Brad Delp's Suicide and the Reality of Mental Illness:

This is sad. Brad Delp seemed like he was in really good shape for a guy in his mid-50s, so I wondered how he died. Like Richard Jeni, it was suicide.

These two recent suicides bring to mind something that disturbs me about the thesis which some libertarians accept, most notably put forth by Thomas Szasz, that mental illness doesn't exist. Though, I note he's done some great work in the profession and I'm with him to some extent. I just can't accept the entirety of his argument. If I understand the argument, if the brain is not "sick" with a virus or cancer or something along those lines -- in other words, if a physiological test reveals a "healthy" brain like a healthy heart and set of lungs, there is no mental illness. And all categorizations have been somewhat arbitrary exercises of power (which thesis was pushed hard by the likes of Foucault).

Perhaps my problem with Szasz is just semantics. Things like schizophrenia and severe depression which causes otherwise healthy people to take their own lives are real things, real problems, regardless of whether we call them "illnesses" or not. If we accept that they are real problems which ought to be recognized as such and treated to the best of our ability, that's all I care about. Often that treatment involves drugs like antidepressants. And Szasz has done Yeoman's work as an advocate for drug legalization. So I don't think he'd have a problem with a shrink recommending a certain amount of an antidepressant. Indeed he'd probably liberalize the requirement for a prescription and allow anyone to avail themselves of these drugs as well as illegal drugs.

Where Foucault, Szasz et al. have a kernel of truth (what I accept in their argument) is that the mental health industry has and continues to try to unjustifiably medicalize social norms or conventional morality. Just as things like masturbation and homosexuality were "illnesses" of the past, things like racism and homophobia, according to some practitioners, are present day "mental illnesses." Indeed, in the Soviet Union, those who questioned the party line could be institutionalized for mental illness.

My solution which both recognizes mental illness but tries to act as a check against the use of such categorization to enforce social norms is to decouple the notion of mental illnesses and social norms. Having a mental illness, even if it doesn't involve physiological sickness like being infected with a virus, ought to be understood as analogous to physical sickness. Finding out someone is mentally ill ought to be like finding out they have high cholesterol or diabetes. Such says nothing about a person's character or social norms.

If anything, because of the unchosen element of mental illnesses and given that they are presumptively covered under disabilities related civil rights laws, if a particular condition qualifies as a real mental illness, such ought to weigh in favor, not of its social stigma, but its socially neutral status.

Of course certain behaviors -- stealing, killing, hurting other people, and perhaps hurting oneself -- are almost always wrong no matter what the cause. But, if they do in fact result from a mental illness, such behaviors are wrong, not because of but in spite of that fact. And, in criminal law and in social morality, behavior which results from mental illness often acts a "mitigating" factor. Someone who chooses to do a bad act with a clear mind and a cold heart is more immoral and criminally culpable than someone who had an impulse, couldn't "help" himself and then felt terribly guilty about it afterwards. And if the resultant behavior is not harmful or immoral -- like for instance jumping over the cracks of a sidewalk (as people with OCD do), or yelping in class (as someone with tourettes syndrome does -- though I can understand how this might distract professors!) then there is nothing socially or morally wrong with either the condition or the behavior of the person and discriminating against or thinking less of a person because of their harmless eccentricities which might result from an underlying neurosis is morally wrong and ought to be frowned upon. (And while professors have no duty to accommodate a yelper without tourettes, if a student yelps because she has tourettes, otherwise inexcusable behavior must be accommodated to the extent that it is "reasonable" to do so).

As I noted before, Madison, Jefferson and Lincoln all likely suffered from moderate to serious mental illnesses of the depression and anxiety variety. Finding this out about them should be like discovering that some founding father had male pattern baldness under his whig. Contrast that with finding out that Lincoln might have been homosexual. Whatever we think of the morality of homosexuality, such ought to have nothing to do with whether homosexuality is a mental illness which would presumptively make that condition more like having high cholesterol, or an even closer analogy -- tourettes -- and demand its inclusion in various disabilities related civil rights legislation and "reasonable accommodations" for the underyling conduct which results from the illness.

Why Lillback's Thesis is Unconvincing, Take 57:

As I have noted many times before, George Washington was not a "strict Deist" like Thomas Paine and to the extent that some folks hold this misconception, Peter A. Lillback, the Novaks and other scholars who dispel this notion do relevant work. The problem, though, is many of them then argue Washington was a "Christian" (as though there were only two boxes "Christian" or "Deist"), but Washington's belief in orthodox Trinitarian Christianity simply cannot be gleaned from the historical record.

While it is quite easy to construct a strict Deist strawman and offer an avalanche of facts on Washington to knock it down, little if anything I have seen from Lillback or the Novaks demonstrates Washington believed any differently than Jefferson, Adams, Franklin, and Madison. If we call their belief system "theistic rationalism," this is not such an easy strawman to knock down. Lillback's book thus is full of non-sequiturs, offering many facts about Washington suggesting they demonstrate he was an orthodox Christian, when they do not. For instance, there is a chapter on Washington's prayers where they deal with Washington's "reciprocal prayers." As Lillback points out, "[t]his is a gracious custom that could be construed as a mere civility." He should have stopped there. But he goes on:

But in some instances, this cannot be offered as the explanation. That is because some of the prayers are so explicitly Christian and biblical, that to affirm a reciprocal prayer would be to confess a Christian faith. If Washington intended to be the honest, candid person that he claimed to be, and yet also was the Deist that so many have claimed him to be, he could not have offered a reciprocal prayer in such instances. Yet, that is exactly what Washington did on various occasions. p. 362-63

Lillback then quotes some of the original letters to whose prayers Washington reciprocated. For instance, one from the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church in Kingston which prayed, for Washington, an orthodox Christian prayer, talking about entering Heaven through the "Blood of the Lamb." Lillback writes, "[s]urely Washington, if he were a Deist, could not reciprocate such a prayer. But he did." p. 364. But notice, when Washington reciprocated, he repeats none of the orthodox language, just stated that his "wishes are reciprocal."

Convinced that our Religious Liberties were as essential as our Civil, my endeavours have never been wanting to encourage and promote the one, while I have been contending for the other; and I am highly flattered by finding that my efforts have met the approbation of so respectable a body.

In return for your kind concern for my temporal and eternal happiness, permit me to assure you that my wishes are reciprocal; and that you may be enabled to hand down your Religion pure and undefiled to a Posterity worthy of their Ancesters is the fervent prayer of Genre. Yrs. &c. 5

Now let us turn to Jefferson doing the same thing. In fact, let us turn to what is arguably Jefferson's most famous correspondence on church/state matters -- his letter to the Danbury Baptists. While many people are aware of the letter Jefferson wrote to them, few know of the letter they wrote to him, to which he responded. Here it is. And let me excerpt part of it: "And may the Lord preserve you safe from every evil and bring you at last to his heavenly kingdom through Jesus Christ our Glorious Mediator." This is an unequivocal statement of orthodoxy from a Church -- the Baptists -- which was unquestionably orthodox in its doctrines.

To which Jefferson responded with his famous letter stating the First Amendment instituted "a wall of separation between Church & State." But few people notice the very bottom of the letter where Jefferson reciprocated their prayer.

I reciprocate your kind prayers for the protection & blessing of the common father and creator of man, and tender you for yourselves & your religious association, assurances of my high respect & esteem.

In short, Jefferson here does exactly what Washington did with his reciprocal prayer to Reformed Protestant Dutch Church. And we know from reading his private letters, Jefferson rejected almost all of the tenets of orthodox Christianity. It no more follows that Washington's reciprocation signified a belief in the orthodoxy of the original letter writers than Jefferson's reciprocation did.

As I noted above, Lillback had the common sense explanation for Washington's reciprocal prayers, that it was "a gracious custom that could be construed as a mere civility." He should have stopped there and not delved in deep to a non-sequitur. His book is 1200 pages of this kind of argumentation.

Sean Hannity Heretic:

A Catholic Priest calls Hannity a "heretic" for endorsing birth control. I absolutely disagree with the Church's position on birth control -- but then again, I'm not a Catholic (other than being baptized one). Hannity's rejection of birth control is a problem for a variety of reasons. One, the Catholic Church is hierarchical and good Catholics are supposed to listen to Church authority. But more importantly, the Church has tied its entire view on "natural sex" to a "procreative teleology." In short, it condemns homosexuality, contraception, and masturbation along the same lines. If one accepts contraception, one then loses the natural grounds for condemning homosexual acts. In other words, according to Church teachings, what Sean Hannity endorses is as "unnatural" as homosexual acts. Perhaps, then, one can still find a way (Scripture) to morally condemn homosexual acts, but not on "naturalness" grounds.

The Priest said he would deny Hannity communion. I don't see how Hannity's position in any way differs from that of other Catholic sexual dissidents like Andrew Sullivan.

Update: Welcome Andrew Sullivan readers. Some folks have noted that the link doesn't work for them. A reader commented that "going through the main Hannity & Colmes site works. Its in the right hand column under Fox News Video here." And here is a clip from YouTube.

Brad Delp RIP:

I thought Brad Delp, Boston's lead singer who just died at 55, had a cool voice -- real smooth and he could hit those high notes. Boston were a little too "corporate" sounding for my taste; but they wrote good tunes and were real musicians. This is a performance I found on YouTube from March 2nd which may be the last recording of Delp's.



And here is one from Nov. 2006 with John Popper. I'm really glad that Delp seemed to have a good time rockin' until the very end. RIP Brad Delp.

The Original Public Meaning of "Religion" in the Constitution:

The Constitution mentions religion in Article VI, section 3 ("no religious tests") and then again in the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. It's fairly uncontroversial among scholars that religious rights apply to more than just the "Christian" religion. Still, I have seen some originalists argue that the term "religion" meant Christian sects only. (Indeed, it's accepted "fact" among the Christian Nation crowd that "religion" which was protected by the Constitution only meant "Christianity".) Justice Rehnquist, although to my knowledge never held such rights should be restricted to Christians or Protestants, in his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree seemed to imply that "religion," as originally understood, meant exactly this at least in the Establishment Clause (though like Scalia, I think he accepted that the Constitution's meaning can change over time if such meaning is consistent with the text of the Constitution and traditions of the nation; and indeed, extending "religious rights" beyond Christianity would qualify as such).

Rehnquist relied on Joseph Story's commentaries in that decision, and offered the following much cited quotation:

The real object of the [First] [A]mendment was not to countenance, much less to advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity, but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent [p105] any national ecclesiastical establishment which should give to a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government. It thus cut off the means of religious persecution (the vice and pest of former ages), and of the subversion of the rights of conscience in matters of religion, which had been trampled upon almost from the days of the Apostles to the present age. . . .

Now, this may well have been one of the "underlying purposes" of the First Amendment, but it would be a mistake to therefore conclude that the First Amendment, because one of its purposes was "to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects" protected "Christianity" only. For one, the text says nothing about "Christianity" but "religion," and the writings from the Founding era record make clear that everyone knew other "religions" existed besides Christianity.

Whether we call it "original intent" (at a general level) or "underlying principles" or "purposes" of the Constitution's text -- however useful these may be for explicating meaning or "filling in gaps" when needed -- such ought never be used to supersede the text of the Constitution. This is exactly what Randy Barnett warned against in this post where he wrote:

I do have one caution about Jack's [Balkin's] appeal to what he calls the "underlying principles" of the text. When the text is vague, appealing to the underlying principles to determine whether or not it covers a particular situation is appropriate and inevitable. But what is not kosher is to dive beneath the surface of the text to ferret out the "underlying principles" and then resurface somewhere else entirely. This is a standard technique by which the text itself can be replaced with the interpreter's version of the "underlying principles" that may even contradict the text itself.

What is appropriate is using the principles underlying the text to interpret its reach, when that reach is in doubt. In other words, when you dive beneath the surface to find the "underlying principles" you must reemerge in the text itself and apply the text (not the principle) to the facts of a particular case.

This post need not exhaust the public record to show that both the framers and the ratifiers of the Constitution, when they used the term "religion," knew that other religions besides the "Christian" one existed and were protected; trust me, they did. If they meant to give rights to the Christian religion only they could have worded the text that way, but they didn't. Though, I will show a little on the debates over Article VI's "no religious tests" clause. The ratifiers knew that by prohibiting religious tests for public office, non-Christians would be able to secure election and many were opposed to the Constitution for that very reason. But, since the Constitution ultimately was ratified, their view lost.

A North Carolina minister, for instance, in his state's ratification debate, noted that Article VI was "an invitation for Jews and pagans of every kind to come among us." At the Massachusetts convention, one speaker noted that unless the President was forced to take a religious oath, "a Turk, a Jew, a Roman Catholic, and what is worse than all, a Universalist, may be President of the United States."

Ultimately the original public meaning of the term "religion" in the Constitution demands that whatever "rights" or "prohibitions" attach to religion, attach to "religion in general" not the Christian sects only. Therefore, a view which I have seen put forth, similar to Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree and Joseph Story's above quoted passage -- the Establishment Clause originally meant to prohibit a national Church plus discrimination or preference among the Christian sects, is untenable. If the EC demands any kind of sect neutrality, it must apply to all religions and therefore government could not promote Christianity in general while excluding "Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity" from whatever program of aid is at issue. Perhaps government could promote "religion" over non-religion. But, if atheism or lack of religion qualifies as someone's "religion," (arguably it does), then government may not be able to do this either. Abolishing sect preference suggests a right to religious equality and religious equality may lead us down the road to government being forbidden from preferring one religion over another or preferring religion over non-religion (in other words, the post Everson line of cases).

Of course, if government were restricted from erecting a national establishment only it could promote Christianity over non-Christianity or one sect of Christianity over another (this is similar to what Philip Hamburger argues).

For a work which argues for a very strict reading of the Establishment Clause that avoids falling into the sect-preference pitfall and some of the problems with Philip Hamburger's "Separation of Church and State," (for instance that what Jefferson, Madison and the religious dissenters fought for in Virginia in the 1780s did not fall under the rubric of "separation of Church and State," an extremely contentious claim which Hamburger puts forth) see Vincent Phillip Munoz's "The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause and the Impossiblity of its Incorporation" . University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 8, 2006.

This passage on the meaning of "respecting an" impressed me:

The key to unlocking the meaning of the Establishment Clause lies in understanding the words "respecting an,"236 which were added by the joint committee. Then, as now, the present participle "respecting" means "with reference to, [or] with regard to."237 The added words reveal a precise intention -- to indicate that Congress lacked power with reference or regard to a religious establishment. By adopting "respecting an," the joint committee drafted a solution to the problem of how to craft language that would specify that Congress lacked power to legislate a national establishment or to interfere with existing state establishments (or lack thereof) without implicitly granting to Congress power to pass church-state legislation short of the stated prohibition.238 To restate the problem, if the committee drew a specific line that Congress could not pass (as proposed in the Senate), future congressional members might interpret their power to include everything short of that line. "Respecting an" offered a precise solution to this problem by indicating that Congress lacked power in the entire realm of religious establishments. Unlike the other First Amendment participles "prohibiting" and "abridging," which regulate but do not categorically deny Congress power, "respecting" indicates Congress's lack of jurisdictional authority over an entire subject matter. The Establishment Clause thus made clear that Congress lacked power to legislate a national establishment or to pass legislation directly regarding state establishments (or the lack thereof).239 Of course, Federalists in the First Congress, such as Roger Sherman, thought this was how the matter stood without an amendment.240 With the addition of "respecting an," Congress found language that did not affect the existing power of Congress (from the Federalists' viewpoint) yet would satisfy the fears aroused by Anti-Federalist criticisms that the Constitution threatened religious freedom. It was a remarkable feat of constitutional craftsmanship.

Note though, Congress wasn't just powerless over "religious establishments," but had no power over religion in general and arguably couldn't, as a general matter, promote religion for that reason. Munoz's paper avoids the pitfall of trying to read an empowerment over religion into the Constitution's text, which just isn't there.

However, if the Establishment Clause weren't incorporated, states could promote religion in general or a Christian or other sect in particular. For instance, Utah could promote Mormonism. Munoz's paper shows that while all of the Founders seemed agreed that Free Exercise for all religions must be guaranteed, they didn't likewise agree on Establishment policy. All three religion clauses -- the Establishment, Free Exercise and "No Religious Tests" -- were meant to secure the "unalienable rights of conscience." Jefferson and Madison endorsed the "Virginia" view or that strict separation of Church and State -- hence no government funds to promote religion -- was needed to secure those unalienable rights. Washington and Adams endorsed the "Massachusetts" view which thought a mild establishment didn't violate the rights of conscience. Hence even if the Free Exercise clause ought to be incorporated, because it is not clear that a mild establishment violates the unalienable rights of conscience and because of the precise way it is worded, the Establishment Clause does not neatly incorporate. The federal government, as originally conceived and persisting through the 14th Amendment, could make no establishment policy at either the federal or state level.

A couple of thoughts. First, even if it's true that certain types of establishments may not violate unalienable rights, certain types probably do. So even if states have leeway in their ability to establish and promote "religion," the rights of conscience will still demand *something* for those whose views aren't promoted by the state. This is what George Washington (and probably Adams and others who endorsed the "Massachusetts" view) believed. For instance, in commenting on Patrick Henry's bill to promote Christianity in general (which Madison remonstrated against and the contents of which were made illegal in Virginia according to Jefferson's Virginia Statute on Religious Freedom) Washington stated:

I am not amongst the number of those who are so much alarmed at the thoughts of making people pay towards the support of that which they profess, if of the denomination of Christians; or declare themselves Jews, Mahomitans or otherwise, and thereby obtain proper relief. As the matter now stands, I wish an assessment had never been agitated, and as it has gone so far, that the Bill could die an easy death; because I think it will be productive of more quiet to the State, than by enacting it into a Law; which, in my opinion, would be impolitic, admitting there is a decided majority for it, to the disquiet of a respectable minority.

In other words, he was against the bill not because he thought, in principle, it violated natural rights, but rather because it was "impolitic." But while he believed that state governments could, by right, support Christianity in general, because men of non-Christian religions have equal rights, they are, by right, entitled to "obtain proper relief."

And this, in turn is suggestive of a natural right to religious equality between not just the Christian sects, but for all religions. Whether when government "aids" various programs it must do so in a "religion blind" manner or could in fact "take cognizance" of religion -- promote a particular religious point of view, and grant equal accommodations, or "proper relief" (as Washington put it) to those whose views are not advanced -- is something I haven't entirely figured out. It's possible that, as Munoz and others argue, modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence greatly misreads the original record, though it's doubtful that the Court will unincorporate it anytime soon. Even if the Court did, I strongly believe, after Akhil Amar, the notion of religious equality or equal rights will vet much of what the Court currently has the incorporated Establishment Clause doing.

Finally, check out this enlightening debate featuring these very concepts with, among others, Michael Newdow and Phillip Munoz. On the matter of "under God" in the pledge, Newdow's position takes Madison's and Jefferson's "Virginia" position probably further than they would (but still to its logical conclusion) and argues religious equality/non-cognizance demands no "under God" in the pledge. After all, "under God" is not neutral or equal any more than saying "under no God" would be neutral or equal. Munoz, on the other hand, more in line with the Massachusetts view thinks it fine for government to promote theism over non-theism as long as atheists like Newdow could "obtain proper relief." In this case, it would be recognizing that atheists or other religious dissidents have an absolute right not to say "under God" in the pledge and suffer no penalty for it.

Novak on the Founders' God:

Michael Novak's latest installment in his dialogue with Joseph Ellis about the Founders on Religion is up. His post summarizes an argument Novak made in his book On Two Wings. What Novak does here is try to find ways in which the Founders' God parallels the Biblical God but "differs from earlier pagan religions, from Islam, and from 18th century deism." He essentially plays a "glass is half-full/half-empty" game. He writes:

First of all, Biblical religion holds that the Creator is intimately concerned with the inner conscience of human beings (the principle Jefferson draws on in his Statute for Religious Freedom); and also that in reply to our prayers ("ask and you shall receive"), the God of the Bible "interposes" his divine action into the affairs of men, the rise and fall of nations, and even the inner thoughts and inspirations of human individuals.

Secondly, the Biblical God "who gave us life, gave us liberty at the same time" (Jefferson). He invited us into friendship with Him -- the friendship of free women and men, not slaves. As William Penn put it, if friendship, then freedom. From this insight flowed the Liberty Bell of Philadelphia. Thus, biblical religion conceived of history as a long-term effort to bring human freedom into fruition across this planet ("Go teach all nations"). As the historian Lord Acton wrote, the history of liberty is coincident with the history of Judaism/Christianity.

In other words, the Biblical God is "the god of liberty." It was for liberty that the Creator made the world. It is by giving humans liberty that He made them "in His image." Unlike the Greek Fates, the Biblical God is sovereign and free; unlike the Muslim Allah who is pure will (over-ruling reason and law), the Biblical God is the light that suffuses the intelligibility of all natural and human law, and all individuals and events. The Biblical God lives liberty through, not license, but self-government under law: "Confirm thy soul in self-control/ Thy liberty in law."

Problems with Novak's thesis: First, Novak only attempts to see how the Founders' God parallels the Biblical God, i.e., the Founders' God was not some remote watchmaker God but an active personal God, the Biblical God is an active personal God, hence the Founders' God is the Biblical God. But we could just as easily ask how the Founders' God differed from the Biblical God. For instance, the Founders' God clearly was unitarian, not Trinitarian in His attributes; He didn't damn anyone to Hell for eternity (just punished the bad temporarily); He was more concerned with works than faith; and though He was, as Novak notes, "concerned with the inner conscience of human beings," He was apparently not a jealous God as He granted men an unalienable right to worship false gods or no God at all (contrast that with the First Commandment). The Founders' God was viewed through the lens of "benevolence" and "rationality"; those parts of Scripture which confirmed God's benevolence and rationality were, accordingly, legitimately revealed; those parts of Scripture which conflicted with these notions (for instance, like God's jealousy, His wrath, His Triune nature, some of His more outlandish miracles) likely were "error" or not legitimately revealed.

So after seeing the full picture and asking how the Founders' God was both similar to and different from the God of traditional orthodox Christianity, then ask whether the Founders' God was "Biblical." The best answer for the affirmative would be yes, He was, but with a caveat: The Founders' God was "Biblical" minus everything written in the Bible conflicting with the findings of man's reason, which was designed to be supreme. See Jefferson taking his razor to the "unreasonable" parts of the Bible or Adams asserting even if he were on Mt. Sinai with Moses and God revealed the doctrine of the Trinity to him there, Adams still wouldn't believe it because man's reason dictates 1+1+1 = 3, not 1.

The second problem with Novak's thesis is that it disregards the universalism with which these Founders were so concerned. Novak essentially tries to argue: The Founders God was "Biblical" but not Allah, not Deistic, not the God of this or that pagan religion. The Founders asserted just the opposite. Their rational unitarian God was, according to them, the God of all. He was the (unitarian) Christian God, Jehovah to the Jews, Allah to the Muslims, "the Great Spirit" to the Native Americans, and so on and so forth. John Adams managed to "find" this monotheistic God in the religion of the Pagan Greeks and Romans and the Hindus. Now one can argue, whatever they asserted, the Founders' God differed in His attributes from Allah, and the rest of the pagan gods. But, He likewise differed from the triune God of the Christians!

See for instance this quotation from Adams in his letter to M.M. Noah, July 31, 1818:

"It has pleased the Providence of the first Cause, the Universal Cause, that Abraham should give religion not only to Hebrews but to Christians and Mahomitans, the greatest part of the modern civilized world."

Here Adams makes it clear that Jews, Christians, and Muslims worshipped the same God as all have "religion."

If one argues that "Allah" possesses different attributes than the "Biblical" God, one could just as easily argue that the Christian God possesses different attributes than the Jewish God. Indeed, while the Christian God is triune in nature, the Jewish God, Allah and the Founders' God are unitarian in nature. Consider this quotation from Adams to Mordecai Noah, March 15, 1819:

I really wish the Jews again in Judea an independent nation. For as I believe the most enlightened men of it have participated in the amelioration of the philosophy of the age, once restored to an independent government & no longer persecuted they would soon wear away some of the asperities and peculiarities of their character [and] possibly in time become liberal unitarian Christians for your Jehovah is our Jehovah & your God of Abraham Isaac & Jacob is our God.

Notice how Adams remarks both that he and the Jews worshipped the same God -- "Jehovah, the God of Abraham Isaac & Jacob," but that his God was aptly described as that of "liberal unitarian Christianity." Hence, from an outer level of generality, all theists worshipped the same God -- "the Providence of the first Cause" -- but from an inner level of specific attributes, Adams' (and the other key Founders') God was unitarian, not Trinitarian, benevolent, not wrathful and jealous, and above all rational. In sum, on specific matters, the Founders' God was their God -- benevolent, rational, and unitarian; and He differed not just from Allah, the God of the strict Deists, and the god(s) of the rest of the pagans, but He also differed from the God of the Jews and the God of orthodox Christians.

My final problem with Novak's thesis is that he imports an "a-biblical" attribute into the "Biblical" God and hence tries to credit the Bible for one of the attributes of the Founders' God which clearly the Enlightenment created. Novak was quoted above as saying "the Biblical God is 'the god of liberty.' It was for liberty that the Creator made the world." The God of the Founders, no doubt, was pro-political liberty; Novak nicely quotes Jefferson as stating the God "who gave us life, gave us liberty at the same time." The problem is the Biblical God seems wholly unconcerned with political, as opposed to spiritual liberty. Tory minister Jonathan Boucher correctly noted: "The word liberty, as meaning civil liberty, does not, I believe, occur in all the Scriptures." Thus, the notion that men have a God-granted right to political liberty is wholly a creation of Enlightenment, not Biblical, theology. As Novak's fellow conservative Catholic scholar, Robert Kraynak, once put it, the theory of liberal democracy as put forth by Jefferson et al. "needs God, but God is not as liberal or as democratic as we would like Him to be." In other words, the Biblical God is not as liberal or democratic as the key Founders made God out to be. Or at the very least, those attributes cannot be gleaned from the text of the Bible.

Response to Cars are Evil:

This blogger has got some issues. I've got a few responses. For instance, this one:



Or this:



Or this:



Or this:



Or finally, this:

Pictures at an Exhibition:

Emerson, Lake and Palmer's entire concert of Mussorgsky's "Pictures at an Exhibition" has now been posted on YouTube. In many ways, they cover Ravel's orchestral arrangement of Mussorgsky's piano piece (most are more familiar with the orchestral version which was arranged by Maurice Ravel).



Love it or hate it. I think it's great.

Out of all of the eras of concert music -- Baroque, Classical, Romantic, Modern, etc. -- the melodies and harmonies written in late Romantic pieces like those from Mussorgsky or Prokofiev fit best with the hard rock idiom. Earlier stuff like Bach, Beethoven and Mozart -- the melodies often are too elegant to rock; and contemporary concert music, post-Stravinsky -- the harmonies too dissonant, the melodies too atonal or unsingable. Late Romantic music has melodies that are closest to the "riffs" in rock music -- exotic and funky, but still very singable.

Even many of the rock guitarists who claim to be influenced by Bach and Pagannini (Yngwie Malmsteen) do things in their melodies/solos, like stress the augmented second of the harmonic minor scale, which Bach et al. would never do in their melodies. Hence Yngwie et al., whether they realize it or not, often give their melodies a late-Romantic feel even as they try to incorporate ideas from the Baroque and Classical era.

Bloomsday:

As Andrew Sullivan and R.R. Reno remind us, it's been 20 years since Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind has been published.

A little while ago Karen tagged me with a "thinking" meme. Though not exactly what she asked for, I strongly recommend this book (if one can deal with the abstruse prose). Like all Straussian works, it makes some very controversial claims, and unless one toes the East Coast Straussian line (I certainly don't), no matter what one's political stripe, one will find much with which to disagree here. Yet, there are also shrewd insights into political philosophy and the human condition. Indeed, one can find ammo in this book to support neocon, paleocon, theocon, secularist, libertarian, or even leftist positions.

The book certainly challenges one to think.

Kind of Funny:

As a neither leftist nor rightist libertarian, I try to avoid taking overtly political stands on my blogs (except those that endorse libertarianism). I must say, though, that Max Blumenthal strikes me as what Bill O'Reilly would call a "smear-merchant." Still, this video has some fun moments.

The funniest moment -- one that plays on all sorts of Republican stereotypes -- is the black Republican featured at the four and a half minute mark. You have to see him to believe it. As someone who is 1/4 Lebanese in ancestry, I think I have as much black blood as this guy.

Recent Webcam Pic:

Ideas Have Consequences:

Most constitutional scholars who defend the concept of "originalism" no longer do so under the rubric of "original intent," but rather under "original meaning." The term "original intent" is more associated with a sort of reflexive conservatism; though, what many don't realize is that "original intent" could be, especially as applied to religious matters, a far more subversive concept than "original meaning."

"Original intent" is where the secret, perhaps "code," intentions of our Founders -- things that they wrote in their private letters but could not utter in public because such sentiments would be far too controversial for that time -- could supersede the original plain meaning of the text of the Constitution.

Enter religious establishments. The First Amendment to the Constitution clearly forbids in its plain text, at the very least, a national religious establishment for America. Yet, it's entirely possible that the key Founders secretly intended to de facto establish "theistic rationalism" -- their personal belief in that system of theological unitarianism and universalism -- as the religion of the United States. Clearly though, even if this were the case, most would agree that we are not ruled by these secret intentions but by the original public meaning of their words as written in the Constitution.

Still, ideas have consequences, and some of the present day outcomes of original public meaning may nonetheless coincide with those secret intentions. Indeed, those Founders may have been far more aware than the normal guy on the street in 1789, of the potential consequences of those ideas.

One thinks of the recent case involving the military chaplain where the military, entirely consistent with the religious ideals of our Founders, ordered that the chaplain not pray in Jesus' name but rather in generic God terms.

The Rutherford Institute responded that it seemed that the military was trying to establish unitarianism or universalism as a de facto religion. From the WorldNetDaily article:

And that, the Rutherford Institute charges, is an attempt by the Navy to assemble a "civic religion."

"There's a unitarian system of religion that's aimed at Christians," Whitehead told WND. "It boils down to that. We're seeing it all across the country, with council prayers, kids wanting to mention Jesus. What's going on here is it's generally a move in our government and military to set up a civic religion."

Some thoughts. First, it strikes me as odd that the Rutherford Institute would raise an Establishment Clause claim. Conservative Christians seem to me most likely to endorse the notion that the EC prevents the federal government only from establishing a national church like the Church of England. Well, telling a chaplain he can't pray in Jesus' name is not (anything) like establishing a Church of England.

Moreover, if government is constitutionally permitted to make religious acknowledgements at all, government must then dictate the content of such acknowledgements. The only alternative is to hold that government may not, under the Establishment Clause, make religious acknowledgements. And that's the outcome that Barry Lynn and Michael Newdow want.

And indeed the content of military's orders demanding the chaplain not pray in Jesus' name is entirely consistent with the ideals of the Founding. Indeed, there is a "civil religion" that founds America which aptly could be described as "a unitarian system of religion that's aimed at Christians," which was constructed not by the Navy but by our Founding Fathers. Consider Justice Scalia's words from his interesting dissent in McCreary and speaking of our Founders' acknowledgement of God: "This is not necessarily the Christian God (though if it were, one would expect Christ regularly to be invoked, which He is not)" and,

All of the actions of Washington and the First Congress upon which I have relied, virtually all Thanksgiving Proclamations throughout our history, and all the other examples of our Government's favoring religion that I have cited, have invoked God, but not Jesus Christ.

Meticulously researching the primary sources over the past few years, I can confirm Scalia is right in this assertion.

Balkin on the Establishment Clause's Equality Norms:

A while ago I posted on Akhil Amar's views of the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection principles. His seminal book on the Bill of Rights notes that the original meaning of the Establishment Clause may make it hard if not impossible to incorporate. But he then asserts that because the Establishment Clause often acts like an equal protection clause, if the Court instead relied on the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause on religious matters, the outcomes may not differ greatly were the Establishment Clause unincorporated. From his book:

Even a noncoercive establishment, [Thomas] Cooley suggested, violated principles of religious liberty and religious equality -- violated norms of equal rights and privileges. And once we see this, it turns out that the question -- should we incorporate the establishment clause? -- may not matter all that much, because even if we did not, principles of religious liberty and equality could be vindicated via the free-exercise clause (whose text, history, and logic make it a paradigmatic case for incorporation) and the equal protection clause (which frowns on state laws that unjustifiably single out some folks for special privileges and relegate others to second-class status). Surely Alabama could not adopt a state motto proclaiming itself "the White Supremacy State"; such a motto would offend basic principles of equal citizenship and equal protection. And so a law that proclaimed Utah a Mormon state should be suspect whether we call this a violation of establishment principles, free-exercise principles, equal-protection principles, equal-citizenship principles, or religious-liberty principles.

Now, exactly how the Equal Protection Clause could do what the Supreme Court currently has the Establishment Clause doing needs much more scholarly explication than is currently out there. Jack Balkin's recent post on the Establishment Clause and issues of standing shows, using an analogy to racial discrimination, the parallels between what the Equal Protection Clause does with race and the Establishment Clause does with religion. Keep in mind while reading the following that the Equal Protection Clause could the same with both.

Frankly, I've always thought this entire line of standing cases is silly. Standing to sue should depend on the nature of the underlying substantive right. In my opinion, the Establishment Clause does not simply protect citizens from certain spending decisions (although it does do that). It protects them from certain dignitary harms caused by the government's endorsement of one religion over another, of religion in general over non-religion, or of atheism over religion. In other words, the Establishment Clause requires the government to give equal respect to its citizens with respect to religious questions, both in its symbolic activities as well as in its expenditures of money. Thus, if the Government were to erect a large sign from general appropriations stating "There is no God," this would violate the Establishment Clause because it imposes a dignitary harm on religious citizens. (Note: not everyone agrees with this view of the Establishment Clause-- some think it only protects against government coercion, for example. Justice O'Connor championed the endorsement view, which the Court later adopted, and I think she was essentially correct.).


If my substantive theory of the Establishment Clause is correct-- and it is more or less the theory that the Court currently holds-- then then any citizen of the U.S. who suffers a dignitary harm by reason of endorsement in violation of the Establishment Clause has standing to sue, and any citizen of a state who suffers dignitary harm by reason of endorsement by a state has standing to sue. A person's status as a taxpayer is irrelevant because it has nothing to do with the underlying nature of the substantive right.


The Establishment Clause is not the only clause in the Constitution that creates dignitary rights. The Titles of Nobility Clause protects citizens from the dignitary harms caused when the government bestows aristocratic titles on someone else. So if the federal government decided to make me Lord Balkin, any other citizen should have standing to sue, and I wish they would! Similarly, I have long been of the view that although the First Amendment protects various forms of racist speech by private actors, speech by the government is in a different position: the Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from making official pronouncements that one race is superior to the other. It would also prohibit states from having "colored" and "white" signs on restrooms or water fountains even if the state never required or enforced segregation of facilities by law. (Indeed, in Brown v. Board, when the states assigned pupils by race, they also sent a message of White Supremacy; this was a dignitary harm separate from the material harms caused by forcing blacks to attend inferior schools. That is, as Chuck Lawrence once put it, Brown is both a segregation case and a case of racist speech by the government.). According to this theory, any citizen who belonged to a disfavored or dispreferred race would have standing to sue if the government engaged in racist speech.

Ellis Responds to the Novaks:

Here on the Encyclopedia Britannica Blog. This passage accurately captures what the disagreement -- not just between them, but between those wishing to see in America's Founding, "secularism" on the one hand, or "religion" on the other -- is all about:

The core of our disagreement, as I see it, is the definition of religion. If the definition is quite broad, the belief that there are providential forces at work in the world which mere humans can never fully understand, or the belief that there are certain rights (i.e., life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness) that should be granted a semi-sacred status in America’s “civil religion,” then all the prominent Founders were religious.

If the definition is more narrowly Christian, to include the belief that Jesus was the divine son of God, and the belief there is life after death in a heavenly location where the saints communed everlastingly with God, then the matter gets much messier. Different Founders took somewhat different postures on these issues, and several of them changed their positions during their respective lifetimes.

Christianists on Mormons:

I don't know enough about the intricacies of Mormonism to tell how much of this is truth how much distortion. I know I have many Mormon readers, perhaps a few can chime in. If Romney gets the GOP nomination, expect many more commentaries like the following:

Top 10 Amazing Facts of Mormonism



1. Mormons can become gods and goddesses.


2. Goddesses will spend eternity in full submission to their god-husband.


3. Mormon women will give birth “forever and ever” to spirit-babies.


4. Mormon men can have multiple wives in heaven—eternal polygamy.


5. Heavenly Father is an exalted man who lives with his goddess wife, Heavenly Mother, on a planet near the great star Kolob.


6. American Indians are descendants of the wicked Lamanites, who were Israelites that God cursed with dark skin.


7. God the Father had sex with Mary to conceive Jesus, who is the half brother of Lucifer.


8. All Christian churches are an abomination.


9. Mormons need 4 secret handshakes to get into the Celestial heaven.


10. Joseph Smith revealed that the actual Garden of Eden is in Jackson County, Missouri.


And so you see, 45% of Christians know what thousands of the media elite do not: Mormonism is not Christian.

The Novaks on Ellis on the Founders:

Michael and Jana Novak have responded to Joseph Ellis' thoughts on the Founders and Religion on the Encyclopedia Britannica Blog. (See my thoughts on Ellis' post.) In particular, they don't like Ellis' use of the phrase, "pantheistic sense of providential destiny," to describe Washington's God. They write:

Finally, it is really not possible to demonstrate from Washington's public decrees that the Providence to whom he asked his army and fellow citizens to pray was "pantheistic." On the contrary, his public prayers as commanding General and as President expected Providence to favor liberty and thus, though both prayed to the same Providence, the American cause over the British. He expected his God -- and the nation -- to "interpose" his divine action in the course of the war, and in the later course of American history.

And just as the American Founders held that the natural rights they declared belonged not solely to them but to all humankind, so the God to whom they prayed did not belong solely to them, but is the Almighty Lord of all, who sits in judgment over this nation and others. President Washington did not scruple, in his eloquent message to the Hebrew Congregation of Savannah, to identify the God "Jehovah" who led the Jewish people in Israel, with the Providence who led Americans through their founding period.

I think "pantheistic" aptly describes not just Washington's, but the other key Founders' God. Though It was, as the Novaks' note, a particular type of pantheistic Providence; theirs was an active personal God, indeed one who favored political liberty and frowned upon tyrannical leaders (not exactly attributes of the Biblical God, who doesn't seem concerned with political -- as opposed to spiritual -- liberty; and Paul admonishes Christians to follow civil magistrates, even secular, pagan, and arguably tyrannical ones like Nero, the leader to whom Paul told Christians to obey in Romans 13).

The Founders' God was, however, universalistic. Various peoples of various religious traditions, even those outside the "Judeo-Christian" one, worshipped the same God who goes by many different proper names. And it was customary for the Founders to use the proper name for God with which the addressees would feel most comfortable. The only time Washington ever, to my knowledge, named God "Jehovah" was in one address to the Hebrew Congregation of Savannah. Twice however, I have counted Washington used the proper name "the Great Spirit" -- here and here -- for God, but only when addressing American Indians.

In sum, if "pantheistic" can mean an active, personal, universalistic God, then such a term accurately describes the God the key Founders like Washington worshipped.

The Founders on Scripture:

The key Founders, you know them -- Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Franklin and a few others -- had a particularly nuanced view of Scripture that differed from that of the "Deists" on the one hand and the "Christians" on the other. Their view of Scripture perfectly illustrates how their religion was a hybrid of the two systems -- in between Deism and Christianity -- with rationalism as the trumping element.

The strict Deist point of view, ala Thomas Paine and Ethan Allen, categorically rejected all revelation in favor of man's reason. Orthodox Christians, on the other hand, viewed Scripture as inerrant and infallible. And though some in the orthodox Christian tradition accepted natural theology -- or what man can discover from reason -- Christians elevated revelation over reason. See Luther calling man's reason "the devil's whore," or Aquinas, who argued the findings of man's reason must perfectly coincide with all of Scripture, or else man, as fallible, must have erred.

The key Founders believed in the truth of both man's reason and biblical revelation. Yet, they thought only parts of the Bible were legitimately revealed by God. They elevated man's reason over revelation as the final arbiter of what revelation was legitimately given by God. Only those legitimate parts of the Bible provided support for man's reason which was supreme.

Without understanding this nuanced hybrid position, both sides -- the secular left and religious right -- can easily claim these Founders as their own, misunderstanding them while quoting them out of context. For instance, a strict Deist believes in no Scripture. Jefferson and Franklin, two Founders often accused of being "Deists," often made Biblical allusions and otherwise suggested that they believed in parts of the Bible. Why would someone who believed Scripture was false seem to hold parts of it in high regard? Reacting to these quotations, some secularists assert Jefferson and Franklin manipulated the masses or the moment, pretending to believe in something that they didn't.

The religious right, on the other hand, jump on such opportunities to assert these Founders as "men of the Bible," just like they are. They should realize that just because a particular Founder seemed to accept parts of Scripture doesn't mean he accepted the whole thing. Only if a Founder clearly and unequivocally stated that he accepted the Bible as inerrant and infallible should he be claimed as believing in such.

I assert, controversially, that Franklin and Jefferson actually thought some Scripture was legitimately revealed by God. This post by no means will exhaust quotations from them which could be offered to support this notion. Rather, I'll submit just a few. First in his letter to John Calder Aug. 21, 1784, Franklin wrote:

To which I may now add, that the[re are] several Things in the old Testament impossible to be given by divine Inspiration, such as the Approbation ascrib’d to the Angel of the Lord, of that abominably wicked and detestable Action of Jael the Wife of Heber the Kenite. If the rest of the Book were like that, I should rather suppose it given by Inspiration from another Quarter, and renounce the whole.

Note how Franklin does not "renounce" the entire Old Testament or Bible, just "that the[re are] several Things in the old Testament impossible to be given by divine Inspiration." This suggests that parts of the Bible possibly have been given by Divine Inspiration. Also, the context of the letter is that it is to a like minded Unitarian who likewise disagreed with the religious test in PA's Constitution of 1776 which required "the Members of Assembly to declare their belief that the whole of [the Bible] was given by divine Inspiration." In other words, Franklin didn't need to "beat around the bush" or write in code because he was speaking to another "infidel."

Peter Lillback constantly shows in his 1200 page tome on Washington's religion how GW made Biblical allusions, tracing Washington's words back to scriptural passages. While this may show that Washington held revelation in higher regard than the strict Deists did, Jefferson and Franklin likewise alluded to the Bible in their writings every bit as much. And both of them clearly rejected parts of the Bible as illegitimate.

This letter of GW's to the Hebrew Congregation of Savannah is stressed by Lillback, the Novaks' and any scholar who would like to believe Washington's God was "Biblical":

May the same wonder-working Deity, who long since delivered the Hebrews from their Egyptian oppressors, planted them in a promised land, whose providential agency has lately been conspicuous in establishing these United States as an independent nation, still continue to water them with the dews of heaven and make the inhabitants of every denomination participate in the temporal and spiritual blessings of that people whose God is Jehovah.

Yet, Thomas Jefferson says something remarkably similar in his Second Inaugural Address: "I shall need, too, the favor of that Being in whose hands we are, who led our fathers, as Israel of old, from their native land and planted them in a country flowing with all the necessaries and comforts of life...."

Or consider Franklin's call to prayer during the Constitutional Convention:

I have lived, Sir, a long time, and the longer I live, the more convincing proof I see of this truth that God Governs in the affairs of men. And if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground without his notice, is it probable that an empire can rise without his aid? We have been assured, Sir, in the sacred writings, that "except the Lord build the House they labour in vain that build it." I firmly believe this; and I also believe that without his concurring aid we shall succeed in this political building no better, than the Builders of Babel:

Though here Franklin alluded to and quoted from the Bible, elsewhere he claimed the Bible was errant, and he probably thought much of it (like the story of the Tower of Babel) was metaphorical. But he seemed open to the notion that some of it was legitimately revealed by God.

Franklin, I would argue, believed slightly closer to conventional Christianity than Jefferson, because he accepted certain supernatural things which Jefferson would have dismissed as "irrational." For instance, he accepted the turning of water into wine at cana. Franklin wrote:

We hear of the conversion of water into wine at the marriage in Cana as of a miracle. But this conversion is, through the goodness of God, made every day before our eyes. Behold the rain which descends from heaven upon our vineyards; there it enters the roots of the vines, to be changed into wine; a constant proof that God loves us, and loves to see us happy. The miracle in question was only performed to hasten the operation, under circumstances of present necessity, which required it.

He also apparently believed in bodily resurrection:

The Body of B. Franklin, Printer; like the Cover of an old Book, Its Contents torn out, And stript of its Lettering and Gilding, Lies here, Food for Worms. But the Work shall not be wholly lost; For it will, as he believ'd, appear once more, In a new & more perfect Edition, Corrected and amended By the Author.

Again, though, Franklin still wasn't a "Christian" because, among other reasons, he denied the Trinity, Incarnation, Atonement, Eternal Damnation, and inerrancy of Scripture. He also held man's reason as the ultimate determiner of truth and thought men were saved through their works not faith.

Jefferson too seemed to believe parts of the Bible were genuinely revealed. In his letter to John Adams Jan. 24, 1814 he criticizes much of Scripture as "defective and doubtful" in its history and asserts "we have a right from that cause to entertain much doubt what parts of them are genuine." This suggests he thought that parts of them are genuine. (A point first made on p. 79 in Dr. Gregg Frazer's Ph.D. dissertation; this entire post though tracks parts of his thesis). Jefferson then stated, "It is as easy to separate those parts, as to pick out diamonds from dunghills." The "diamonds" referred to what parts of Scripture are legitimately revealed, the "dunghills," the error in the Bible.

Similarly, when Jefferson took his razor to the Bible and cut out what he regarded as untruth, this suggests what remained he believed legitimate revelation. A strict Deist would just cut up the whole book.

Finally, when Jefferson argued against the Deity of Jesus, he seemingly claimed to believe John 1:1-3 was legitimate revelation, but his interpretation of that passage rejected a central tenet of Christianity: That Jesus was both man and God. This comes from his same letter to John Adams where he bitterly attacked Calvinism as "Daemonism" and stated "the day will come when the mystical generation of Jesus, by the supreme being as his father in the womb of a virgin will be classed with the fable of the generation of Minerva in the brain of Jupiter." While denying the Trinity, Jefferson wrote of John 1:1-3:

and his doctrine of the Cosmogony of the world is very clearly laid down in the 3 first verses of the 1st. chapter of John, in these words, `{en arche en o logos, kai o logos en pros ton Theon kai Theos en o logos. `otos en en arche pros ton Theon. Panta de ayto egeneto, kai choris ayto egeneto ode en, o gegonen}. Which truly translated means `in the beginning God existed, and reason (or mind) was with God, and that mind was God. This was in the beginning with God. All things were created by it, and without it was made not one thing which was made'. Yet this text, so plainly declaring the doctrine of Jesus that the world was created by the supreme, intelligent being, has been perverted by modern Christians to build up a second person of their tritheism by a mistranslation of the word {logos}. One of it's legitimate meanings indeed is `a word.' But, in that sense, it makes an unmeaning jargon: while the other meaning `reason', equally legitimate, explains rationally the eternal preexistence of God, and his creation of the world. Knowing how incomprehensible it was that `a word,' the mere action or articulation of the voice and organs of speech could create a world, they undertake to make of this articulation a second preexisting being, and ascribe to him, and not to God, the creation of the universe.

Yet, by understanding "logos" as "reason" or God's mind as opposed to a second person in the Trinity, Jefferson's interpretation of the Bible is not Christian, but rationalist.

Finally, I will offer a bit on Washington. As Peter Lillback shows, Washington often suggested that he believed in some revelation. But nowhere did he clearly assert that the Bible is inerrant or infallible. Moreover, Washington also clearly trumpeted Enlightenment rationality and liberality. So Washington's beliefs on revelation do indeed, as Lillback argues, show that he was not a strict Deist (they didn't believe in any revelation). But everything that Washington said on revelation is consistent with Jefferson's and Franklin's hybrid religion, as described above. The following from Washington's 1788 letter to MARQUIS DE CHASTELLUX is typical of a passage Dr. Lillback quotes to prove Washington wasn't a Deist: "For certainly it is more consonant to all the principles of reason and religion (natural and revealed) to replenish the earth with inhabitants, rather than to depopulate it by killing those already in existence."

Again statements like this are just as consonant with Jefferson's and Franklin's rational theism as with orthodox Christianity.

(And, to end on a lighter note, check out Washington's words to DE CHASTELLUX just before the quoted passage: They are semi-pornographic.)

Princeton University Press Features My Blurb:

On James H. Hutson's The Founders on Religion: A Book of Quotations.

"The book . . . represents, with great balance, the Founders' differing religious viewpoints. . . . All in all, this is the most balanced collection of quotations representing the Founders' religious views published thus far."--Jonathan Rowe, First Things

To see my entire review, scroll down here to the eighth book review.

Christopher Hitchens Does it Again:

Christopher Hitchens tries to claim another Founding Father as an atheist. First he did this with Jefferson. Now Franklin. Hitchens' review of Brooke Allen's book isn't all bad. And Allen's book is well written and researched even if it does have a few moderate gaffes (which one day, maybe I'll discuss). Here is the offending passage:

Of Franklin it seems almost certainly right to say that he was an atheist (Jerry Weinberger's excellent recent study Benjamin Franklin Unmasked being the best reference here), but the master tacticians of church-state separation, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, were somewhat more opaque about their beliefs.

Compare that with Franklin's own words, shortly before his death:

Here is my Creed: I believe in one God, Creator of the Universe. That He governs it by his Providence. That he ought to be worshipped. That the most acceptable Service we can render to him, is doing Good to his other Children. That the Soul of Man is immortal, and will be treated with Justice in another Life respecting its Conduct in this. These I take to be the fundamental Principles of all sound Religion, and I regard them as you do, in whatever Sect I meet with them. As to Jesus of Nazareth, my Opinion of whom you particularly desire, I think the System of Morals and his Religion as he left them to us, the best the World ever saw, or is likely to see; but I apprehend it has received various corrupting Changes, and I have with most of the present Dissenters in England, some Doubts as to his Divinity: tho' it is a Question I do not dogmatise upon, having never studied it, and think it needless to busy myself with it now, when I expect soon an Opportunity of knowing the Truth with less Trouble. I see no harm however in its being believed, if that Belief has the good Consequence as probably it has, of making his Doctrines more respected and better observed, especially as I do not perceive that the Supreme takes it amiss, by distinguishing the Believers, in his Government of the World, with any particular Marks of his Displeasure.

I wonder if Hitchens believes that Franklin and others were some kind of Straussians -- atheists who repeatedly lied about believing in God in their public and private statements.

Note also, when Franklin says that Jesus' teachings have "received various corrupting Changes," that term has specific meaning. It was coined by Franklin's friend Joseph Priestly and those corruptions were the Trinity, Incarnation, Atonement, and Plenary Inspiration of Scripture. These were central creeds of orthodox Christian Churches in which almost all founding fathers were raised and to which most -- like Jefferson, Madison, and Washington -- belonged in adult life. Religious conservatives are apt to note Washington et al. regulary attended the Anglican/Episcopal Church where he/they would hear orthodox doctrines -- the Trinity, Incarnation, the Atonement, etc. -- being preached. If he didn't believe these things, the argument goes, why would he subject himself to hearing this? Well, Jefferson and Madison, both, without question, theological unitarians, likewise attended the Anglican/Episcopal Church in whose orthodox doctrines they did not believe.

Franklin here resolves this paradox: It's because the orthodox Trinitarian Churches, like "all sound Religion," even the non-Judeo-Christian ones, teach that there is "one God, Creator of the Universe. That He governs it by his Providence. That he ought to be worshipped. That the most acceptable Service we can render to him, is doing Good to his other Children. That the Soul of Man is immortal, and will be treated with Justice in another Life respecting its Conduct in this." As long as this theistic minimum is met, it matters not that church members are taught to believe in such harmless irrationalities as the Trinity, Incarnation, and the Atonement.

While Adams and Jefferson can be quite harsh on such "corruptions of Christianity" in their letters -- indeed Jefferson in a fit of anger once wrote it would be better to be an atheist than believe in Calvin's God -- judging by Jefferson's behavior going to and never formally renouncing his membership in the Anglican/Episcopal Church, he too probably would rather see people believe in irrational Trinitarianism than in no God at all.

I have not seen in any of Washington's letters the rants against Trinitarianism that we see in Jefferson's and Adams'. Though he never endorses Trinitarianism or speaks in Trinitarian terms. Like Franklin, he probably dismissed the Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement as harmless irrationalities.

Ellis on the Religion of the Founding Fathers:

The eminent scholar Joseph Ellis has been posting this week about the Founders at the Encyclopaedia Britannica blog. Today he posts on the Founders and their religious beliefs. My biggest problem with his analysis is that he finds "diversity" of belief where, in fact, little diversity exists. Now, there was a split between the strict Deists, the orthodox Christians, and the "theistic rationalists" (a middle ground between strict Deism and orthodox Christianity with "rationalism" as the trumping element). But the key Founders -- the ones that everyone thinks of when we say the term "Founding Fathers" -- indeed the only ones that Ellis mentions here -- all believed the same: They were the "theistic rationalists." Ellis writes:

In recent decades Christian advocacy groups, prompted by motives that have been questioned by some, have felt a powerful urge to enlist the Founding Fathers in their respective congregations. But recovering the spiritual convictions of the Founders, in all their messy integrity, is not an easy task. Once again, diversity is the dominant pattern. Franklin and Jefferson were deists, Washington harbored a pantheistic sense of providential destiny, John Adams began a Congregationalist and ended a Unitarian, Hamilton was a lukewarm Anglican for most of his life but embraced a more actively Christian posture after his son died in a duel.

Jefferson and Franklin Deists? Neither of them referred to themselves as Deists in their adult life. Franklin embraced Deism as a teenager but rejected Deism his entire adult life. Both Franklin and Jefferson, contra the Deists, invoked an active, personal God. Ellis apparently is unaware that Adams' Congregation preached Unitarianism as of 1750 and Adams testified being one since a teenager.

When one examines the specific doctrines in which each of the five key Founders Ellis invokes believed, it turns out that little difference can be found between Jefferson's and Franklin's "Deism," Adams' "Unitarianism," Washington's "pantheistic sense of providential destiny," and Hamilton's "lukewarm Anglicanism."