When the greatest judges, who ever adorned or illuminated a court of justice, have candidly and cheerfully acknowledged their mistakes; shall I be afraid of committing myself?


The learned and indefatigable Spelman, after all the immense researches, which enabled him to prepare and publish his Glossary, published it with this remarkable precaution: "under the protestation of adding, retracting, correcting, and polishing, as, upon more mature consideration, shall seem expedient."8


I hope I have now shown, that my acceptance of this chair, instead of diminishing, is calculated to increase my usefulness, as a judge. Does it derogate from my dignity? By no means, in my opinion.


8. Sub protestatione de addendo, retrahendo, corrigendo, poliendo, prout opus fuerit et consultius videbitur. Sir H. Spelman.


Let things be considered as they really are. As a judge, I can decide whether property in disputee belongs to the man on my right hand, or to the man on my left hand. As a judge, I can pass sentence on a felon or a cheat. By doing both, a judge maybe eminently useful in preserving peace, and in securing property.


Property, highly deserving security, is, however, not an end, but a means. How miserable, and how contemptible is that man, who inverts the order of nature, and makes his property, not a means, but an end!


Society ought to be preserved in peace; most unquestionably. But is this all? Ought it not to be improved as well as protected? Look at individuals: observe them from infancy to youth, from youth to manhood. Such is the order of Providence with regard to society. It is in a progressive state, moving on towards perfection. How is this progressive state to be assisted and accelerated? Principally by teaching the young "ideas how to shoot," and the young affections how to move.


What intrinsically can be more dignified, than to assist in preparing tender and ingenuous minds for all the great purposes, for which they are intended! What, I repeat it, can intrinsically be more dignified, than to assist in forming a future Cicero, or a future Bacon, without the vanity of one, and without the meanness of the other!


Let us see how things have been considered in other ages and in other countries.


Philip of Macedon, a prince highly distinguished by his talents, though not by his virtues, was fully sensible of the value of science. An heir was born to his kingdom and his throne. Could any thing be more interesting to a father and a king? There was, it seems, a circumstance, which, in his opinion, enhanced the importance even of this event. His heir was born at a time, when he could receive a most excellent education.


Philip wrote to Aristotle the following letter: "You are to know that a son hath been born to us. We thank the gods, not so much for having bestowed him on us, as for bestowing him, at a time when Aristotle lives. We assure ourselves, that you will form him a prince worthy to be our successour, and a king worthy of Macedon."9


On Aristotle, accordingly, was devolved the charge of superintending the education of the young prince, "that he may be taught," said Philip, " to avoid those errours, which I have committed, and of which I now repent."


What price Alexander the Great set upon his education, before his mind was fatally poisoned by the madness of ambition, will appear by a letter from him to Aristotle, in which we find this sentiment: "I am not so anxious to appear superiour to the rest of mankind in power, as in the knowledge of excellent things."10 We see here the impetus of strong ambition; but it had not then taken its pernicious direction.


9. 1 Lel. L. Phil. 98.


10. 2 Lel, L. Phil. 126.


In the most shining periods of the Roman republick, men of the first distinction made the science of law their publick profession, and taught it openly in their houses as in so many schools. The first of these publick professors was Tiberius Coruncanius, who was raised to the office of chief pontiff the highest in the whole scale of Roman honours. His example was followed by many distinguished characters, among whom we find the celebrated names of the two Scevolæ, of Cato, of Brutus, and of others well known to such as are conversant with the writers of the classical ages. Even Cicero himself, after he had been consul of Rome, after he had had kings for his clients, projected this very employment, as his future "honour and ornament."11


Whether, therefore, we consider the intrinsick or the external dignity of this chair; we shall find that it is, by no means, beneath an alliance with the highest offices and the highest characters.


If any example, set by me, can be supposed to have the least publick influence; I hope it will be in raising the care of education to that high degree of respectability, to which, every where, but especially in countries that are free, it has the most unimpeachable title.


I have been zealous ― I hope I have not been altogether unsuccessful ― in contributing the best of my endeavours towards forming a system of government; I shall rise in importance, if I can be equally successful ― I will not be less zealous ― in contributing the best of my endeavours towards forming a system of education likewise, in the United States. I shall rise in importance, because I shall rise in usefulness.


11. Decus et ornamentum. De orat. l. 1. c. 45.


What are laws without manners? How can manners be formed, but by a proper education?12


Methinks I hear one of the female part of my audience exclaim ― What is all this to us? We have heard much of societies, of states, of governments, of laws, and of a law education. Is every thing made for your sex? Why should not we have a share? Is our sex less honest, or less virtuous, or less wise than yours?


Will any of my brethren be kind enough to furnish me with answers to these questions? ― I must answer them, it seems, myself? and I mean to answer them most sincerely.


Your sex is neither less honest, nor less virtuous, nor less wise than ours. With regard to the two first of these qualities, a superiority, on our part, will not be pretended: with regard to the last, a pretension of superiority cannot be supported.


I will name three women; and I will then challenge any of my brethren to name three men superiour to them in vigour and extent of abilities. My female champions are, Semiramis of Nineveh; Zenobia, the queen of the East; and Elizabeth of England. I believe it will readily be owned, that three men of superiour active talents cannot be named.


12. The ancient wisdom of the best times did always make a just complaint, that states were too busy with their laws; and too negligent in point of education. 2. Ld. Bacon 423.


You will please, however, to take notice, that the issue, upon which I put the characters of these three ladies, is not that they were accomplished; it is, that they were able women.


This distinction immediately reminds you, that a woman may be an able, without being an accomplished female character.


In this latter view, I did not produce the three female characters I have mentioned. I produced them as women, merely of distinguished abilities ― of abilities equal to those displayed by the most able of our sex.


But would you wish to be tried by the qualities of our sex? I will refer you to a more proper standard ― that of your own.


All the three able characters, I have mentioned, had, I think, too much of the masculine in them. Perhaps I can conjecture the reason. Might it not be owing, in a great measure ― might it not be owing altogether to the masculine employments, to which they devoted themselves?


Two of them were able warriours: all of them were able queens; but in all of them, we feel and we regret the loss of the lovely and accomplished woman: and let me assure you, that, in the estimation of our sex, the loss of the lovely and accomplished woman is irreparable, even when she is lost in the queen.


For these reasons, I doubt much, whether it would be proper that you should undertake the management of publick affairs. You have, indeed, heard much of publick government and publick law: but these things were not made for themselves: they were made for something better; and of that something better, you form the better part ― I mean society ― I mean particularly domestick society: there the lovely and accomplished woman shines with superiour lustre.


By some politicians, society has been considered as only the scaffolding of government; very improperly, in my judgment. In the just order of things, government is the scaffolding of society: and if society could be built and kept entire without government, the scaffolding might be thrown down, without the least inconvenience or cause of regret.


Government is, indeed, highly necessary; but it is highly necessary to a fallen state. Had man continued innocent, society, without the aids of government, would have shed its benign influence even over the bowers of Paradise.


For those bowers, how finely was your sex adapted! But let it be observed, that every thing else was finished, before Heaven's "last best gift" was introduced: let it be also observed, that, in the pure and perfect commencement of society, there was a striking difference between the only two persons, who composed it. His "large fair front and eye sublime" declared that, "for contemplation and for valour he was formed."


"For softness, she, and sweet attractive grace.

Grace was in all her steps, Heav'n in her eye;

In every gesture, dignity and love.

A thousand decencies unceasing flow'd

From all her words and actions, mixt with ―

― mild compliance."


Her accomplishments indicated her destination. Female beauty is the expression of female virtue. The purest complexion, the finest features, the most elegant shape are uninteresting and insipid, unless we can discover, by them, the emotions of the mind. How beautiful and engaging, on the other hand, are the features, the looks, and the gestures, while they disclose modesty, sensibility, and every sweet and tender affection When these appear, there is a "Soul upon the countenance."


These observations enhance the value of beauty; and show, that to possess and to admire it, is to possess and to admire the exhibition of the finest qualities, intellectual and moral. These observations do more they show how beauty may be acquired, and improved, and preserved. When the beauties of the mind are cultivated, the countenance becomes beautifully eloquent in expressing them.


I know very well, that mere complexion and shape enter into the composition of beauty: but they form beauty only of a lower order. Separate them from animation ― separate them from sensibility ― separate them from virtue: what are they? The ingredients that compose a beautiful picture or a beautiful statue. I say too much; for the painters and the statuaries know, that expression is the soul of mimick as well as of real life.


As complexion and shape will not supply the place of the higher orders of beauty; so those higher orders have an independent existence, after the inferiour influence of complexion and shape are gone. Though the bloom of youth be faded; though the impressions of time be distinctly marked; yet, while the countenance continues to be enlivened by the beaming emanations of the mind, it will produce, in every beholder possessed of sensibility and taste, an effect far more pleasing, and far more lasting, than can be produced by the prettiest piece of uninformed nature, however florid, however regular, and however young.


How many purposes may be served at once, if things are done in the proper way! I have been giving a recipe for the improvement and preservation of female beauty; but I find that I have, at the same time, been delivering instructions for the culture and refinement of female virtue; and have been pointing at the important purposes, which female virtue is fitted and intended to accomplish.


If nature evinces her designs by her works; you were destined to embellish, to refine, and to exalt the pleasures and virtues of social life.


To protect and to improve social life, is, as we have seen, the end of government and law. If, therefore, you have no share in the formation, you have a most intimate connexion with the effects, of a good system of law and government.


That plan of education, which will produce, or promote, or preserve such a system, is, consequently, an object to you peculiarly important.


But if you would see such a plan carried into complete effect, you must, my amiable hearers, give it your powerful assistance. The pleasing task of forming your daughters is almost solely yours. In my plan of education for your sons, I must solicit you to cooperate. Their virtues, in a certain proportion ― the refinement of their virtues, in a much greater proportion, must be moulded on your example.


In your sex, too, there is a natural, an easy, and, often, a pure flow of diction, which lays the best foundation for that eloquence, which, in a free country, is so important to ours.


The style of some of the finest orators of antiquity was originally formed on that of their mothers, or of other ladies, to whose acquaintance they had the honour of being introduced.


I have already mentioned the two Scevolæ among the illustrious Roman characters. One of them was married to Lælia, a lady, whose virtues and accomplishments rendered her one of the principal ornaments of Rome. She possessed the elegance of language in so eminent a degree, that the first speakers of the age were ambitious of her company. The graces of her unstudied elocution were the purest model, by which they could refine their own.


Cicero was in the number of those, who improved by the privilege of her conversation. In his writings, he speaks in terms of the warmest praise concerning her singular talents. He mentions also the conversation of her daughters and grand daughters, as deserving particular notice.


The province of early education by the female sex, was deemed, in Rome, an employment of so much dignity, that ladies of the first rank did not disdain it. We find the names of Aurelia and Attia, the mothers of Julius Cæsar and of Augustus, enumerated in the list of these honourable patronesses of education.


The example of the highly accomplished Cornelia, the daughter of the great Africanus, and the mother of the Gracchi, deserves uncommon attention. She shone, with singular lustre, in all those endowments and virtues that can dignify the female character.


She was, one day, visited by a lady of Campania, who was extremely fond of dress and ornament. This lady, after having displayed some very rich jewels of her own, expressed a wish to be favoured with the view of those which Cornelia had; expecting to see some very superb ones, in the toilet of a lady of such distinguished birth and character. Cornelia diverted the conversation, till her sons came into the room: "These are my jewels," said she, presenting them to the Campanian lady.


Cicero had seen her letters: his expressions concerning them are very remarkable. "I have read," says he, "the letters of Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi; and it appears, that her sons were not so much nourished by the milk, as formed by the style of their mother."13


13. Legimus epistolas Corneliæ, matris Gracchorum: apparet filios non tam in gremie educatos, quam in sermone matris. Cic. de clar, orat, c. 58.


You see now, my fair and amiable hearers, how deeply and nearly interested you are in a proper plan of law education. By some of you, whom I know to be well qualified for taking in it the share, which I have described, that share will be taken. By the younger part of you, the good effects of such a plan will, I hope, be participated: for those of my pupils, who themselves shall become most estimable, will treat you with the highest degree of estimation.


PLAN.


GENTLEMEN,


PERMIT me, at this time, to address, in a very few words, the younger and more inexperienced part of those who attend my lectures ― I say the younger and more inexperienced part; because my lectures are honoured with the presence of some, whose learning, talents, and experience fit them for communicating instead of receiving instruction here. For the honour of their presence, I must consider myself indebted to the importance of my subject; and to a desire, generous and enlightened, of countenancing and encouraging every attempt, however feeble, to diffuse knowledge on a subject so important.


You have seen, my young friends, in what a high point of view I consider your education. Is this on your own account? Partly it is ― that you may be great and good men. But solely it is not; for more extended hopes are entertained concerning you: you are designated by your education, and by your country, to be great and good citizens.


In no other part of the world, and in no former period, even in this part of it, have youth ever beheld so glorious and so sublime a prospect before them. Your country is already respectable for its numbers; it is free; it is enlightened; it is flourishing; it is happy: in numbers; in liberty; in knowledge; in prosperity; in happiness it is receiving great and rapid accessions. Its honours are already beginning to bud: in a few years, they will "blossom thick" upon you. You ought certainly, by proper culture, to qualify yourselves in such a manner, that when the blossoms fade and fall, the fruit may begin to appear. Remember that, in a free government, every honour implies a trust; that every trust implies a duty; and that every duty ought to be performed.


I mean not, that such of you as are designed for the practice of the law, should be inattentive to the emoluments of your profession; but I mean that you should consider it as something higher than a mere instrument of private gain. By being fitted for higher purposes, it will not be less fit, it will be more fit for accomplishing this.


It is peculiarly necessary, that you should, as soon as possible, form proper conceptions of what ought to be your objects in your course of study. Let them not be fixed too low: the higher your aims, the higher your attainments will be. To assist you in fixing those aims, let me lay before you the sentiments of a writer, who wrote on some subjects most excellently, and on others most contemptibly ― I mean Lord Bolingbroke. When he wrote on politicks or business, he wrote well; because he wrote on what he knew: when he wrote concerning religion, he wrote ill; because he wrote concerning that, of which he was ignorant. The passage I am about to quote to you is vouched by the respectable authority of Lord Kaims, who considered it, and justly, as a master piece of expression and thought.


"I might instance," says he, "in other professions, the obligations men lie under of applying themselves to certain parts of history; and I can hardly forbear doing it in that of the law, in its nature, the noblest and most beneficial to mankind, in its abuse and debasement, the most sordid and the most pernicious. A lawyer now is nothing more, I speak of ninety nine in a hundred at least" (the proportion in this country, I believe, is much smaller) "to use some of Tully's words, "nisi liguleius quidam cautus, et acutus præco actionum, cantor formularum, auceps syllabarum:" but there have been lawyers that were orators, philosophers, historians: there have been Bacons and Clarendons. There will be none such any more, till, in some better age" (I hope that better age has found you, my young friends) "true ambition or the love of fame prevail over avarice; and till men find leisure and encouragement for the exercise of this profession, by climbing up to the vantage ground, so my Lord Bacon calls it, of science,14 instead of groveling all their lives below, in a mean but gainful application to all the little arts of chicane. Till this happen, the profession of law will scarce deserve to be ranked among the learned professions: and whenever it happens, one of the vantage grounds, to which men must climb, is metaphysical, and the other, historical knowledge." By metaphysical knowledge, his lordship evidently means the philosophy of the human mind; for he goes on in this manner. "They must pry into the secret recesses of the human heart, and become well acquainted with the whole moral world, that they may discover the abstract reason of all laws: and they must trace the laws of particular states, especially of their own, from the first rough sketches to the more perfect draughts; from the first causes or occasions that produced them, through all the effects, good and bad, that they produced."15


14. It is not possible to discover the more remote, and deeper parts of any science, if you stand but upon the level of the same science, and ascend not to a higher science. 2. Ld. Bac. 432.


15. Boling. of the Study of History. let. 5. p.149.


Such, my young friends, are the great prospects before you; and such is the general outline of those studies, by which you will be prepared to realize them. Suffer me to recommend most earnestly this outline to the utmost degree of your attention. It comes to you supported with all the countenance and authority of Bacon, Bolingbroke, Kaims ― two of them consummate in the practice, as well as in the knowledge of the law ― all of them eminent judges of men, of business, and of literature; and all distinguished by the accomplishments of an active, as well as those of a contemplative life. The propriety, the force, and the application of their sentiments will be gradually unfolded, fully explained, and warmly urged to you in the course of my lectures.


It is by no means an easy matter to form, to digest, and to arrange a plan of lectures, on a subject so various and so extensive as that of law. With great deference to some of you, with anxious zeal for the information of others, I lay before you the following analysis: reserving, however, to myself, the full right and force of the protestation, which I have already borrowed


from Sir Henry Spelman, of adding, retracting, correcting, and polishing, as, on more mature consideration, shall appear to me to be expedient.16


16. Some alterations, as the reader will observe, were afterwards made in the plan; but they are neither numerous nor important and need not be here particularized. Ed.


I begin with the general principles of law and obligation. These I shall investigate fully and minutely; because they are the basis of every legal system; and because they have been much misrepresented, or much misunderstood.


Next, I shall proceed to give you a concise and very general view of the law of nature, of the law of nations, and of municipal law.


I shall then consider man, who is the subject of all, and is the author as well as the subject of the last, and part of the second of these species of law. This great title of my plan, dignified and interesting as it is, must be treated in a very cursory manner in this course. I will, however, select some of the great truths which seem best adapted to a system of law. I will view man as an individual, as a member of society, as a member of a confederation, and as a part of the great commonwealth of nations.


His situation, under the third relation, is, in a great measure, new; and, to an American, peculiarly important: It will, therefore, merit and obtain peculiar attention.


The proper discussion of this title will draw on a discussion of the law of nations, under an aspect, almost


wholly new. How far, on the principles of the confederation, does the law of nations become the municipal law of the United States? The greatness of this question is selfevident: it would be very unwise, at present, even to hint at an answer.


After having examined these important preparatory topicks, I shall trace the causes, the origin, the progress, the history, the kinds, the parts, and the properties of government.


Under this title, I shall have occasion to treat concerning legislative, executive, and judicial power; and to investigate and compare the simple and the mixt species of governments and constitutions ― one, particularly, that is simple in its principle, though diversified in its form and operations.


This will lead me to a particular examination of the constitution and government of the United States, of Pennsylvania, and of her sister commonwealths.


By this time, we shall be qualified to enter, with proper advantage, upon the illustration of the different parts of our municipal law. The common law is the first great object, which will here present itself. I shall think it my duty to investigate very carefully its principles, its nature, and its history; particularly the great event of its transmigration from Europe to America; and the subsequent juridical history of the American States.


Our municipal law, I shall consider under two great divisions. Under the first, I shall treat of the law, as it relates to persons: under the second, I shall treat of it, as it relates to things.


The division of the United States into circuits, districts, states, counties, and townships will, probably, be introduced here, with some remarks concerning the causes, the operation, and the consequences of those divisions.


In considering the law as it relates to persons, the legislative department of the United States will occupy the first place; the executive department, the second; and the judicial department, the third.


Under the first, the institution and powers of congress will come into view. The principles on which the senate and house of representatives are separately established, will be carefully discriminated; and the necessary remarks will be made on the great doctrine of representation. The importance and the manner of legislation will also claim a portion of our regard.


In considering the executive authority of the United States, the appointment, the powers, and the duties of the president, will first attract our notice. We will then proceed to consider the number and the nature of the subordinate executive departments. We shall here have an opportunity of taking a very general view of the civil, commercial, fiscal, maritime, and military establishments of the United States.


When we come to the judicial department, our attention will be first drawn to the supreme court of the United States. Its establishment and its jurisdiction will be particularly considered; as also the establishment and jurisdiction of the circuit and district courts.


Here the nature, the history, and the jurisdiction of courts in general; and the powers and duties of judges, juries, sheriffs, coroners, counsellors, and attornies will be naturally introduced.


Perhaps this may be the proper place, likewise, for some general observations on the nature and philosophy of evidence; a proper system of which is the greatest desideratum in the law.


The investigation of the different parts of the constitution and government of the United States, will lay the foundation of a very interesting parallel between them and the pride of Europe ― the British constitution.


If the consideration of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the sister states can, without intricacy or confusion, be severally arranged under the three corresponding articles in the constitution of the United States; the parts of my plan will be considerably reduced in their number. I hope, but I am not confident, that this can be done. Upon this, as upon every other part of my plan, I shall be thankful for advice.


Bodies politick and inferiour societies will be described and distinguished.


The relations of private and of domestick life will pass in review before us; and after these, the rights and duties of citizens will come under consideration.


Here the important principles of election will receive the merited attention.


The rights, privileges, and disabilities of aliens will then be examined.


Happy would it be, if the great division of the law, which relates to persons, could be closed here. But it cannot be done. We are under the sad necessity of viewing law as sometimes violated, and man as sometimes guilty. Hence the ungracious doctrine of punishment and crimes.


I will introduce this disagreeable part of my system with general observations concerning the nature of crimes, and the necessity and the proportion of punishments next, I will descend into a particular enumeration and description of each. and I will afterwards point out the different steps prescribed by the law for apprehending, detaining, trying, and punishing offenders.


Here warrants, arrests, attachments, bail, commitments, imprisonment, appeals, informations, indictments, presentments, process, arraignments, pleas, trials, verdicts, judgments, attainders, pardons, forfeitures, corruption of blood, and executions will be considered.


With regard to criminal law, this observation may be made even in a summary: it greatly needs reformation. In the United States, the seeds of reformation are sown.


As to the second great division of our municipal law, which relates to things; it may be all comprehended under one word ― property. Claims, it is true, may arise from a variety of sources, almost infinite: but the declaration of every claim concludes by alleging a damage or a demand; and the decision of every successful claim concludes by awarding a satisfaction or a restitution in property.


I shall trace the history of property from its lowest rude beginnings to its highest artificial refinements; and, by that means, shall have an opportunity of pointing out the defects of the first, and the excesses of the last.


Property is of two kinds; publick and private. Under publick property, common highways, common bridges, common rivers, common ports are included. In the United States, and in the states composing the Union, there is much land belonging to the publick.


Private property is divided into two kinds; personal and real: things moveable are comprehended under the first division: things immoveable, under the second.


Estates in real property are measured by their duration. An estate of the greatest duration, is that which is in fee, or "to a man and his heirs," in the language of the common law. Real property of shorter duration is known by the names of estates tail, estates in tail after possibility of issue extinct, estates by the curtesy of England, estates in dower, estates for life, estates for years, estates by sufferance, and estates at will.


Estates may be either absolute or conditional. Under the title of conditional estates, the excellent law of Pennsylvania with regard to mortgages will deserve particular consideration.


Estates may be in possession or in expectancy. Under the last head, reversions, remainders, vested and contingent, and executory devises will be treated.


Property may be joint or cotemporary, as well as separate and successive. Here we will treat concerning coparceners, partners, joint tenants, and tenants in common.


Property may be acquired by occupancy, conveyance, descent, succession, will, custom, forfeiture, judgment in a court of justice. In much the greatest number of instances, the acquisition of property by one is accompanied with the transfer of it by another.


Conveyances are by matter of record; as a fine, a common recovery, a deed enrolled: or by matter in pais; as livery, deed: here the nature and different kinds of deeds, at common law, and by virtue of statutes, will be particularly considered.


Property may consist of things in possession, or of things in action.


Land, money, cattle, are instances of the first kind; debts, rights of damages, and rights of action are in. stances of the second kind.


These are prosecuted by suit.


You have heard much concerning the forms of process, and proceedings, and pleadings. Much has been written in praise, and much has been written in ridicule, of this part of law learning. It has certainly been abused: in some hands, it has become, and daily does become ridiculous. And what is there that has been exempted from a similar fate! religion herself, elegant and simple as she is, yet, when dressed in the tawdry or tattered robes put upon her by the false taste of her injudicious friends, assumes an awkward and ridiculous appearance.


Law has experienced the same treatment with her elder sister. But though the learning with regard to pleas and pleading has been abused, it may certainly be employed for the most excellent purposes.


When properly directed and properly used, the science of well pleading is, indeed, in the language of Littleton, "one of the most honourable, laudable, and profitable things in our law."17 Let me also adduce, in its favour, the weighty testimony of Earl Mansfield.18 "The substantial rules of pleading," says this very able judge, "are founded in strong sense, and in the soundest and closest logick; and so appear when well understood and explained: though, by being misunderstood and misapplied, they are too often made use of as the instruments of chicane."


Permit me to add, that some of the forms of writs and pleas, particularly those that are most ancient, are models of correct composition, as well as of just sentiment.


17. Litt. s. 534.


18. 1. Burr. 319.


The history of a suit at law, from its commencement, through all the different steps of its progress, to its conclusion, presents an object very interesting to a mind sensible to the beauty of strict and accurate arrangement. The dispositions of the drama are not made with more exactness and art. Every thing is done by the proper persons, at the proper time, in the proper place, in the proper order, and in the proper form.


This history may be comprised under the following titles ― original writ, process, return, appearance ― in person, by guardian, by next friend, by attorney ― bail, declaration, profert, over, imparlance, continuance, pleas ― in abatement and bar ― replication, rejoinder, issue, demurrer, trial, demurrer to evidence, bill of exceptions, verdict, new trial, judgment, appeal, writ of error, execution.


CHAPTER II.


OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND OBLIGATION.


ORDER, proportion, and fitness pervade the universe. Around us, we see; within us, we feel; above us, we admire a rule, from which a deviation cannot, or should not, or will not be made.


On the inanimate part of the creation, are impressed the continued energies of motion and of attraction, and other energies, varied and yet uniform, all designated and ascertained. Animated nature is under a government suited to every genus, to every species, and to every individual, of which it consists. Man, the nexus utriusque mundi, composed of a body and a soul, possessed of faculties intellectual and moral, finds or makes a system of regulations, by which his various and important nature, in every period of his existence, and in every situation, in which he can be placed, may be preserved, improved, and perfected. The celestial as well as the terrestrial world knows its exalted but prescribed course. This angels and the spirits of the just, made perfect, do "clearly behold, and without any swerving observe." Let humble reverence attend us as we proceed. The great and incomprehensible Author, and Preserver, and Ruler of all things ― he himself works not without an eternal decree.


Such ― and so universal is law. "Her seat," to use the sublime language of the excellent Hooker,19 "is the bosom of God; her voice, the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage; the very least as feeling her care, and the greatest as not exempted from her power. Angels and men, creatures of every condition, though each in different sort and manner, yet all with uniform consent, admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy."


19. Hooker 34.


Before we descend to the consideration of the several kinds and parts of this science, so dignified and so diversified, it will be proper, and it will be useful, to contemplate it in one general and comprehensive view; and to select some of its leading and luminous properties, which will serve to guide and enlighten us in that long and arduous journey, which we now undertake.


It may, perhaps, be expected, that I should be girt with a regular definition of law. I am not insensible of the use, but, at the same time, I am not insensible of the abuse of definitions. In their very nature, they are not calculated to extend the acquisition of knowledge, though they may be well fitted to ascertain and guard the limits of that knowledge, which is already acquired. By definitions, if made with accuracy ― and consummate accuracy ought to be their indispensable characteristick ― ambiguities in expression, and different meanings of the same term, the most plentiful sources of errour and of fallacy in the reasoning art, may be prevented; or, if that cannot be done, may be detected. But, on the other hand, they may be carried too far, and, unless restrained by the severest discipline, they may produce much confusion and mischief in the very stations, which they are placed to defend.


You have heard much of the celebrated distribution of things into genera and species. On that distribution, Aristotle undertook the arduous task of resolving all reasoning into its primary elements; and he erected, or thought he erected, on a single axiom, a larger system of abstract truths, than were before invented or perfected by any other philosopher. The axiom, from which he sets out, and in which the whole terminates, is, that whatever is predicated of a genus, may be predicated of every species contained under that genus, and of every individual contained under every such species.20 On that distribution likewise, the very essence of scientifick definition depends: for a definition, strictly and logically regular, "must express the genus of the thing defined, and the specifick difference, by which that thing is distinguished from every other species belonging to that genus."21


From this definition of a definition ― if I may be pardoned for the apparent play upon the word ― it evidently appears that nothing can he defined, which does not denote a species; because that only, which denotes a species, can have a specifick difference.


20. 1. Gill. (4to.) 690.


21. Reid's Ess. Int. 10, 11.


But further: a specifick difference may, in fact, exist; and yet language may furnish us with no words to express it. Blue is a species of colour; but how shall we express the specifick difference, by which blue is distinguished from green?


Again: expressions, which signify things simple, and void of all composition, are, from the very force of the terms, unsusceptible of definition. It was one of the capital defects of Aristotle's philosophy, that he attempted and pretended to define the simplest things.


Here it may be worth while to note a difference between our own abstract notions, and objects of nature. The former are the productions of our own minds; we can therefore define and divide them, and distinctly designate their limits. But the latter run so much into one another, and their essences, which discriminate them, are so subtile and latent, that it is always difficult, often impossible, to define or divide them with the necessary precision. We are in danger of circumscribing nature within the bounds of our own notions, formed, frequently, on a partial or defective view of the object before us. Fettered thus at our outset, we are restrained in our progress, and govern the course of our inquiries, not by the extent or variety of our subject, but by our own preconceived apprehensions concerning it.


This distinction between the objects of nature and our own abstract notions suggests a practical inference. Definitions and divisions in municipal law, the creature of man, may be more useful, because more adequate and more correct, than in natural objects.


By some philosophers, definition and division are considered as the two great nerves of science. But unless they are marked by the purest precision, the fullest comprehension, and the most chastised justness of thought, they will perplex, instead of unfolding ― they will darken, instead of illustrating, what is meant to be divided or defined. A defect or inaccuracy, much more an impropriety, in a definition or division, more especially of a first principle, will spread confusion, distraction, and contradictions over the remotest parts of the most extended system.


Errours in science, as well as in life, proceed more frequently from wrong principles, than from ill drawn consequences. Prava regula prima may be the parent of the most fatal enormities.


The higher an edifice is raised, the more compactly it is built, the more precisely it is carried up in a just direction ― in proportion to all these excellencies, a rent in the foundation will increase and become dangerous.


The case is the same with a radical errour at the foundation of a system. The more accurately and the more ingeniously men reason, and the farther they pursue their reasonings, from false principles, the more numerous and the more inveterate will their inconsistencies, nay, their absurdities be. One advantage, however, will result ― those absurdities and those inconsistencies will be more easily traced to their proper source. When the string of a musical instrument has a fault only in one place, you know immediately how and where to find and correct it.


Influenced by these admonitory truths, I hesitate, at present, to give a definition of law. My hesitation is increased by the fate of the far greatest number of those, who have hitherto attempted it. Many, as it is natural to suppose, and laboured have been the efforts to infold law within this scientifick circle; but little satisfaction ― little instruction has been the result. Almost every writer, sensible of the defects, the inaccuracies, or the improprieties of the definitions that have gone before him, has endeavoured to supply their place with something, in his own opinion, more proper, more accurate, and more complete. He has been treated by his successours, as his predecessors have been treated by him: and his definition has had only the effect of adding one more to the lengthy languid list. This I know, because I have taken the trouble to read them in great numbers; but because I have taken the trouble to read them, I will spare you the trouble of hearing them ― at least, the greatest part of them.


Some of them, indeed, have a claim to attention one, in particular, will demand it, for reasons striking and powerful ― I mean that given by the Commentator on the laws of England.


Let us proceed carefully, patiently, and minutely to examine it. If I am not deceived, the examination will richly compensate all the time, and trouble, and investigation, that will be allotted to it; for it will be uncommonly fruitful in the principles, and in the consequences of the great truths and important disquisitions, which it will lead in review before us. "Law," says he, "in its most general and comprehensive sense, signifies a rule of action."22 In its proper signification, a rule is an instrument, by which a right line ― the shortest and truest of all ― may be drawn from one point to another. In its moral or figurative sense, it denotes a principle or power, that directs a man surely and concisely to attain the end, which he proposes.


22. 1. Bl. Com. 38.


Law is called a rule, in order to distinguish it from a23 sudden, a transient, or a particular order: uniformity, permanency, stability, characterize a law.


23. 1. Bl. Com. 44.


Again; law is called a rule, to denote that it carries along with it a power and principle of obligation. Concerning the nature and the cause of obligation, much ingenious disputation has been held by philosophers and writers on jurisprudence. Indeed the sentiments entertained concerning it have been so various, that an account of them would, in the estimation of my Lord Kaims, be a "delicate historical morsel."


This interesting subject will claim and obtain our attention, next after what we have to say concerning law in general.


When we speak of a rule with regard to human conduct, we imply two things. 1. That we are susceptible of direction. 2. That, in our conduct, we propose an end. The brute creation act not from design. They eat, they drink, they retreat from the inclemencies of the weather, without considering what their actions will ultimately produce. But we have faculties, which enable us to trace the connexion between actions and their effects; and our actions are nothing else but the steps which we take, or the means which we employ, to carry into execution the effects which we intend.


Hooker, I think, conveys a fuller and stronger conception of law, when he tells us, that "it assigns unto each thing the kind, that it moderates the force and power, that it appoints the form and measure of working."24 Not the direction merely, but the kind also, the energy, and the proportion of actions is suggested in this description.


Some are of opinion, that law should be defined25 "a rule of acting or not acting; " because actions may be forbidden as well as commanded. But the same excellent writer, whom I have just now cited, gives a very proper answer to this opinion, and shows the addition to be unnecessary, by finely pursuing the metaphor, which we have already mentioned. "We must not suppose that there needeth one rule to know the good, and another to know the evil by. For he that knoweth what is straight, doth even thereby discern what is crooked. Goodness in actions is like unto straightness; wherefore that which is well done, we term right."26


After this dry description of the literal and metaphorical meaning of a rule, permit me to relax your strained attention by a critical remark. In the philosophy of the human mind, it is impossible altogether to avoid metaphorical expressions. Our first and most familiar notions are suggested by material objects; and we cannot speak intelligibly of those that are immaterial, without continual allusions to matter and the qualities of matter.


24. Hooker 2.


25. Daws. Orig. Laws, 4.14.


26. Hooker 11.


Besides, in teaching moral science, the use of metaphors is not only necessary, but, if prudent, and honest, and guarded, it is highly advantageous. Nature has endowed us with the faculty of imagination, that we may be enabled to throw warming as well as enlightening rays upon truth ― to embellish, to recommend, and to enforce it. Truth may, indeed, by reasoning, be rendered evident to the understanding; but it cannot reach the heart, unless by means of the imagination. To the imagination metaphors are addressed.


From this short excursion into the field of criticism, let us return to our legal tract. Law is a rule "prescribed." A simple resolution, confined within the bosom of the legislator, without being notified, in some fit manner, to those for whose conduct it is to form a rule, can never, with propriety, be termed a law.


There are many ways by which laws may be made sufficiently known. They may be printed and published. Written copies of them may be deposited in publick libraries, or other places, where every one interested may have an opportunity of perusing them. They may be proclaimed in general meetings of the people. The knowledge of them may be disseminated by long and universal practice. "Confirmed custom," says a writer on Roman jurisprudence, "is deservedly considered as a law. For since written laws wind us for no other reason than because they are received by the judgment of the people; those laws, which the people have approved, without writing, are also justly obligatory on all. For where is the difference, whether the people declare their will by their suffrage, or by their conduct? This kind of law is said to be established by27 manners."28


Of all yet suggested, the mode for the promulgation of human laws by custom seems the most significant, and the most effectual. It involves in it internal evidence, of the strongest kind, that the law has been introduced by common consent; and that this consent rests upon the most solid basis ― experience as well as opinion. This mode of promulgation points to the strongest characteristick of liberty, as well as of law. For a consent thus practically given, must have been given in the freest and most unbiassed manner.


With pleasure you anticipate the prospect of a species of law, to which these remarks have already directed your attention. If it were asked ― and it would be no improper question ― who of all the makers and teachers of law have formed and drawn after them the most, the best, and the most willing disciples; it might be not untruly answered ― custom.


Laws may be promulgated by reason and conscience, the divine monitors within us. They are thus known as effectually, as by words or by writing: indeed they are thus known in a manner more noble and exalted. For, in this manner, they may be said to be engraven by God on the hearts of men: in this manner, he is the promulgator as well as the author of natural law.

I Don't Want a Naked Public Square:

But I do want a crowded, pluralistic one.

"The Naked Public Square" refers to the title of Father Neuhaus' classic book. NPS means in essence if government has to remain entirely neutral among all theological systems, including atheism and polytheism, then we form a lowest common denominator of "0" and the public square refuses to speak on religious matters. Hence, it's "naked."

A few things spurred this post. First, the new visitor's hall in the Capitol Building has deleted some Founding era God talk and that's ticked off among others, Christian America proponents and Senator Jim DeMint of South Carolina. You can read Michael Tomasky's account of it where he links to one of my posts where I explain why George Washington was likely neither a strict deist nor an orthodox Trinitarian Christian.

The second is Tom Van Dyke's recent comment where he asserts my attacking the Christian Nation idea is leading to a public square "naked" of Christianity's influence:

By the time we drag in words like "nominal" or "theistic rationalism" all we've done is obliterate Christianity from the Founding. This is nonsense, and seeks neither truth nor meaning.

There's a minority in Christianity [the "orthodox" who believe non-Trinitarians are not "Christians"] that seeks---for purely theological reasons---to exploit the heterodoxy of the Founding to claim Christianity for itself.

And those from the secular side like Marci Hamilton use them back, to exploit the doctrinal divisions within Christianity [which have endured for 2000 or so years] to claim the Founding for themselves, or at least to scrub it clean of Christianity.

[...]

Folks like [secular] Ms. Hamilton are as wrong as [orthodox] Dr. [Gregg] Frazer because they use an understanding of Christianity that's held by only a minority of its adherents, and turn it into "definitions" that obscure and elide too much.

Personally, I don't want to obliterate Christianity (or Judeo-Christianity) from the public square; but the Christian Nation claim that I have relentlessly addressed seeks to "outright" own the public square and disrespects the pluralism of the Founding; and I want proponents of such to understand they have a place at the public square as long as they don't mind sharing it as America's Founders intended.

Look, the American Founding, in many ways, treated unacceptably various social groups -- women, blacks, non-propertied males, Roman Catholics, American Indians, and many others. I agree with Harry Jaffa that if we view the Founding through these "compromises," as opposed to its "ideals," then the whole thing is non-starter; arguments from its authority cannot take the moral high ground. And this has implications for constitutional interpretation (and remember arguments from authority are NOT fallacious in law, i.e., constitutional law), patriotism, and the ideal vision of what America "ought to be."

There is good reason to want argue from the Founding's authority and preserve its moral vision; the Founders did deliver broad ideals of liberty and equality, democratic-republican government, and, of especial import -- religious liberty [and made the US the most powerful nation on Earth].

And the Founders were ahead of the learning curve on issues of pluralism. So ahead that they had to keep many of their heterodox religious beliefs on the down low.

America was not founded to be pluralistic per se. But on some issues -- like religion -- the Founders wanted pluralism...to an extent. They wanted to take sectarian issues "out" of politics. Yet they were so non-sectarian that their vision of "ecumenicism" transcended "Judeo-Christianity." And this is one important reason why America was NOT founded to be a Christian Nation, but a religiously pluralistic one. And I'm going to run with it as far as I can.

My prescription for the public square: Instead of making it "naked," let's make it crowded. Feature the traditional Christian utterances of the Founding, along with utterances from that era that blatantly contradict such claims. James Madison believed in exploiting religious factions to "cancel" one another out.

As he wrote in Federalist 10:

The great desideratum in Government is such a modification of the sovereignty as will render it sufficiently neutral between the different interests and factions, to controul one part of the society from invading the rights of another, and at the same time sufficiently controuled itself, from setting up an interest adverse to that of the whole Society.

And in Federalist 51:

In a free government, this security for civil rights must be the same as for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other, in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government.

See Gary North's commentary on pp. 194-96 of "Conspiracy in Philadelphia."

Christian Nationalists might like to think that those factions were to constitute orthodox Trinitarian Christian sects only, which is laughable given that Jefferson, J. Adams and Franklin were certainly unitarians as Madison and many others probably were. But even limiting the "factions" to "Judeo-Christian" sects is problematic as the Founders' vision for religious pluralism extended further.

And so it is that I think we should give equal time to heterodox, pluralistic and freethinking statements of the Founders on these "religious heritage" public displays. I thought perhaps feature some of the statements of men like John Adams and Thomas Jefferson attacking the Trinity next to Founding era quotations "talking up" Christianity; but in a sense, that would be "uncivil" to conservative Trinitarians.

So my prescription for public displays of religious pluralism is accentuate the positive. Display founding era quotations "talking up" non-Christian religions as valid and acceptable places at the public table next to those that talk up Christianity. Let the Christian Nationalists be the ones who go negative when they assert these non-Christian religions false or the heresies in which the American Founders believed as "not Christian."

For instance, the following from John Adams:

“It has pleased the Providence of the first Cause, the Universal Cause, that Abraham should give religion not only to Hebrews but to Christians and Mahomitans, the greatest part of the modern civilized world.”

– John Adams to M.M. Noah, July 31, 1818.

That puts an arrow through the oft-repeated notion that Jews and Christians worship the same God but Muslims a different one.

The Native Americans' "Great Spirit" especially should play a prominent role. For one, arguably we owe Indians such public respect given their mistreatment at the hands of Westerners. And they certainly have influenced America's cultural heritage in terms of names of American geographic locations and whatnot. And two, they were (I believe) the largest population of non-identificatory Christians in America during the Founding era. The key Founders often supported converting them to Christianity; but it was invariably for utilitarian reason; it helped them to better assimilate and civilize. It was not because the key Founders believed the Indians in a state of spiritual darkness, that their religion was "false" while [orthodox] Christianity was "true." Indeed, when dealing with unconverted Natives the key Founders had no problem invoking their "Great Spirit" God suggesting It was the same "Providence" Jews, Christians and Muslims worshipped and a valid way to God. George Washington went so far as to pray to the "Great Spirit" by name which is more heterodox than praying to Allah, because at least Allah claims to be the God of Abraham.

As Washington spoke:

"I now send my best wishes to the Cherokees, and pray the Great spirit to preserve them."

Here is the other time Washington used the term "the Great Spirit" when speaking to the Natives. Note, one of Washington's aides wrote this speech and Washington HIMSELF crossed out the word "God" and wrote in "the Great Spirit above."

Thomas Jefferson followed Washington's precedent and prayed to the Great Spirit by name. As he wrote in an 1803 letter to the Choctaw Indians:

But we thank the Great Spirit who took care of you on the ocean, and brought you safe and in good health to the seat of our great Council; and we hope His care will accompany and protect you, on your journey and return home; and that He will preserve and prosper your nation in all its just pursuits.

And in an 1806 letter to the Cherokee Nation:

My children, I thank you for your visit and pray to the Great Spirit who made us all and planted us all in this land to live together like brothers that He will conduct you safely to your homes, and grant you to find your families and your friends in good health.

And finally Madison's invocation of "the Great Spirit" to the Cherokee Indians in 1812.

"I have a further advice of my Red children. You see how the country of the eighteen fires is filled with people. They increase like the corn they put into the ground. They all have good houses to shelter them from all weathers, good clothes suitable to all seasons; and as for food, of all sorts, you see they have enough and to spare. No man, woman, or child, of the eighteen fires, ever perished of hunger. Compare all this with the condition of the Red people. They are scattered here and there in handfulls. Their lodges are cold, leak, and smoky. They have hard fare, and often not enough of it.

"Why this mighty difference? The reason, my Red children, is plain. The white people breed cattle and sheep. They spin and weave. Their heads and their hands make all the elements and productions of nature useful to them.

"It is in your power to be like them. The ground that feeds one lodge by hunting, would feed a great band by the plough & the hoe. The Great Spirit has given you, like your white brethren, good heads to contrive, and strong arms, and active bodies. Use them like your white brethren of the eighteen fires, and like them, your little sparks will grow into great fires. You will be well fed, dwell in good houses, and enjoy the happiness for which you, like them, were created. These are the words of your father to his red children. The Great Spirit who is the father of us all, approves them. Let them pass through the ear in to the heart. Carry them home to your people; and as long as you remember this visit to your father of the eighteen fires, remember these are his last and best words to you!"

Given the significant number of Hindus in America, public displays might also feature John Adams' quotation that asserts Hindu principles are at heart the same as Christian principles.

Where is to be found Theology more orthodox or Phylosophy more profound than in the Introduction to the Shast[r]a [a Hindu Treatise]? “God is one, creator of all, Universal Sphere, without beginning, without End. God Governs all the Creation by a General Providence, resulting from his eternal designs. — Search not the Essence and the nature of the Eternal, who is one; Your research will be vain and presumptuous. It is enough that, day by day, and night by night, You adore his Power, his Wisdom and his Goodness, in his Works.”

– John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, December 25, 1813.

And finally the following statement from Ben Franklin's biography well demonstrates the "openness" the key Founders believed in when they invoked "religion" that they believed went hand in hand with "morality" needed to support republican government and "the people's" inalienable liberty to therefore choose which one to support:

Both house and ground were vested in trustees, expressly for the use of any preacher of any religious persuasion who might desire to say something to the people at Philadelphia; the design in building not being to accommodate any particular sect, but the inhabitants in general; so that even if the Mufti of Constantinople were to send a missionary to preach Mohammedanism to us, he would find a pulpit at his service.

NYT on Christian Heritage Battles:

This is from DAVID D. KIRKPATRICK, 2005. It's very good, quite fair to both sides. They got Mark Noll to go on record on David Barton. Here's a taste:

But academic historians, including some conservative and evangelical scholars, give the Christian conservative veneration of this history about a B-minus. They say that Mr. Barton is more or less right, as far as it goes, that the founders never guessed that courts would construe the First Amendment to forbid public displays of religion like prayer in the schools. But the 18th-century religious views of the founders hardly fit into contemporary categories like evangelical Protestant or secular humanist. Nor, historians say, do the great leaders' public expressions of faith necessarily tell us much about how their notion of an ideal relationship between religion and government.

"Barton is a very hard-working researcher, but what I guess I worry about is the collapsing of historical distance, and the effort to make really anybody fit directly into the category of the early 21st century evangelicals," said Mark A. Noll, a prominent historian at Wheaton College, a prestigious evangelical school.

But, Professor Noll added, "I would say he is no worse than some of the Ivy League types who do the same thing, who say the founding fathers believed in separation of church and state and therefore we do, too."

Gordon Wood, a professor at Brown and historian of early America, agreed that the founders never imagined a culture as secular as ours. After all, many states had tax-supported churches well into the 19th century. "They definitely did not contemplate this kind of what we might call 'extreme,' where a minister or a rabbi at a public school graduation is considered to be a violation of separation of church and state," Professor Wood said. "We have built that wall much higher than any of them, even Jefferson, would have anticipated."

But he said educated colonials like the founders also took a dim view of religious fervor. "They just were not in favor of religious 'enthusiasms' - that is the word they would have used for what we would call evangelical," he said.

Richard Brookhiser, a biographer of Washington and a senior editor at the conservative National Review, put it differently. "The temperature of a lot of 18th century religion was just a lot lower," he said.

Founding Era Civic Christianity Is Nominal Christianity:

I often engage my evangelical friends at WorldMagBlog on their comment threads. One thread discusses the actions of some secularists to scrub Founding era references to God out of Washington DC's Capitol Visitor Center.

One commenter noted famous utterances by Joseph Story and John Marshall on Christianity's organic connection to law and government. You can read the originals here and see James Madison's opinion for the opposite position. All three replied to the same sermon by one Jaspar Adams which addressed this issue. John Marshall's comments are short, so I'll reproduce all of his:

MAY 9, 1833

FROM JOHN MARSHALL

Richmond May 9th 1833.

Reverend Sir,

I am much indebted to you for the copy of your valuable sermon on the relation of Christianity to civil government preached before the convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Charleston, on the 13th of Feb. last. I have read it with great attention & advantage.

The documents annexed to the sermon certainly go far in sustaining the proposition which it Is your purpose to establish. One great object of the colonial charters was avowedly the propagation of the Christian faith. Means have been employed to accomplish this object, & those means have been used by government.

No person, I believe, questions the importance of religion to the happiness of man even during his existence in this world. It has at all times employed his most serious meditation, & had a decided influence on his conduct. The American population is entirely Christian, & with us, Christianity & Religion are identified. It would be strange, indeed, if with such a people, our institutions did not presuppose Christianity, & did not often refer to it, & exhibit relations with it. Legislation on the subject is admitted to require great delicacy, because freedom [sic] of conscience & respect for our religion both claim our most serious regard. You have allowed their full influence to both.

With very great respect,

I am Sir, your Obedt.,

J. Marshall.

Here is an excerpt from Joseph Story:

MAY 14, 1833

FROM JOSEPH STORY

Cambridge May 14, 1833.

Dear Sir,


I am greatly obliged to you for the copy of your convention sermon, which you have been pleased to send me. I have read it with uncommon satisfaction, & think its tone & spirit excellent. My own private judgement has long been, (& every day's experience more & more confirms me in it,) that government can not long exist without an alliance with religion to some extent; & that Christianity is indispensable to the true interests & solid foundations of all free governments. I distinguish, as you do, between the establishment of a particular sect, as the Religion of the State, & the Establishment of Christianity itself, without any preference of any particular form of it. I know not, indeed, how any deep sense of moral obligation or accountableness can be expected to prevail in the community without a firm persuasion of the great Christian Truths promulgated in your South Carolina constitution of 1778. I look with no small dismay upon the rashness & indifference with which the American People seem in our day to be disposed to cut adrift from old principles, & to trust themselves to the theories of every wild projector in to [?] religion & politics.

And here is an excerpt of Madison's:

I must admit moreover that it may not be easy, in every possible case, to trace the line of separation between the rights of religion and the Civil authority with such distinctness as to avoid collisions & doubts on unessential points. The tendency to a usurpation on one side or the other, or to a corrupting coalition or alliance between them, will be best guarded agst by an entire abstinence of: the Govt from interference in any way whatever, beyond the necessity of preserving public order, & protecting each sect agst trespasses on its legal rights by others.

What's ironic about this collection of three is all were theological unitarians. Let us reflect on Marshall's assertion that: "The American population is entirely Christian, & with us, Christianity & Religion are identified." This is an idea that evangelicals ("born-again Christians") by necessity of their professed religious beliefs must reject. As I noted to my evangelical friends:

[B]oth Story and Marshall were “unitarians” and considered their theological system which rejected the trinity, incarnation, and atonement to be “Christianity.” Therefore “Christianity” to Story and Marshall really wasn’t “Christianity” as evangelicals understand it here but some kind of broader theological system. If termed “Christian” at all, what Story & Marshall refer to is what folks here might term “nominal Christianity.”

Think about the implication of the notion that the entire population was Christian. No population has ever been nor could be — given the teachings of evangelical Christianity of the “narrow path” — “entirely Christian” as folks here understand the term, as being “regenerate” or “born again.”

Roger Williams understood that the unregenerate will always be among you. So in essence these unitarians are saying that America is almost entirely “Christian” in at least a nominal sense. Woo-hoo to that.

Indeed at least one evangelical on these threads properly understands this as he eloquently wrote:

But, as Jon points out, this civic Christianity was so broadly defined as to lack any of the theological content that we identify with orthodox Christianity. Thus, the “Christian America” crowd errs in supposing that these vague references to God evince a historical commitment to orthodoxy.

Although I’m not generally sympathetic to secularists, I often have no problem accepting the outcomes they propose on these kinds of issues. Christianity is fundamentally a dogmatic, exclusivist, particularistic enterprise. It says that our chief enemies are sin and death, and that we can only escape their curse by embracing the scandal of particularity found in the crucified Christ. But civic Christianity has never had much affinity for this message. It prefers trite platitudes, such as “God Bless America” and “In God We Trust.” In that sense, civic Christianity is just one more cultural elixir that leads to death.

Secularists fear that a Constantinian civil religion will harm the state. Honestly, I couldn’t care less about that. If I hate Constantinianism, it is because it obscures the scandal of particularity that lies at the heart of the Christian gospel.

In this season, we often speak of Christ’s peace. On my walk home, I passed by a department store whose window showed a snowman proclaiming “Peace on Earth.” Civic Christianity, it seems, would have us believe that Christ’s peace is a warm, feel-good kind of peace that conjures up images of Norman Rockwell paintings, toasted marshmallows, and the crackle of the fireplace. Yet true Christianity reminds that Christ’s peace is a peace that comes by God’s just wrath against our sinful world - a wrath against which the Cross of Christ is our sole refuge. Christmas reminds us of God’s inauguration of His righteous judgment. When department stores begin hanging up signs where snowmen proclaim “Repent, for the Kingdom of Heaven is Near,” then I will consider the War on Christmas a worthy fight.

Examples of David Barton's Influence:

You can listen to Robert Jeffress' latest Christian Nation sermon here. In it he notes David Barton recently spoke at his church and then repeated the canard that 52 out of 55 of the men who attended the Constitutional Convention were "evangelical Christians." As I noted in a past post, Jeffress is also adamant that Mormons are not Christians.

Earlier at American Creation we posted this video of David Barton, which I reproduce below. Look at how Barton nods his head when asked by two evangelicals that 95% of the FFs were Christians. When they say "Christian" they think evangelical, orthodox Trinitarian. And it's ludicrous to think that 95% of the FFs qualify as such.

The only reason why I bring this up is because I've been challenged that, no, this really isn't what Barton is trying to do; these two examples demonstrate what Barton's game is all about. If we can concede this, I'm willing to move on and just not discuss David Barton anymore, rather focus on what the Founders actually said and believed and not on attacking one man's revisionist agenda.

Also note how Barton distorts James Wilson's teachings. James Wilson's Works never quotes from the Bible, the Ten Commandments as authority, though he does make some dithering allusions to scripture. The following is the type of dithering allusion that Wilson made to scripture without ever citing individual verses and chapters as authority:

Reason and conscience can do much; but still they stand in need of support and assistance. They are useful and excellent monitors; but, at some times, their admonitions are not sufficiently clear; at other times, they are not sufficiently powerful; at all times, their influence is not sufficiently extensive. Great and sublime truths, indeed, would appear to a few; but the world, at large, would be dark and ignorant. The mass of mankind would resemble a chaos, in which a few sparks, that would diffuse a glimmering light, would serve only to show, in a more striking manner, the thick darkness with which they are surrounded. Their weakness is strengthened, their darkness is illuminated, their influence is enlarged by that heaven-descended science, which has brought life and immortality to light. In compassion to the imperfection of our internal powers, our all-gracious Creator, Preserver, and Ruler has been pleased to discover and enforce his laws, by a revelation given to us immediately and directly from himself. This revelation is contained in the holy scriptures. The moral precepts delivered in the sacred oracles form a part of the law of nature, are of the same origin, and of the same obligation, operating universally and perpetually.

And James Wilson was (probably) not an orthodox Christian but a theistic rationalist who noted, in those dithering allusions, that scripture still doesn't supersede the "operations" of man's reason and the senses which were designed to be supreme. The following is the type of quotation that Barton's followers don't like the hear:

These considerations show, that the scriptures support, confirm, and corroborate, but do not supercede the operations of reason and the moral sense.

Religion, Early America & the 14th Amendment:

The following is an outstanding symposium put on by by Federalist Society on the First Amendment's religion clauses and the Fourteenth Amendment featuring Philip Hamburger (of Columbia University School of Law), John Eastman (Dean of Chapman University School of Law) and Marci Hamilton (of Cardozo School of Law and currently visiting at Princeton). Hamilton also happens to live a few miles up the road from me in Washington's Crossing, PA (which she mentions in the lecture).

Frazer Chimes In On Definition of Christianity:

I alerted Dr. Gregg Frazer of the controversy at American Creation over what exactly it means to be a "Christian" and whether America had an authentically "Christian" Founding. I'm reproducing his quick remarks he emailed to me:

1) Speaking as an evangelical Christian, I know that there is only one correct definition of the term “Christian” – that is, a true follower of Jesus Christ who has repented of his sins and accepted Jesus Christ as his personal Lord and Savior – i.e. been “born again.” Getting to that point entails assent to certain fundamental beliefs on the part of the individual. It is not simply a club membership.

2) Speaking as a historian, there are many definitions of the term “Christian” – depending on the training, purposes, biases, beliefs, and historical/cultural context of the individual historian. Consequently, it’s not a very useful or helpful or meaningful term in the hands of a historian as such. Each historian is obliged to define what he means by the term, if he’s going to use it. In my work, I set aside my own personal definition because I wanted to know whether 18^th century American Christians would consider the key Founders to be “Christians” by the beliefs that they held. I thought (and still think) it important to determine what beliefs their contemporaries thought were necessary to identify someone as an actual Christian.

3) A critical question to ask is whether someone has signed on to Jesus as the Christ – or whether they only recognize Jesus the moral teacher. I would suggest that those I call theistic rationalists should, at best, be called “Jesusians,” not Christians. Jesus was important to most of them (though not all), but Christ was not. They never referred to Him as “Christ;” if they used anything beyond Jesus, they preferred “Jesus of Nazareth” because it emphasized his humanity. They liked Jesus the moral teacher, but had no room for Jesus the Christ. They did not believe in the Christ that is the core of the term “Christian” – so how is it an appropriate term for them? [Of course, there is no distinction between Jesus of Nazareth, Jesus the moral teacher, and Jesus the Christ – BUT THEY THOUGHT THERE WAS, and we’re trying to understand/categorize them]

4) I’m not interested in the club membership notion of what constitutes a Christian. As an evangelical Christian, I’m not interested in it because God is not interested in that notion – man looks at the outside, but God looks at the heart. But as a historian, I’m not interested in that notion, either, because it doesn’t tell us anything of importance. Mr. Van Dyke is concerned to protect the role of “Christianity” in the Founding – but if Christianity is nothing more than self-proclaimed membership in a club (denomination) or a vague notion that Jesus was an important person for whatever reason, what’s important about its role? If it didn’t have any particular content or meaning, how is it any more important than the role of powdered wigs or pubs or horsemanship or any number of trivial things? How is it any more important than to follow the role of chess clubs?

5) Aren’t we primarily concerned about ideas when we talk of the role of a religion or belief system? That’s what I think is important, so I think it is critical to determine what the key Founders thought and, so that we don’t have to talk about each individually, to try to correctly categorize their beliefs when possible. It does no favor to Christianity to include in its roll those whose beliefs run precisely counter to it; it’s misleading – and it’s not historically accurate, either.

6) John Kennedy gained about 12% in polls and was elected president after famously holding a press conference in which he made it crystal clear that Catholic beliefs would play no role in his actions as president. So, other than for demographic or presidential trivia purposes, of what significance was the fact that he belonged to the Catholic club? He clearly did not believe in the core doctrines of his church (he said as much), so Catholic beliefs made no impact on his presidency – what he really believed is what made a difference. I am interested in the political theology of the American Founding – the beliefs that really impacted the American Founding – not the beliefs that didn’t. It is distracting, misleading, and false to talk of the role of Christianity while talking about people who did not hold to Christian beliefs. In recent embarrassing television appearances, Joe Biden and Nancy Pelosi made it crystal clear that they do not hold to the Catholic Church’s beliefs concerning the life of the unborn – so for the purposes of that issue, it is completely irrelevant and even misleading that they self-identify as Catholics. An uninformed voter might be ardently pro-life, see that they are listed as “Catholic,” and vote for them on false pretenses. Similarly, historians and non-historians who traffic in pseudo-history (such as Barton) may be misled or may mislead based on assumptions made on the basis of the term “Christian” or “Christianity.”

Babka Defends Me:

I want to thank my friend Jim Babka, former Press Secretary to the late great Harry Browne and currently of Downsize DC for defending me against Kristo Miettinen's criticisms and what I do in debunking David Barton's Christian Nation idea. Miettinen is very smart and we both agree on a number of important things (that many key Founders were not orthodox Trinitarian Christians and America was founded to be "minimally" or as I would put it "nominally" Christian, not on orthodox Trinitarian Christian principles). I just don't think he "gets" David Barton. Babka clearly does. We haven't just read Barton's books; we've also seen endless of his recorded live appearances and presentations. As Babka writes:

Jon Rowe is correct to attempt to define orthodoxy, because as David Barton uses it, he (Barton) is engaging in sleight of mouth. And I suspect he knows he’s doing it.

One of Barton’s core arguments is that 52 of the 55 signers of the Declaration of Independence were orthodox in their Christian faith. When Barton is speaking to a television audience, he might even go a bit further and say, “evangelical,” instead of “orthodox.” Barton may, as Miettinen has spelled out, have a method to justify his position, but Barton’s audience is clearly getting a very different message.

And why does he make this argument of high level of orthodoxy, and even occasionally substitute the word, “evangelical?”

Well, the answer is simple. It’s what his audience wants to hear. And here’s the part Mr. Miettinen misses when he says that Rowe is, and Barton is NOT clinging to the unhistorical definition of Christianity: Barton is not a historian.

Rather, Barton is a politician. He’s been a high-ranking member of the Texas GOP and a paid consultant to the Republican National Committee, including a stint as a GOTV spokesman for the 2004 Bush campaign. He continues to lead groups of pastors into the fold with special DC tours. Barton is an advocate, not a scholar.

I suspect Mr. Rowe’s clarification of the Founder’s orthodoxy, or lack thereof — AS MODERN LAY-FOLK UNDERSTAND IT — is quite a threat to Mr. Barton’s story, or at least with his audience. Maybe Rowe’s use of the term orthodox Christian doesn’t follow some hifalutin rule of history departments, but it sure breaks down the opposition. What if Barton’s audiences knew that several of the signers were unitarians? You see, creeds aside, there are few more important notions to Christian Right Evangelicals than the deity of Christ. Jesus was God. Unitarians, Socinians (Jefferson’s likely position), and Arians (e.g., Jehovah’s Witnesses) are all heretics from an Evangelical perspective — even if they call themselves Christian.

It is doubtful that modern Christian Right Evangelicals would support Jefferson or Adams for elected office today, were their true opinions on the public record. Even David Barton knows that, which is why he uses tortured logic to re-present them in a more “helpful” image. Jon Rowe knows of their heresy as well, and he’s exposing it, effectively driving a wedge into the Barton myth. Good for Jon.

[...]

I am an Evangelical. I think we need about 100 Jon Rowe’s, though it would be even better if they too were Evangelicals — people from in the camp to right it. Fortunately, much of what Jon is doing is popularizing the work of Gregg Frazer, who is an Evangelical. We need more Rowe’s because Barton, in a phrase Evangelicals will have special appreciation for, “tickles the ears of his audience” — that is, he tells them what they want to hear; not what’s true. If he did tell the truth, it would be too nuanced to be of remunerative value to him, or political value to his partisan patrons.

If this was a Christian (founded) Nation, then for Mr. Barton, it means vote Republican. For his listeners, most of whom will agree to give their vote to the GOP after hearing his presentation, it means something more…

This was our country. It was stolen. We need to take it back.

This is a powerful motivator to the culture wars.

There's more. Read the whole thing.